Serbian Parties Begin to Prepare for Elections

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BELGRADE 001277

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
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E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL SR
SUBJECT: Serbian Parties Begin to Prepare for Elections


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Summary
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1. (SBU) Responding to perceptions that the international
community will decide Kosovo independence in the near
future, parties across the spectrum have begun to prepare
for a tense political period and probable early elections
in the aftermath. Across the board, democratic parties
remain unprepared and divided, although some are undergoing
attempts to rectify their problems. The nationalist
parties remain strong with a dedicated following, but have
failed to attract additional supporters to their xenophobic
ideology. They are hoping that even a modest backlash to
Kosovo independence could secure for them a majority in the
national assembly. Most parties anticipate an IC decision
for Kosovo independence in late winter with elections to
follow in spring. End Summary.

The DSS: We're Angry and We Aren't Going to Take It Anymore
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2. (SBU) Milos Aligrudic, the PM Kostunica's DSS Caucus
Chair, avoided speculating to poloff about the future
longevity of the governing coalition, but admitted the
party is preparing for elections in the near future. Many
in his party and the governing coalition anticipate a
difficult future Kosovo status solution to be handed down
in early 2007 with elections to follow. This would allow
the GOS to save some face since, according to Serbian law,
elections at anytime next year are not considered "early."


3. (SBU) In speaking of future political partners,
Aligrudic told poloff that the DSS was equidistant from the
Democratic Party (DS) and the Serbian Radical Party (SRS).
He was noncommittal on cooperation with the DS, while
suggesting that collaboration with the SRS could be
possible under the right circumstances. Nonetheless, Prime
Minister Kostunica recently told Ruzica Djindjic, wife of
the late premier, that he would prefer to form a coalition
with the DS instead of the SRS, both of whom offered him
the premiership in the next government. (Some months ago,
Kostunica told the Ambassador that he would never form a
government with the Radicals, arguing that it "would go
against everything" he has stood for in his political
life.)


4. (SBU) Aligrudic complained that the DSS' development
was arrested during the Milosevic period and as a result
its bureaucracy is overly centralized, with a
disproportionate authority over party operations resting
with Premier Kostunica. Conversely, local leaders have too
much control over day-to-day activities on the ground,
reflecting the DSS' lack of a central political strategy.
Experts have complimented the DSS's recent efforts to
overhaul its creaking, chaotic party structure, but
acknowledge that this process will last an extended period
and that the party will suffocate under the weight of its
bureaucracy in the meantime.

The DS: We'll Get to It...After the Vacation
--------------


5. (SBU) President Tadic's party has been reeling from a
series of local election defeats since his 2004
presidential victory, which include losses in Nis, Novi
Sad, and Kragujevac (Serbia's second, third, and fourth
most populous cities). The loss of its central Serbia
stronghold, Uzice, on July 16 and the recent split in its
critical Belgrade chapter are yet more setbacks that
threaten the party's ability to act. Party insiders are
frustrated with the influence of several of Tadic's close
childhood friends from the public relations sector who
serve as spin-doctors/advisors, but have little standing in
the party. Outside experts have lamented the DS' lack of
message, its poor internal communication, weak local
leadership, an aloof presidency, and--most of all--a
seeming unwillingness to address these recognized problems.
Pessimists within the party's leadership have grown
concerned about increasingly unfavorable polls and some
have even privately voiced their belief that the Radicals
are unbeatable and that the next election is already lost.


6. (SBU) In a meeting with poloff, Dusan Petrovic, first
deputy president of the party, faithfully defended the DS,
highlighting its solid support (19 percent) and noting that
the party was addressing its dficiencies, a response we
have heard many times efore. He gave vague assurances
that the party ould begn to create a platform sometime
after th summer vacation, focused on economic issues, but
heavily playing on the public's fear o an SRS victory. He
added that President Tadic will be able to draw throngs to
the polls, once he gets around to hitting the stump, and

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that they are relying on the West to spend lavishly on a
GOTV campaign.


7. (SBU) Additionally, Slobodan Homen, a member of the DS
Main Board, told poloff in mid-July that the Democrats
would begin a more aggressive approach to coalition
building due to fear that an election could occur earlier
than expected. Smaller parties have complained for years
that the DS offers of partnership translated as requests of
servitude, providing the DS with needed support in return
for nothing. Last week Tadic visited Minister Draskovic to
discuss a pre-election coalition between the DS and SPO,
and an insider close to Tadic has told us the president is
preparing a substantial offer to the G-17 Plus that could
include accepting Finance Minister Dinkic as premier.
[Comment: The DS remains the key to Serbia's short-term
democratic and economic transition, which makes its
lackadaisical approach to preparation all the more
frustrating. An honest self-appraisal, hard work, and
Western assistance as part of an aggressive GOTV campaign
will be needed to halt its hemorrhaging of supporters. End
Comment].

The SPO: For King and President?
--------------


8. (SBU) Vlajko Senic, General Secretary of FM Draskovic's
shrinking SPO, told poloff that the party is facing a
significant challenge and likely will only reenter
parliament through a pre-election coalition. The party has
a three part plan for early elections, which it believes
will occur after an international community pronouncement
of Kosovo independence early next year. First, Draskovic
will spend less time concentrating on his Foreign Minister
duties and begin campaigning throughout the country. Senic
noted that Draskovic's aloofness from the SPO had
undermined its support since 2003. Second, the party would
highlight its support for restoration of the monarchy, in
hopes of attracting support from the 14 percent of Serbs
that advocate for a return of the king (Senic noted quietly
that this is a political ploy and not a key political
goal).

