ICTY ACTION PLAN UPDATE NUMBER 2: AUGUST 11, 2006

C O N F I D E N T I A L BELGRADE 001324

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: CLOSURE OF ICTY
TAGS: ICTY PREL PGOV PHUM SR
SUBJECT: ICTY ACTION PLAN UPDATE NUMBER 2: AUGUST 11, 2006


Classified By: Ambassador Michael Polt, reasons 1.4 (b,d)

Summary

This cable describes GoS ICTY Action Plan implementation as
of August 11, 2006.


1. (c) Our second meeting with Action Plan coordinator
Rasim Ljajic (and an earlier meeting with operational
coordinator Vladimir Vukcevic) revealed modest progress in
setting up the infrastructure for the Action Plan, but not a
great deal more action. The media side of the plan is still
woefully lacking - no one in the government has said anything
significant about the need to bring in Mladic since the plan
was launched July 17. We will continue to push Ljajic to
encourage Kostunica to take a leadership role in the effort,
and to push Vukcevic to exercise more of his authorities as
operational coordinator. End summary.

Actions


2. (c) Ljajic told Emboffs in a weekly meeting August 11
that the GoS had blocked an attempt by Mladic's
brother-in-law, (FNU) Jegic, to acquire Serbian citizenship
(Jegic lives in Serbia but comes from RS). He said the GoS
had shared with ICTY all its case files on the Mladic
investigation, including statements by Tomic and others and
interrogation transcripts from Djogo and others. He said the
GoS had made a decision to "immediately act" on any intel
provided by ICTY, to include ICTY officials in the
operations, and to film the activities. He said the most
recent such raid was "an embarrassment," as MUP (acting on
ICTY intel passed on by Bosnian intel, says Ljajic) made a
surprise raid on a poor ) and very surprised ) family of
four in an apartment in Novi Beograd. Finally, he said the
AP team still intends to bring in Tomic and Krga for
questioning ) but again, he provided no specifics on when
that might be, what form the questioning would take, and
whether or not the government would let it be known that they
had been called in.

Media Plan


3. (c) Ljajic said the current plan is to start "leaking"
information to the press, in measured fashion, so that the
press can claim the information is a result of their own
investigative journalism. The information, he said, will
paint a picture o Mladic and his supporters as linked to
criminal activities, and try to portray a "marriage" of
crminality and false patriotism. He said the aim is
two-fold: first, by releasing info given by thoe in
custody, to intimidate them into giving up more by signaling
to them that the State will not protect them; and second, to
start to show the public that Mladic supporters aren't true
patriots, but criminals out for personal gain. We reminded
him of the need to have high-level government leaders -
particularly the Prime Minister - start to speak out clearly
on the issue. He said the Action Plan team had secured a
commitment from Kostunica that the PM would come out with a
statement ) he wouldn't say when that might be, though.

Other Notes


4. (c) We also met with Vukcevic earlier on the 11th, and
he gave us a glimpse (but not a copy) of the implementation
plan ) which included written plans by BIA, VBA, and MUP,
along with a complex, multi-colored org chart (showing
multiple lines of authority for the operational teams but no
horizontal integration). Unfortunately, Vukcevic didn't have
anything to say about particular results. He noted the work
had just begun, and it was still too soon to expect anything
major. He assured us, though, that he has full and direct
authority over the teams when needed and he is confident they
will carry out his direct orders (e.g., ordering electronic
surveillance or the search of a house). On a day-to-day
basis, though, he works with the teams through deputy
prosecutors (one assigned to each team). He confirmed that
there is no/no standing task force where representatives of
the three services are collocated.

Comment


5. (c) There is still no sign that the government is
energized about demystifying Mladic or preparing the public
for a decision to arrest him. The decision to act
immediately on any ICTY tip shows at least an increased
sensitivity to following through on requests from the
international community as a way to rebuild trust - even if
there continues to be skepticism in the GoS and the broader
analytical community about the utility/veracity of the
ICTY-derived intel. Vukcevic, for his part, so far seems to
be taking more of a hands-off approach to the operational
aspects, relying on his deputies to act as "watchdogs" for
the three operational services. Given Vukcevic's lack of
political backing (his appearance in the SWCI/Kostunica
meeting notwithstanding) and the bad relations between him
and the intel chiefs, he is highly unlikely ever to exercise
the kind of operational and political power needed to fully
mobilize Serbia's security apparatus. We will continue to
push him to test his authorities and political backing by
taking more leadership actions a the operational level.

MOORE