Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BELGRADE1211
2006-08-01 08:55:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Belgrade
Cable title:  

SWCI AMBASSADOR WILLIAMSON'S VISIT TO BELGRADE

Tags:  ICTY GPGOV PREL SR 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO6655
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHBW #1211/01 2130855
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 010855Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9080
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1171
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BELGRADE 001211 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SWCI AND EUR/SCE
DOJ FOR ALEXANDRE

E.O. 12958: DECL: CLOSURE OF ICTY
TAGS: ICTY GPGOV PREL SR
SUBJECT: SWCI AMBASSADOR WILLIAMSON'S VISIT TO BELGRADE


Classified By: DCM Rod Moore, reasons 1.4 (b,c,d)

SUMMARY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BELGRADE 001211

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SWCI AND EUR/SCE
DOJ FOR ALEXANDRE

E.O. 12958: DECL: CLOSURE OF ICTY
TAGS: ICTY GPGOV PREL SR
SUBJECT: SWCI AMBASSADOR WILLIAMSON'S VISIT TO BELGRADE


Classified By: DCM Rod Moore, reasons 1.4 (b,c,d)

SUMMARY


1. (c) S/WCI Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues
Clint Williamson told the senior GoS leadership that we are
eager to see Serbia integrate into Euro-Atlantic
institutions, but that we needed to see results on Mladic and
ICTY cooperation first. Calling the GOS' Action Plan on ICTY
a good starting point (as a "statement of intent"),he urged
the GoS to incorporate into the implementation of its Plan
the eleven USG recommendations on ICTY. PM Kostunica voiced a
strong commitment to "complete" ICTY cooperation. The GOS
has already taken initial procedural steps to implement its
new Action Plan, but much work remains to be done before it
can be judged credible and effective. Ambassador Williamson
called on Serbian law enforcement and judicial authorities to
be more pro-active in investigating new war crimes cases and
exhorted them to bring justice in the Bytyqi brothers case.
End summary.


2. (c) S/WCI Ambassador Clint WilliamsQs visit to
Belgrade July 26-28 included separate meetings with every key
plQ in the ICTY portfolio - PM Kostunica, President Tadic,
FONMIN Draskovic,QFMIN Stankovic (with VBA chief Kovac
alongside),MININT Jocic, BIA chief Rade BULATOVIC, and DPM
Dulic-Markovic. He also met with Rasim Ljajic and War Crimes
Prosecutor Vladimir Vukcevic in their new positions as
coordinators for the GoS Action Plan. The Ambassador also
toured the Special Court and met with key officials involved
in the Bytyqi brothers' murder case. Media coverage of the
visit was generally positive, carrying Ambassador
Williamson's messages about our desire to assist Serbia and
the need to implement the Action Plan.

KEY MESSAGES


3. (c) Ambassador Williamson conveyed five key messages to
senior officials regarding ICTY cooperation. He reassured
the leadership of the USG's strong interest in helping Serbia
integrate into the EU and NATO, emphasizing that transferring
Mladic to the ICTY is a key obstacle to progress in these
processes. He noted that he was encouraged by the GOS'
progress on transferring 16 indictees to the Hague in 2005,

but stressed the need for all sides to move beyond combative
rhetoric and start building productive, professional working
relationships to finish with Mladic. He welcomed the Action
Plan as a good statement of intent for the GoS, but cautioned
that the international community would expect to see strong
and concrete operational implementation measures. One key
component, he stressed, would be an aggressive media campaign
to reshape public opinion and change the terms of the debate
about Mladic - i.e., to stop characterizing ICTY cooperation
as sacrificing a hero in exchange for EU membership, and to
instead to show the public that the government believes ICTY
cooperation is in the interest of Serbia as a modern and just
democracy that promotes the rule of law. Finally, he urged
the GOS to incorporate the USG's recently-presented eleven
recommendations into its operational plan for implementation
of the Action Plan. He noted that the USG recommendations
had been positively received by ICTY and the EU.

