SERBIA: PM KOSTUNICA NOT LETTING UP ON KOSOVO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 001381

SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D COPY- ADDRESSEE

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/29/2006
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL SR YI MW
SUBJECT: SERBIA: PM KOSTUNICA NOT LETTING UP ON KOSOVO


BELGRADE 00001381 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: AMBASSADOR MICHAEL C. POLT PER REASONS 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (C) Summary: The Ambassador met with PM Kostunica on
August 29 to review priority issues after the Serbian
government,s August recess. He acknowledged the PM,s
recent personal address to the nation on Mladic (and several
other positive developments) but pressed Kostunica to
explicitly call for Mladic,s arrest and to be much more
visibly involved in the effort. The Ambassador strongly
urged the PM to defuse the ongoing controversy over
Ahtisaari,s alleged remarks (septel) and asked about
Kostunica,s earlier assurances that there would be no GoS
support for partition, noting U.S./IC determination to act
decisively in response to provocations on the ground.
Kostunica reaffirmed his opposition to partition but
reiterated his continued determination to fight an
independence outcome both at home (via political and legal
means) and in Serbia,s ongoing diplomatic efforts. End
Summary


2. (U) PM Kostunica met with Ambassador Polt on August 29,
in his private office for a discussion of several priority
issues. Kostunica mfa advisor Protic and Embassy polcouns
also attended.

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Some Progress but(
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3. (C) The Ambassador noted several positive recent
developments including progress in our negotiations on a new
embassy site, and the announcement of indictments in the
investigation of the murder of the amcit Bytyqi brothers, and
congratulated the PM on the successful sale of the Mobtel
cellular telephone company to a Norwegian company. Kostunica
expressed his satisfaction with the outcome of the sale on
many levels: in dollar terms, in terms of clarifying
ownership, and with respect to strengthening ties with a
European country with which Serbia enjoyed close political
and cultural links.

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More Needed on ICTY
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4. (C) The Ambassador also acknowledged Kostunica,s recent
public comments(August 25) on the heightened effort to locate
and transfer ICTY indictee Mladic. While it was certainly a
step in the right direction, he urged Kostunica to call
explicitly for Mladic,s arrest and to consider other ways to
visibly engage in the heightened effort. The Ambassador
shared the U.S.-produced wanted poster for Mladic,s arrest
and asked Kostunica to consider having it posted at Ministry
of Interior (MUP) installations around Serbia. The PM
downplayed the importance of using the &arrest8 word ) he
claimed he had used it (indirectly) and would look to
specifically saying it &at the next opportunity.8 As for
the wanted posters, he expressed skepticism (as he has
countless times in the past) that it would send the right
message, but he promised to take it under consideration. The
important thing, said Kostunica, was that the public had
begun to understand that one man could not hold the country
hostage.

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Ambassador: Stop Attacking Ahtisaari
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5. (C) The Ambassador lamented the recent grenade attack in
Northern Mitrovica, among other incidents, noting full U.S.
support for bringing the perpetrators to justice. Kostunica
said the attack was just the latest in a series of attacks
against Serbs, and doubted that the investigation would yield
any results, observing that even in the few cases where
arrests had been made (for attacks against Serbs),the
culprits were always released for lack of evidence. The
Ambassador noted the unhelpfulness of some of the public
statements linking the attack to Ahtisaari and his team and
urged Kostunica to defuse the issue related to his alleged
remarks about collective guilt. Ahtisaari retained the full
confidence of the international community and it was
counterproductive for Serbia to attack his credibility,
particularly during a trip to Kosovo where he was pressing on
Serb priorities.

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Kostunica on Ahtisaari
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6. (C) Kostunica acknowledged the need to deal with
Ahtisaari given his central role in the status process, but
lamented the lack of personal engagement. "We were told that
there would be an aggressive schedule for talks in August but
there was no follow up after meetings on the 7th and 8th.
Where was the big push?" It was particularly bothersome,
observed Kostunica, that instead of seeking to clarify his
remarks quickly and quietly, Ahtisaari had ignored
Belgrade,s official complaint and then responded publicly in
a way that complicated the situation in Serbia even more.
&He only answers to himself,8 said Kostunica, contrasting
the lack of communication with Ahtisaari to his difficult but
personal and direct relationship with EU High Rep Solana. In
any case, Kostunica said he was not surprised at Ahtisaari's
attitude, since he had pre-judged Kosovo independence from
the onset. The Ambassador noted that Ahtisaari,s comments
about &collective responsibility8 (as opposed to guilt)
were neither dramatic nor inappropriate and urged the PM to
drop the issue.

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Kosovo ) Oppose Partition but PM Not Giving Up on Outcome
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7. (C) The Ambassador raised two important concerns that had
a bearing on the outcome of the Kosovo talks and the likely
reaction to independence. He recalled Kostunica,s earlier
assurances that he would not support partition in any way,
and noted U.S. resolve, shared by others in the Contact
Group, to ensure against any post-settlement violence. Would
the GoS work closely with us at all levels to ensure there
were no problems? Kostunica said that while Serbia strictly
respected the CG principles on the status talks, there would
be no change in Serbia,s opposition to an independence
outcome. The PM said he continued to doubt that independence
would be the outcome ) there were too many complications.
Kosovo was part of Serbia and would be recognized as such in
the constitution; partition made no sense. As for possible
violence, there had been no attacks (in the UNMIK era) by
Serbs against Albanians ) only Serbs had suffered. Of
course, he was committed to guarding against such violence.

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Not Promising on CHOD ) SOFA Maybe
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8. (C) Ambassador Polt urged Kostunica to support quick
resolution of military command issues, including the
appointment of General Ponos as Chief of Staff. Kostunica
assured the Ambassador that he fully accepted President
Tadic's constitutional authority as civilian
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. The Ambassador added
that it was crucial that Serbia reassure on civilian and
military unity of command. Kostunica agreed, but noted the
&need for a new law to confirm procedures and processes
before moving to personalities.8 It was strange, he
observed, that the U.S. seemed to know more about Ponos then
he did. He had never met him personally and knew little
about his military preparation. In response to the
Ambassador,s request to quickly approve the bilateral Status
of Forces Agreement (SOFA),Kostunica said it would be taken
up in the Government,s session on Thursday, August 31.
(Kostunica did not explicitly say that it would be approved.)

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Comment
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9. (C) Kostunica appeared rested and relaxed. He was not
combative on Kosovo or the Mladic effort. But clearly he has
no intention of relaxing Serbia,s strong opposition to an
independence outcome in the Kosovo status talks, suggesting
even that he is ready for the endgame (the fight with
Ahtisaari is not encouraging in that regard). On the ICTY
front he has taken a few more steps, but as always has
stopped short of really committing all his political power.
He can do much more. Kostunica met with Tadic the evening of
8/28 on the package of priority issues but he offered no
details during our discussion. We will seek a read-out from
Tadic in the coming days but it does not appear that they
agreed to a quick fix on the pending legislative package
required to formalize the transition from State Union to
Republic of Serbia. We are not optimistic that Ponos will be
appinted Chief of Staff before Tadic,s trip to the U..; we
are more encouraged, however, on approval f the SOFA at the
government,s 8/31 meeting. En Comment
MOORE