Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BELGRADE1160
2006-07-20 08:24:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Belgrade
Cable title:
SCENESETTER FOR JULY 25 VISIT OF AMBASSADOR WISNER TO
how-toVZCZCXRO5963 OO RUEHAST DE RUEHBW #1160/01 2010824 ZNR UUUUU ZZH O 200824Z JUL 06 FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9036 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1162 RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE RXFEAA/HQ AFSOUTH NAPLES IT
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BELGRADE 001160
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O.12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM SR MW YI
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR JULY 25 VISIT OF AMBASSADOR WISNER TO
BELGRADE
BELGRADE 00001160 001.2 OF 003
Ambassador Wisner,
Since your last visit to Belgrade in mid-April, the State Union with
Montenegro has dissolved, the SAA talks with the EU have stalled,
there is a new Deputy Prime Minister, and Belgrade continues to
voice reservations with the UNOSEK-led Kosovo status process at the
highest levels in Contact Group capitals and in the press.
Your visit on July 25-26 will provide an important opportunity to
reinforce the very clear messages Secretary Rice and other senior
USG officials conveyed to Kostunica in Washington last week. You
will also have the opportunity to (again) try to convince Serbia to
accept our offers to help them in protecting the legitimate rights
of Serbs in Kosovo and, just as importantly, to focus them on the
big prize -- our sincere interest in facilitating their way to the
Euro-Atlantic community. You know as well as I do that this is not
an easy sell to interlocutors such as the PM, but as our private
messages increasingly (we hope) sink in, we need to do our best to
bring along the more flexible Serbian leadership. You will also
have the chance to explore strategies with business and Church
leaders on how best to support the "Serbia in Europe" vision during
and after the resolution of Kosovo status.
You will be arriving the day after the "Elephant Round" of status
talks. The GOS is very nervous about these talks -- which they
themselves have been vocally advocating for months -- and Kostunica
has not even confirmed his attendance as of the time of this
writing. In essence, the GOS is concerned that it has fallen into a
trap of its own making. By agreeing to the Elephant Round, they
fear that they will give Ahtisaari a pretext for dispensing with
further negotiations and proceeding more quickly to his status
recommendation. Ahtisaari's reply to the GOS that he is willing to
pursue additional talks on key issues does not reassure Belgrade.
Background:
PM Kostunica is on a "diplomatic offensive" to convey to the world
that Serbia cannot accept an independent Kosovo -- the message he so
emphatically delivered at Gracanica on June 28 (the anniversary of
the Battle of Kosovo Polje). He has personally delivered this
message in all the Contact Group capitals: Kostunica saw French
President Chirac on April 11, German Chancellor Merkel May 15,
Russian President Putin June 12, UK PM Blair on June 27, Italian
Premier Prodi on July 5 and came to Washington on July 11. In a
rare public interview relating to Kosovo on July 5, Kostunica said
categorically that he will never accept an independent Kosovo and
reported that his recent engagement with Contact Group leaders "has
shown results." Kostunica warned that an imposed solution in Kosovo
"cannot remain without consequences" and will be a threat to Serbian
democracy. Like several other Serbian leaders, he has emphasized
that Serbia will reject an "imposed" solution. Most Serbs know
little else about Belgrade's policy on Kosovo than what they hear
from Kostunica.
President Tadic, however, gave a more realistic viewpoint on the
same television program one week later. He said that although he
would fight against independence for Kosovo, "preventing
independence cannot be guaranteed." FM Draskovic offered a
similarly realistic viewpoint a day later, noting that "five of the
six" CG members supported some form of "conditional independence."
Tadic maintains his common policy on Kosovo with Kostunica, but you
will likely again hear hints of a more realistic perspectives during
your meeting with him.
Political landscape:
The dissolution of the State Union with Montenegro has been accepted
by Belgrade, although Kostunica was predictably resentful and bitter
over the results (indeed, he blames the EU SAA decision for the
defeat). Kostunica gave the ex-State Union Foreign Minister
Draskovic, among others, a 45-day extension in his job - something
of dubious legality that met with vehement protest by the Radicals
and Socialists, who want badly to unseat him. As it stands,
parliament is set to reconvene in September to make the legislative
changes necessary to bring the Foreign and Defense ministries in
line with other Republic ministries, which could lead to changes at
the top of both bodies.
The unexpected resignation of Deputy PM Labus, the only principled
stand by a Serbian leader in recent memory over Serbia's failure to
cooperate fully with ICTY, had little long-term effect on the War
Crimes and SAA issues, but did serve to solidify MINFIN Dinkic's
position as undisputed G-17+ party leader. Former Agriculture
Minister Ivana Dulic-Markovic (G-17+) is now Deputy PM and has
remained a progressive (if lonely) voice on Kosovo, ICTY and other
critical issues.
