Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BELGRADE1590
2006-09-29 15:49:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Belgrade
Cable title:  

SERBIA: PARLIAMENT SET TO APPROVE CONSTITUTION;

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PREL KDEM SR YI MW 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BELGRADE 001590 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

EUR FOR DAS DICARLO AND SCE HOH; S/WCI FOR AMB WILLIAMSON;
USUN FOR SHUFLETOWSKI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/28/2006
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL KDEM SR YI MW
SUBJECT: SERBIA: PARLIAMENT SET TO APPROVE CONSTITUTION;
POSSIBLE ELECTIONS BEFORE YEAR END

REF: BELGRADE 1556

Classified By: AMBASSADOR MICHAEL C. POLT PER REASONS 1.4 (B) and (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BELGRADE 001590

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

EUR FOR DAS DICARLO AND SCE HOH; S/WCI FOR AMB WILLIAMSON;
USUN FOR SHUFLETOWSKI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/28/2006
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL KDEM SR YI MW
SUBJECT: SERBIA: PARLIAMENT SET TO APPROVE CONSTITUTION;
POSSIBLE ELECTIONS BEFORE YEAR END

REF: BELGRADE 1556

Classified By: AMBASSADOR MICHAEL C. POLT PER REASONS 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: It appears that all major political parties
in Serbia are close to agreement on a package for approving
the constitution in a national referendum (late October/early
November) with follow up elections before the end of the
year. President Tadic is supporting the referendum, despite
some misgivings, and seeking to nail down agreement for
concurrent (presidential and parliamentary) elections on
December 10, with a Christmas Eve second presidential round.
While the election date cannot be legally set until after the
results of the referendum are known, Kostunica, Tadic, and
leaders of other democratic forces are intent on holding
elections before year end -- i.e., before the expiry of the
Contact Group's target deadline for finalizing Kosovo's final
status.


2. (C) Given the strong constitutional language about Kosovo
as an "integral part of Serbia," the referendum is likely to
be cast, at least in part, as a vote on Kosovo forever
remaining a part of Serbia. The GOS hopes this will inoculate
it from charges of having "lost" Kosovo. The
behind-closed-doors nature of the constitutional preparations
has prompted condemnation from progressive political parties
and NGOs about the secrecy of the discussions. The same
organizations are also concerned about certain provisions
(Kosovo, minority rights, regional autonomy) and are already
talking about a referendum boycott. Ultimately, however, the
referendum's success will depend more on consensus among the
major political parties than the 50 percent plus one
participation requirement. END SUMMARY.

Parties Close to Agreement on Constitution
--------------


3. (C) An all-night session of the Serbian parliament
(9/28-29) suggests that the scenario Tadic presented to A/S
Fried earlier in the week -- Constitutional referendum in

early November, elections in December -- may in fact be
holding (reftel). In the wee hours of 9/29, all deputy
groups approved (for vote) the final draft text of the
constitution. Deputies also changed the house rules to allow
Parliament to be in session any day of the week, preserving
the possibility of a Saturday session during which the full
Parliament could adopt the constitution, and pass the
Constitutional Law setting a referendum for October 29. The
government will have to act quickly: it will likely approve
the draft in special session today, and send it back to the
Constitutional Commission, headed by Speaker of the
Parliament Predrag Markovic. After the Commission blesses it,
fifty deputies can request Saturday's special session.


4. (C) While reportedly skeptical about the need and wisdom
of a constitutional referendum, Tadic appears to have agreed
in exchange for getting Kostunica on board for early
elections. The President has been lobbying for elections for
some time to place the democratic forces in a stronger
position before Kosovo final status. Tadic's point man in the
constitutional negotiation and one of its main drafters,
Dragor Hiber (DS),has repeatedly assured us that language
was being finalized and that the constitution would soon be
ready for a parliamentary vote. Media and other sources have
been speculating on Kostunica's efforts to work out a deal
with the SRS and the DS on the final constitutional issues
and the electoral timetable. While Kostunica has been
publicly supportive of a constitutional referendum this year,
he has said nothing specific about election dates which
seemed to shift daily between December and March of next
year.


5. (C) Kostunica's hand may have been forced by Finance
Minister Dinkic and his G-17 party. Dinkic's very public
pledge to leave the government on October 1, barring progress
on the Mladic front that would reopen SAA talks with the EU,
presented the possibility that Dinkic could suddenly bring
down the government. The accelerated timetable for elections
would allow the government to forestall the Dinkic problem
and eliminate the need to appoint a new Foreign Minister, a
key demand of the Socialist Party, which has sought to remove

BELGRADE 00001590 002 OF 003


the current Minister and its personal nemesis, Vuk Draskovic.
The constitutional/election package could theoretically
allow Dinkic and the other G-17 ministers to remain as
caretaker ministers after their resignations, which are
expected to be officially sent to the government today
(September 29). Minister Draskovic would also keep his
position until elections, and his party's critical
seats--which push the coalition over the majority
threshold--would remain in Kostunica's coalition.


