BELGRADE'S RESPONSE TO STATE 138362 (C-RE6-01248)

C O N F I D E N T I A L BELGRADE 001554

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/26/2016
TAGS: PINR PBTS PGOV PHUM PNAT PREL MW YI SR
SUBJECT: BELGRADE'S RESPONSE TO STATE 138362 (C-RE6-01248)

REF: SECSTATE 138362

Classified By: AMBASSADOR MICHAEL C. POLT FOR REASONS 1.4B AND D


1. (U) The following is Embassy Belgrade's response to INR's
questions in reftel.


2. (C) Response follows (reftel's questions in caps):


A. (C) WHAT IS THE NATURE OF KOSTUNICA AND TADIC'S
RELATIONSHIP?

(C) The President and Prime Minister continue to balance
their dislike for each other with their mutual need for basic
cooperation by democratic forces to survive an election. As
we approach the endgame on Kosovo, they appear to be more
willing to work together and speak from the same
uncompromising position. Increasingly, they have referenced
similar points in public (the current insecurity for Serbs in
Kosovo, no acceptance of an independent Kosovo, no acceptance
for a Kosovo army). Independence for Kosovo would solidify
this cooperation as both men seek political cover from
accusations that they "lost Kosovo"; it might also open the
door to more competitive jingoism. In general, both men
delink personal animosity from political calculus, though
there is quite a bit of suspicion and distrust right below
the surface.


B. (C) HOW WILL KOSTUNICA REACT TO TADIC AS COMMANDER AND
CHIEF OF THE SERBIAN MILITARY? WILL HE ATTEMPT TO ASSERT
CONTROL THROUGH THE DEFENSE MINISTRY? WILL THERE BE A
MOVEMENT FOR A NEW SUPREME DEFENSE COUNCIL IN WHICH POWER IS
SHARED AMONG MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT?

(C) Kostunica is not likely to directly challenge Tadic's
statutory role as Commander and Chief of the Serbian military
) he explicitly acknowledged it in a meeting with the
Ambassador in mid-August. It is likely that both parties
will use the constitutional process to redefine the CinC
authorities for the armed forces and the MoD's relationship
to the government and president, respectively.

(C) Kostunica is, though, apparently blocking Tadic's
attempts to name a politically loyal, reformist CHOD (Zdravko
Ponos) ) but more likely due to policy differences over the
pace and scope of military reform than as an attack on
Tadic's authorities. There was some talk in the late spring
about constituting a bi-cephalous national security council,
but Tadic voiced opposition and the proposal does not seem to
have gone anywhere.

(C) In addition, the PM will likely look for ways to suggest
his own authorities as he did with his comments and media
speculation on his supposed "control" of specialized
anti-terrorism units. If that particular example is
indicative, Tadic will not react too strongly on attempted
inroads on his role as commander in chief but nstead seek to
express his concern behind the scenes and perhaps directly to
the Minister of Defene. We expect Kostunica will continue
to look fo ways to carve out some role on the defense side) the details on how
he will do that are likely to come out
in the discussion of the package of legislation (in late
September or October) that will be required to confirm and
consolidate the transition from State Union to the Serbian
Republic.


C. (C) GIVEN THE ANIMOSITY BETWEEN KOSTUNICA AND
DJUKANOVIC, WHAT WILL FUTURE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO
GOVERNMENTS BE LIKE?

(C) While Kostunica was clearly upset about the outcome of
the referendum; Tadic's more constructive efforts to keep
relations on an even keel have been largely successful. Dire
predictions about Serbia not recognizing Montenegro or the
countless problems on "practical issues," e.g. student
status, pensions, etc. that were likely to arise have not
panned out. Tadic has a significant say on foreign affairs
and the details of diplomatic relations and appears to be
quite committed to ensuring that the relationship is, at the
very least, formal and correct. His Montenegrin counterpart,
Vujanovic, has been equally constructive and restrained.
There are continuing reports that Kostunica maintains close
links with the Serb opposition in Montenegro and that
Djukanovic may be looking for ways to counter that
involvement. (Note: This cable does not incorporate US
Office Podgorica's views. End Note.) There is no sign in
Belgrade of any significant problems on the horizon between
Podgorica and Belgrade.


