SERBIA: EU/UNOSEK REP LEHNE VENTURES ON SLIPPING

C O N F I D E N T I A L BELGRADE 001382

SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D COPY- ADDRESSEE

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/29/2006
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL SR YI MW
SUBJECT: SERBIA: EU/UNOSEK REP LEHNE VENTURES ON SLIPPING
KOSOVO TIME TABLE


Classified By: AMBASSADOR MICHAEL C. POLT PER REASONS 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (C) Summary: Recent discussions in Belgrade with visiting
EU officials attached to the UNOSEK negotiations suggest some
openness in Brussels to extending the Kosovo end-game
calendar well into 2007 in response to alleged reports of
imminent Tadic-Kostunica agreement on a Serbian electoral
timetable. Tadic has subsequently vehemently denied any such
agreement in a direct conversation with the Ambassador. End
Summary


2. (C) EU representative to UNOSEK Stefan Lehne gave the
Ambassador a read out of his August 29 meetings with G17
Finance Minister Mladen Dinkic and DS point man in the
ongoing, behind-the-scenes negotiation on a new constitution
Dragor Hiber. According to Lehne, Dinkic and Hiber confirmed
separately that Tadic and Kostunica will soon present a joint
strategy &signed in blood8 that will set forth a timeline
calling for the Constitution to be presented in December, a
referendum for its adoption in February and parliamentary
elections in May 2007. Under the agreement, Kostunica would
remain PM and Tadic the President with the rest of the GOS
determined by election results. Regarding the Kosovo status
timeline, this joint strategy would include a diplomatic
press of the Contact Group and other states to delay decision
on Kosovo status until June 2007, after the proposed
elections. The Ambassador spoke to President Tadic directly
shortly after the Lehne readout who asserted that there was
no, repeat no, truth to such an alleged agreement.


3. (C) While Lehne reported that Dinkic had told EU
Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn that he remains committed
to leaving the GOS and precipitating new elections (which he
says the Radicals will win) if SAA talks are not restarted
(which, if started,he says will put Serbia in better position
economically and politically to deal with Kosovo and return a
democratic government in elections in 2007),he observed that
it would not make sense for him to leave the government early
if there were a DS-DSS deal on an electoral timetable.


4. (C) Lehne said Hiber reports &enormous progress8 on the
Constitution negotiations with the only major point of
disagreeement being the modality of adoption (either a
referendum or a special election of a &constitutional
assembly8 which would transition into a new Parliament).
Lehne said Hiber told him Kosovo would be mentioned in the
Constitution through a reference to international supervision
under UNSC 1244, but did not say whether this would change if
another resolution supersedes 1244.


5. (C) Lehne thought that some EU capitals (and likely the
Russians) might be drawn to a delay plan as a way of allowing
both a resolution in Kosovo and democratic victory in Serbia.
Lehne agreed this delay would be a hard sell to the
Albanians, even if it came from a united CG and UNOSEK. He
acknowledged that ICTY cooperation would be a &victim of the
exercise8 and said he had talked to Carla Del Ponte who said
her plan to report to the UNSC on September 15 was ¬
fixed.8 He also acknowledged any immediate incentive to
deliver Mladic would be lost.


6. (C) Comment: Tadic told the Ambassador most emphatically
that no such deal had been agreed and that he had no idea
where Dinkic had gotten this news he was receiving for the
first time from the American Ambassador. A Tadic staffer
later called the DCM to assure him that Lehne's people had
misunderstood and that Tadic's position on elections was an
old one: elections &way before8 May 2007, and that there
was no agreement from Kostunica. (We have yet to get a
read-out of Tadic,s discussion with Kostuinca on 8/28 at
which they reportedly went over &the big package8 of
political issues.) Despite this categorical denial, Lehne's
reaction to Dinkic's false information unfortunately points
to a potential wobbly EU response ) and one that we should
strongly discourage ) to such a proposal. Sch an approach
would be a blatant attempt by theSerbs to try to divide the
Contact Group. Some in Belgrad might even hope that a delay
by the CGwould incite Albanian violence, weakening IC
reslve to grant independence. A truly bad ida that for now
at least has no legs. End Comment
MOORE