6. (C) The rules for setting the constitutional and electoral
timetable are from a Milosevic-era law on changing the
constitution, which requires a two-thirds majority in
parliament, and majority support in a national referendum of
fifty percent plus one of the voting population. Given the
success of the Parliament's all-night session, Kostunica
should have no problem getting the 167 votes out of the
250-seat parliament. A few small parties might complicate the
session on Saturday, but in reality the key parties are
reportedly on board. The DS, which has been boycotting the
Parliament since the beginning of the year, will join the
special session in support of the constitution. There is
even an outside chance that Kostunica could accept Dinkic's
resignation, and name a DS finance minister, substituting the
DS for the G-17 right before the elections. (Comment: There
are reports that Kostunica is fed up with Dinkic and would
like nothing better than to kick him out of the government,
seriously undermining the G-17 's prospects in elections. End
Comment)

CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM AND FOLLOW-ON ELECTIONS
-------------- --------------


7. (SBU) According to the same law, Kostunica then has 15-45
days to hold a public referendum on the constitution. Embassy
sources claim that the parliament will set the referendum on
October 29. In order to pass, the referendum must get support
from 50 percent plus 1 of the voting population. As in the
past, we expect authorities here will not count the 1.5
million voters in Kosovo in calculating the participation
requirements but will court and count Serb votes in Kosovo.
(Note: In past elections, Serbs in Kosovo have been allowed
to vote but our recollection is that, apart from security,
UNMIK and OSCE did not assist in organizing the effort. End
Note) If the Constitution gets approved by at least 3.3
million voters, the results are communicated back to the
parliament and the Speaker can then announce a date for
elections. If the referendum fails, then the Parliament
would have to take exceptional action, most likely
designating the follow-on election as one for a
Constitutional Assembly, which could transition immediately
into a regular parliament once a new constitution was
adopted.


8. (C) While there is increasing evidence that the parties
are lining up behind a December election, reports are still
drifting in that the Radicals may try to delay them until
next year. (The Radicals have less of an incentive for early
elections and would probably prefer that elections be held
AFTER a Kosovo status decision.) We do not expect that the
Constitutional law will have any provision suggesting a date
for follow-on elections before the results of the referendum
are known, but in today's Serbia nothing is impossible: the
rules tend to be somewhat flexible (e.g., the change in the
House rules last night). A joint statement by Kostunica and
Tadic in support of a December timeline would, however, be a
strong signal that the timetable is set. Negotiations behind
the scenes continue: the Radicals are said to be demanding a
change in the local election law (Mayors no longer elected
directly) that would allow local elections to be held
concurrently with the Presidential and Parliamentary polls or
shortly thereafter. Increasingly, it looks like everything
may fall in place for at least Presidential and Parliamentary
elections in December.

Referendum on Kosovo?
--------------

9. (C) Although Kosovo plays a small part in the draft
Constitution, political leaders here are already ramping up
public support for the constitutional referendum by implying
it is a referendum on Kosovo. Some have begun to protest the

BELGRADE 00001590 003 OF 003


way in which the Constitution is being adopted. Democrats in
Vojvodina are reported to have lost out on a number of
significant autonomy issues, with Kostunica cutting a
separate deal with the Hungarian minority community.
Pro-Autonomy and other minority parties probably will object
to certain provisions and the lack of adequate debate, and
may even call for a boycott of the referendum. It is
unlikely however that a constitutional referendum supported
by all of the major political parties will fail. Regardless
of the final vote count it will be the parties themselves
that police the balloting through the electoral commission.
More than one party has pointed out the parties' shared
interest in ensuring that the referendum is successful. More
importantly, the accelerated timetable will likely increase
voter fatigue and decrease voter turnout for follow-on
elections, which could cause serious problems for the
democrats and increase the importance of an aggressive Get
Out The Vote (GOTV) effort.


10. (C) Although we have yet to see the finished draft, we
have pieced together the likely language in several important
provisions. Kosovo is mentioned in the preamble, which
states essentially that Kosovo is an autonomous province
within the sovereign state of Serbia and that all state
bodies have the "constitutional obligation to represent and
protect the state interests of Serbia in Kosovo." Hiber
claimed that this statement is for domestic consumption only
and that because it is in the preamble, it is unlikely to be
held up as legally binding by the Serbian constitutional
court. In the body of the constitution, the territorial
organization articles state Kosovo is an autonomous province
of Serbia with substantial authority to be defined by a later
law. The language also states that any changes in the status
of autonomous provinces (not specifically Kosovo) must be
determined by Parliament and then the people of Serbia
through a referendum, similar to a constitutional amendment.
Another provision now requires a supermajority and referendum
to approve a change in Serbia's borders. These points leave
the door open for Belgrade to claim any new resolution by the
UN on Kosovo final status would need to be approved through
public referendum and parliamentary resolution.


11. (C) COMMENT: Any announcement of a Kosovo outcome before
the referendum on the new constitution (late October, early
November) would focus discussion on that issue. In such a
campaign, a huge turnout could be interpreted as popular
support for a nationalist hard line position. The
not-to-be-excluded possibility is that the referendum and the
Kosovo issue could elicit a giant yawn, making the political
parties' determination to achieve the 50% plus 1 threshold --
by hook or crook -- a bit harder to make believable. It is
possible that the date for elections will not be formally
locked in until after the referendum.


12. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: It appears that both Tadic and
Kostunica now hope to have elections before the final
decision of Kosovo final status. We are already beginning to
see high level commentary trying to shape public
expectations. The Foreign Minister in an interview to
Belgrade daily Beta, talked about a "Plan B" for Kosovo that
would include a UN resolution that would neither mention
Kosovo's independence nor Serbia's sovereignty. Belgrade may
be calculating that Russia will either help deliver that
"non-definitive" result or at the very least delay the UNSC
vote with the help of those in the international community
who want to postpone the decision on Kosovo until after
Serbian elections.


13. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: Even if Belgrade politicians are
successful in obtaining voter turnout for the referendum,
getting an apathetic Serbian public out to vote again six
weeks later in a general wintertime election and then two
weeks later in a presidential second round could be too tall
an order for the democrats. If the elections move along this
timetable, Tadic and the DS may have created difficult
conditions for a democratic campaign. At a minimum the
accelerated timetable will increase the importance of our
GOTV campaign. We will be reporting on that effort
separately in the days and weeks ahead.
POLT