9.(SBU) Political analysts have opined that this unique
approach could bear fruit for the SPO because even the low
support for the royals is significantly better than the
SPO's current polling results. Third, it will seek an
alliance with President Tadic and the DS to ensure that it
crosses the five percent parliamentary threshold.
[Comment: Danica Draskovic, wife of the SPO president and
influential party leader, allegedly half-jokingly
threatened President Tadic that, if the DS did not make a
good offer to the SPO, then the party would side with the
DS-nemesis Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). End Comment].

The G-17+: Dazed and Confused
--------------



10. (SBU) Deputy Premier Dulic-Markovic (strictly protect)
told poloff that she does not anticipate that the coalition
will survive its mandate (while making clear her disdain
for Kostunica's policies). She would not confirm to poloff
(though she had done so to the Ambassador previously) that
Finance Minister and G-17 Plus leader, Mladjan Dinkic,
would fulfill his promise to withdraw the party's support
for the GOS on October 1 if EU negotiations were still
frozen. [Comment: Observers have suggested that Dinkic
will renege on his promise if he cannot cut a pre-election
deal with the DS and if he retains the potential to siphon
off significant funds from the GOS. End Comment].


11. (SBU) Dulic-Markovic acknowledged that the G-17 Plus
was in trouble and would not likely enter parliament
without help. Although the party has belatedly begun
internal reforms, analysts point out that the G-17 Plus
lacks a credible message since it failed to live up to its
reform-oriented, anti-corruption platform, which prompted
its base to abandon it (support for the party plummeted
from about 10 percent in 2003 to 2.9 percent in June). To
this end, Dulic-Markovic said the G-17 Plus is looking to
form an alliance with the DS, but complained bitterly that
the Democrats had offered them nothing. Many pundits also
anticipate that Dinkic will attempt to redirect funds from
upcoming privatizations into G-17 Plus coffers, which could
dramatically increase the party's war chest and ability to
utilize the media to campaign.

The LDP: Momentum Versus Polling
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12. (SBU) LDP President Cedomir "Ceda" Jovanovic presented

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to poloff the steps to prepare his party for elections that
he foresees in spring. The party has established offices
in 112 of Serbia's 145 municipalities and registered 23,000
members (although it remains well below its goal of
250,000) since its inception in November 2005.
Additionally, it has scored a series of moderate successes
in local elections, including its first mayoral victory in
June. The LDP still faces an uphill challenge, though. It
is only polling at two percent nationally and the
anticipated merger with its ally, the Civic Alliance of
Serbia (GSS),has stalled due to GSS demands for guaranteed
positions in the LDP hierarchy and election list.


13. (SBU) Milka Puzigaca, a respected political analyst,
said she is confident that the LDP will cross the
threshold. She noted that the party has a lot of momentum,
its supporters are the most loyal and active, and its
Western, reform-oriented image and message could appeal to
the mass of disaffected voters who are looking for someone
with vision. Additionally, according to this one analyst,
Jovanovic (though hardly an uncontroversial figure) could
receive a boost from smaller parties joining his election
coalition, although he admits he is battling large egos who
each want to be the big man in the party.

The SRS and SPS: Power to the People
--------------


14. (SBU) The SRS and SPS are both expecting elections in
spring, following an announcement of Kosovo's final status
at the end of the year. According to a reliable Embassy
contact, Milorad Vucelic, the leader of the
ultranationalist wing in the SPS, indicated that this was
the general opnion of the governing coalition. Aleksander
Vucic, the SRS General Secretary, said that the Radical
expect the same. Vuclic added, however, that,the only
thing that could trigger elections thisyear would be for
the international community toannounce final status before
expected. Regardless, this is the moment both parties have
been awaiting: an unpopular GOS forced to deal with the
loss of Kosovo, which they hope will give them a temporary
boost in the polls that will propel them to power.


15. (SBU) As a result of this perceived timeline, neither
the SRS nor SPS has begun to prepare actively for
elections. The SPS is focused on the struggle for
leadership--and the party's future ideological direction--
which will reach its climax at the party's congress in
December. Analysts suggest that an election this year
could be a disaster for the SPS, which will be woefully
unprepared. The SRS has begun to develop a strategy, but
it is in its nascent stages and the party has done little
else to prepare. Vucic and acting party leader, Tomislav
Nikolic, plan on implementing an extensive door-to-door
campaign that utilizes the party's sizeable grassroots
network. They plan to use this strategy because they know
that their party cannot match the tycoon-fueled war chests
of the ruling parties, which monopolize the media.
Ironically, both hope to follow the example of the
opposition's electoral victory over Milosevic, despite his
likewise large monetary advantage and unscrupulous
manipulation of state structures and media, as a guide for
their strategy.

Comment
--------------


16. (SBU) All parties assume elections will be in the
spring because of their perceptions of the Kosovo
timetable. We have noted recently, however, a growing fear
that a pronouncement on Kosovo may come much earlier,
prompting the parties to worry about their lack of
preparation. Even the DS, which has been pushing for early
elections since January, has not done the necessary work to
win. Observers have noted that an announcement of early
elections by the GOS will begin a two month period (until
the actual elections are held) during which there will be
no parliament and a caretaker government unwilling or
unable to take any decision on important issues, e.g.
Kosovo. We have begun our planning of the crucial GOTV
campaign (septel),and will be working intensely in the
months ahead to focus all of the democratic parties on
Serbia's future after Kosovo.
POLT