D. (C) WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
KOSTUNICA AND KOSOVO SERB HARDLINERS MARKO JAKSIC AND MILAN
IVANOVIC?
(C) Jaksic is a leader in the Kosovo chapter of the DSS and
likely maintains a close working relationship with Kostunica
through the Head of the CCK and DSS VP Raskovic Ivic.
Ivanovic is more of a hired gun available to whoever is
willing to pay ) he worked at various points for Milosevic
(against Kostunica),for DOS (with Covic) and now for
Kostunica. We have certainly never seen and would be
surprised if Kostunica were to make any detailed comment
restraining local Serb leaders in Kosovo. More likely he
works through the security services and through numerous

private channels to "monitor and manage" the local
environment. Recent reports suggested that CG pressure about
problems in Northern Kosovo had prompted some such quiet
expressions of concern from Belgrade resulting in some toning
down of Kosovo Serb rhetoric (at least before the latest
controversy about Ahtisaari's alleged remarks and the
grenade-throwing incident in North Mitrovica). We continue
to hear reports that both Jaksic and Ivanovic have lined up
apartments and business interests in Belgrade, suggesting
considerable coaching rather then a romantic (or spontaneous)
fight for their beloved homeland. We expect the PM has and
will continue to use Jaksic and Ivanovic to reinforce his
expressed commitment to stand up for Serb rights ) a kind of
pressure valve for directing unhappiness in northern Kosovo
away from Belgrade and towards the international community.


(C) WHAT DEGREE OF CONTROL, IF ANY, DOES KOSTUNICA AND HIS
ADVISERS EXERT OVER HARDLINERS IN THE NORTH OR THEIR
ORGANIZATIONS, SUCH AS THE SERB NATIONAL COUNCIL (SNV) AND
THE ASSOCIATION OF SERB MUNICIPALITIES AND SETTLEMENTS(ASMS)?


(C) In the past the CCK has provided significant funds,
including through the hospital in Mitrovica and other
channels, in support of the SNV and the ASMS. It is not
clear, however, exactly how effective the CCK is on the
ground. The SNV and the ASMS exploit their links to Belgrade
and prey on the fears and frustrations of the Serb community
in Kosovo, which looks to Belgrade for protection and
financial support. The SNV and the ASMS are neither
independent from Belgrade nor carefully controlled pawns of
the CKK/DSS. They are both political actors and vehicles for
patronage and corruption.

(C) DO ANY OTHER SERBIAN POLITICAL LEADERS HAVE INFLUENCE
OVER HARDLINE KOSOVO SERB LEADERS?

(C) The Socialists have traditionally fared better then the
Radicals in Kosovo, probably due to Milosevic's legacy.
Hardline Kosovo Serbs seem content with the maneuvering room
and resources they are receiving. We do not see any sign
from Belgrade that other political leaders are challenging
that relationship. There is some symbiosis here: Kostunica
sees political benefit from having DSS members like Jaksic
represent a strong anti-independence view rather than ceding
that role to the SRS or other affiliated group.

(C) We have not seen the SRS, SPS or other parties seek any
tangible control over Kosovo Serb leaders. We would expect
they cannot offer similar resources or protection. Belgrade
is perceived as the critical, and perhaps only, patron. The
SRS and SPS may, however, seek to exploit the situation if
Kostunica is seen as weak and/or a failure by the Serbian
electorate.


E. (C) WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN KOSTUNICA AND THE
SERBIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH (SPC)?

(C) Kostunica continues to have strong ties with the SPC.
Bishop Amfilohije is the uncle of Kostunica's wife and Bishop
Irinej of Backa is known to be an active participant in
internal government discussions on nationalist issues.

(C) In general, we still see a split among the clergy on
Kosovo between Bishop Artemije and Bishop Teodosije with the
former advocating a hardline stance supported with
allegatio;;"Islamic Jihadism" among Kosovo Albanians, and
the latter who wants to prepare the SPC for a future in
Kosovo regardless of status. Artemije brought his message of
fiery rhetoric and intolerance to the US when he led a
Serbian National Congress delegation in July, which CCK
director Raskovic-Ivic confirmed to us was arranged in
consultation with the GOS. After that visit, Artemije
requested a meeting with the Ambassador, who very directly
challenged him on the approach and his unhelpful and
un-Christian behavior. The PM still views SPC deviation from
GOS policy as a potential "Trojan horse" for Kosovo
independence and overall weakness in Serbia's case.

(C) WHAT DEGREE OF INFLUENCE DOES HE HAVE ON THEIR THINKING?

(C) Kostunica and the SPC hardliners currently have the same
outlook on Kosovo independence, which makes it hard to tell
if there is any direct influence. He does not appear
bothered by Teodosije to the level of making comments aimed
specifically at the moderate Bishop and his supporters.
Nevertheless, the PM went to Gracanica on Vidovdan and
maintains close ties with the large part of the SPC which
supports his inflexible stance on Kosovo.


F. (C) WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SPC AND KOSOVO
SERB LEADERS?

(C) USOP is best placed to comment.

End response to reftel.
POLT