GOS REACTIONS


4. (c) All of the GoS leadership welcomed Ambassador
Williamson's visit and expressed willingness to work with us
closely on the Mladic issue. Kostunica was in surprisingly
high spirits ) in marked contrast to his bitterness in the
previous day's meetings with Ambassador Wisner on Kosovo
status issues. The PM assured Ambassador Williamson that the
GoS is totally committed to finding Mladic, noting: "it is in
our utmost interest to complete this." Kostunica noted that
the GoS's transfer of 16 PIFWCs in 2005 was proof of its
commitment to cooperation. In another signal of the GoS's
commitment, Kostunica included war crimes prosecutor and
operational coordinator for the Action Plan, Vladimir
Vukcevic, in his meeting with Ambassador Williamson. In a
separate meeting, Ljajic told Ambassador Williamson he would
not have agreed to take a key role in the Plan if he was not
absolutely convinced the government was serious about
finishing the job.


5. (c) All the leadership voiced support for VukceQs

BELGRADE 00001211 002 OF 003


appointment, and officials responsible for operations (BIA
chief BULATOVIC, VBA chief Kovac, and MUP General Veljevic)
all assured Ambassador Williamson they would support
Vukcevic. While BULATOVIC acknowledged he had reservations
about Vukcevic's qualifications to coordinate the effort, he
pledged BIA operations would continue to approach the Mladic
hunt with the utmost professionalism, and welcomed the GoS's
commitment in the Action Plan to more closely coordinate the
efforts of BIA, VBA, and MUP.

ACTION PLAN IMPLEMENTATION


6. (c) Jocic noted, and others later confirmed, that the
GoS had already started putting in place the appropriate
structure to implement the Action Plan. Of note, the GoS had
already delineated responsibilities - Rasim Ljajic will serve
as the diplomatic/political coordinator for the Plan, and
along with DPM Dulic-Markovic, Jocic, Stankovic, and others
as necessary, will represent a sort of executive council for
the Plan. Vukcevic, meanwhile, will be the operational
coordinator, in consultation with BULATOVIC, Kovac, and
Veljevic - each of whom, in turn, will establish separate
operational teams that will carry out the "leg work" of the
search effort. Jocic told Ambassador Williamson, and Ljajic
and Dulic-Markovic confirmed, that the political and
operational coordinators had already held two meetings to set
up these structures, and they expected the operational teams
from each of the three services to have work plans completed
by July 31. Both Ljajic and Vukcevic will have regular
meetings (at least weekly) separately with USG, EU, and ICTY
officials to brief on GoS actions and share information.

MEDIA PLAN


7. (c) Ljajic will be in charge of developing the media
plan, and wasted no time asking for help from the USG in
creating a convincing plan. Ambassador Williamson stressed
to Ljajic and the rest of the leadership that personal
involvement from the top-most ranks of the GoS ) including
the PM - would be critical to public acceptance of the Action
Plan itself and of the Government's commitment to capture
Mladic. He said it was not enough to tell the Serbian people
that Mladic was a "box to check" to get into the EU. Mladic
would have to be de-mythologized so that average Serbs
stopped viewing him as a martyr/hero and started viewing him
as an indicted criminal and fugitive from justice. He noted
the importance of portraying efforts to bring indicted
fugitives to justice as the right thing to do in order to
promote the rule of law and a just society. Ambassador
Williamson expressed confidence that, once the people started
hearing this message consistently from the highest levels of
the Serbian leadership, this would help to sway public
opinion.


8. (c) The USG recommendations were welcomed by Tadic,
Draskovic, and Dulic-Markovic, all of whom have made
statements in support of this approach in the past. Ljajic,
too, recognized the efficacy of such an approach, admitting
also that the GoS would have to work to restore the
confidence of the international community. He admitted that
GoS "errors in assessment" and "promises made too soon" had
led to an atmosphere of distrust with ICTY, and that the GoS
would now have to engage strongly to dispel this. Kostunica
did not comment on the leadership's role in the media plan,
but he did acknowledge that the government would have to
focus on reshaping public opinion, much as it had done in
advance of the PIFWC transfers in 2005. Kostunica advisor
Vladeta Jankovic pointed to recent increased press attention
on Mladic and his recent whereabouts as proof that the GoS
had already started trying to reshape public opinion. Jocic,
meanwhile, expressed his opinion that there would likely
not/not be any significant public backlash even if Mladic was
apprehended "tomorrow."

