ICTY ACTION PLAN UPDATE #4; AUGUST 25, 2006

S E C R E T BELGRADE 001371

SIPDIS

NOFORN

SIPDIS
STATE FOR SWCI

E.O. 12958: DECL: CLOSURE OF ICTY
TAGS: ICTY PREL PROG PHUM SR
SUBJECT: ICTY ACTION PLAN UPDATE #4; AUGUST 25, 2006

REF: BELGRADE 1325 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador Michael C. Polt, reasons 1.4 (b,c,d)

This cable describes GoS ICTY Action Plan Implementation as
of August 25, 2006.

SUMMARY


1. (c) This week saw the most action to date on the media
campaign portion of the Action Plan. Kotunica made a public
statement about Serbia's reolve to hand over Mladic to The
Hague - if he isfound on the teritory of Serbia. While the
PM' statements were welcome, we have continued to pus him
to be more explicit on arrest and to sustin his personal
engagement in a stepped up campaign (septel). Operationally,
the GoS is expressing confidence that they may see some
results in the near future on fugitive indictees - though not
on Mladic. End summary.

ACTIONS


2. (s) Co-Action Plan coordinator Rasim Ljajic told emboffs
during their weekly Action Plan implementation briefing that
the GoS is working on three tracks now ) Hadzic, Tolimir,
and Mladic. Regarding Hadzic, he said the GoS is going after
his financiers in Novi Sad, leaning particularly hard on one
individual to force him to talk or go bankrupt. (NFI).


3. (s) Regarding Tolimir, he said they were seeing
additional progress over what was reported last week. He
said BIA chief Rade Bulatovic told him something could happen
very soon. He noted Tolimir's wife had been extremely well
briefed on communications procedures, keeping very tight rein
on her cellphone and landline conversations, making only one
small mistake in the past two years (NFI).


4. (s) Regarding Mladic, he said they had recently expanded
surveillance measures against people known or suspected of
being in Mladic's new support network (ref) ) to include
some number of active military officers. All the subjects
under surveillance are in Belgrade. He said he thought
arresting the previous supporters had been a mistake, as it
drove the network underground and forced Mladic to use new
faces.

MEDIA PLAN


5. (c) Ljajic was intensely interested in the Embassy's
reaction to the Kostunica statement. Emboffs told him that
this was a generally positive step, but not entirely
sufficient. He asked what the international community still
needed to hear. Emboffs responded that, while unable to
speak for all interested parties, at least three main changes
to Kostunica's approach would be helpful: first, he should
eliminate the qualifiers, stopping at the need to apprehend
Mladic and not adding the shopworn "if found on the territory
of Serbia". Second, Kostunica should explicitly say Mladic
will be arrested - saying Serbia is committed to "hand him
over" to The Hague (local media translated it as "extradite")
does not signal to Serbia's people or its law enforcement and
intelligence communities that the government will and should
arrest him. Finally, the PM and other government
spokespeople should stop drawing parallels between Mladic and
Dudakovic. The Action Plan is about Hague indictees,
especially Mladic, and that ) and that alone ) needs to be
the focus of the statements. Emboffs also reiterated that
the PM's message would only register through repetition ) we
needed to see a concerted, week-in week-out campaign, not
just a one-off. Ljajic seemed to take the points seriously.
(Note Ambassador raised the issue directly with PM Kostunica
in a 8/29 meeting ) see septel. End Note)

OTHER ISSUES


6. (s/nf) Ljajic said he talked to del Ponte by video link
on August 23, and she told him (in strictest confidence, so
please protect) she would not give a report to the EU in
September. She told him she could not give a positive report
now due to lack of progress to date, but thought giving a
negative report would be counter-productive - i.e., would
"de-motivate" the operational people who, she said (according
to Ljajic),seemed to be making more serious efforts. She
told Ljajic she would not issue a positive report until
Mladic was located (NOTE: not captured),and preferred to
stay quiet until that time to allow Bulatovic and other
operational professionals to do their jobs. Ljajic said they
discussed Dinkic,s dilemma, about claiming he would quit the
government - thereby forcing new elections - if talks didn't
restart by October 1. Ljajic surmised that, if there was
some substantial movement (emboffs inferred that to mean
apprehension of Tolimir or Hadzic) in the meantime, that
might give Dinkic enough political cover to stay his decision
temporarily.

COMMENT


7. (c) The statements we saw on the 25th were the most
direct so far, and were delivered live by Kostunica himself -
not through a government spokesperson. We believe this to be
a necessary, but not sufficient, element to a successful
media campaign - a campaign that should ideally include the
Serbian equivalent of an Oval Office address from Kostunica
to the Serbian people. As for Dinkic, he and other G-17 Plus
senior officials continue to be adamant that they will
withdraw support from the government if SAA talks do not
resume by October 1. Since the EU sounds increasingly
intransigent on the matter, and with del Ponte seemingly
unprepared to issue a report absent solid information on
Mladic, Dinkic may soon find his hand forced.
MOORE