ELEVEN POINTS


9. (c) Most officials ) some of whom had just seen the USG
recommendations for the first time in their meetings with
Ambassador Williamson ) expressed general support for our
recommendations. DEFMIN Stankovic said he fully supported the
recommendations on a first reading, while Draskovic,
Dulic-Markovic and Tadic all expressed support for the key
aims of the recommendations, noting especially the need for

BELGRADE 00001211 003 OF 003


Kostunica to take a leadership role in the media campaign.
Tadic, in particular, told Ambassador Williamson he has been
"listening every day" for Kostunica to take a public,
personal stand on Mladic's arrest. Kostunica took a more
cautious approach to the USG recommendations, telling
Ambassador Williamson the GoS will "go on with implementation
of the Action Plan as presented and accepted by the ICTY,"
but allowing that they would "consider the proposals"
presented in the paper.

REGIONAL COOPERATION


10. (c) Several officials, including Ljajic, Dulic-Markovic
and Vukcevic, expressed their desire for improved cooperation
with neighboring countries for apprehending ICTY fugitives
and for facilitating investigations and prosecutions of
domestic war crimes cases. They warmly welcomed Ambassador
Williamson's proposed initiative to provide a regional
liaison who would engage regional governments on a regular
basis to failitate cooperation and information sharing among
prosecutors, security an law enforcement services, an
enhance cooperation with the ICTY.
OTHER ISSUES: DOMESTIC PROSECUTIONS AND BYTYQI BROTHERS


11. (c) In addition to his extensive meetings on Mladic and
the Action Plan, Ambassador Williamson spent considerable
time discussing domestic prosecutions, especially the Bytyqi
brothers murder case, with officials in MUP and the Special
Court for War Crimes. Officials at all levels, including
MININT Jocic, reiterated their commitment to solving the case
) Jocic said it is his top priority after Mladic. The
minister and Investigative Judge Dilparic provided detailed
updates on the case (to be provided SEPTEL),and Dilparic
pledged to work closely with FBI agents assigned to the case
in Washington. Ambassador Williamson delivered copies of a
Letter Rogatory asking for assistance in the case to Jocic,
Dilparic, and Vukcevic, and advised that the formal Letter
would arrive via official channels soon.


12. (c) Ambassador Williamson also took the opportunity to
commend the work of the Special Court, and in particular the
work of Vukcevic to successfully prosecute a number of
high-profile cases. He expressed his hope, both to Vukcevic
and to MUP War Crimes unit chief Kostic in separate meetings,
that the Court and the War Crimes unit in MUP would soon be
in a position to take more aggressive action to initiate
their own cases in addition to following up on cases handed
over to them by other parties. Kostic asserted his
willingness to do so, noting only that severe resource
constraints made it difficult to spread his unit too thin
when priority cases still demanded the attention of all five
of the investigators on his staff. He said he would welcome
any additional assistance the USG could provide in terms of
office space, personnel funding, and equipment.


13. COMMENT: This visit was timely, allowing Ambassador
Williamson to convey the strong USG message that we view the
Action Plan as only a first step and that we would need to
see aggressive operational implementation of measures such as
those contained in our 11-point recommendations in order to
assess the GOS effort on Mladic as credible. Some of the
initial steps the GOS has taken are moderately encouraging.
Still, these steps are largely procedural at this point, and
we have seen no commitments yet to follow through on many of
our key recommendations - including a direct, public role by
the PM. Moreover, we will have to keep a close eye on the
functioning of the Action Team that will be in charge of the
Mladic hunt. Given the mutual suspicions between the
security services, their general lack of confidence in
Vukcevic, and the fact that the services will still
apparently retain separate teams (i.e., not a standing task
force),a special effort will be required to make this group
produce results.


14. (u) Ambassador Williamson has cleared this message.
MOORE