BELGRADE 00001160 002.2 OF 003
Regarding domestic politics, parties across the spectrum have begun
to prepare for a chaotic political period and possible early
elections in 2007 in the aftermath of a Kosovo settlement. Across
the board, democratic parties remain unprepared and divided,
although they are undergoing an eleventh hour push to rectify their
problems. The nationalist parties remain strong (polling a possible
majority, according to our own surveys) with a dedicated following,
but have failed to attract additional supporters to their ideology
of hate. They are hoping that even a modest backlash to Kosovo
independence could ensure for them a majority in the national
assembly. The results of the next parliamentary elections will
likely be determined by voter turnout, and the ability of democratic
bloc parties to rally a largely democratic electorate that feels
increasingly disenfranchised by weak leadership from the government.
Your meetings:
Your official calls will be with PM Kostunica, President Tadic, FM
Draskovic and DPM Dulic-Markovic. You will also have a working
lunch with GOS negotiators Leon Kojen and Slobodan Samardzic and a
meeting with Orthodox Church representatives. In addition to a
press event and roundtable with Serbian business leaders, you will
outbrief the Contact Group Chiefs of Mission.
What to expect:
PM Kostunica: The Prime Minister is consistent Q he has never
wavered from his assertion that he will never accept an independent
Kosovo, and has indeed turned up the volume in recent weeks. His
op-ed in the Washington Post and remarks at the UNSC illustrate his
continued intention to play the legal card with regards to Kosovo
status. He will likely stick to similar themes raised at the UNSC,
and by extension what comes out in Vienna. To him, the Serbs are
the victims and the international community is treating Serbia as if
Milosevic were still in power.
President Tadic: The President maintains the same position on
Kosovo as the Prime Minister, but less convincingly. Tadic will
hint at a more realistic understanding of the state-of-play, but has
so far been reluctant to engage on post-status strategizing. To a
significant degree, Tadic views the Kosovo question through the
prism of domestic politics and the fortunes of his own party. In
contrast to the PM, President Tadic has said publicly that Kosovo
independence might be unstoppable. He may have signaled a further
step in the right direction when he told the media in Brussels on
7/19 that protecting the Serbs (i.e., not independence) in Kosovo
was his "main demand." Advisors Leon Kojen and Vuk Jeremic will
attend.
FM Draskovic: Draskovic sincerely would like Kosovo to remain
within Serbia and is still touting his idea of keeping the fig leaf
of a Serbian flag on the external borders. That said, he is more
realistic than the PM. The Foreign Minister echoed Tadic's public
comments with an interview of his own. Draskovic said that "five of
six" countries in the Contact Group have decided on supervised
independence, implying Russia has not agreed. Unlike Tadic, however,
Draskovic has a faltering party and imperiled cabinet position. SPO
getting more than 5% of the vote and parliamentary representation
remain a long shot. He will likely have to partner with other
party(ies).
DPM Dulic-Markovic: We are heartened by the Deputy Prime Minister's
constructive approach to issues in the way of Serbia's path to
Euro-Atlantic integration. In fact, you may hear a more realistic
view of Serbia's vision, and Kosovo's fate, from her than from any
other GOS official. Unfortunately, she wields little real power at
present, with Finance Minister Dinkic the real shot-caller in her
party. The Radicals have attacked her viciously for her Croat
background (calling her an "Ustasa" - basically, a Nazi collaborator
- on the Parliament floor),but she has not withered. She has
called for Mladic to be arrested and is one of the only GOS
officials to renew condemnation of the Srebrenica massacre during
the recent anniversary. To her and her G-17+ colleagues, an
unresolved Kosovo represents an impediment to growth and investment
in Serbia. We are exploring ways in which the international
community can bolster her and other progressive voices within the
Government Q your meeting provides a significant opportunity.
Kojen and Samardzic: This working lunch with be an opportunity to
discuss in details the results of the July 24 meetings, and next
steps.
Church leaders: Although he was just consecrated as Bishop to
Australia and New Zealand, Iriniej Dobrievic will still be involved
with Kosovo status talks on behalf of the Serbian Orthodox Church
(SOC) in the near term. Irinej of Backa, Bishop Artemije and
BELGRADE 00001160 003.2 OF 003
Metropolitan Amfilohije will likely also attend. The SOC's official
stance is very close to the Prime Minister's. Privately, we know
moderate elements are committed to planning for the future of the
SOC in a Kosovo separated from Serbia, and some have privately
criticized the GOS' politicizing of their issues. However, given
its probable composition, this group will likely take a less
enlightened approach.
Business leaders: In response to your successful meeting in
Washington, we have arranged for a small group of business leaders
in Serbia to convene for discussion with you on how best to help the
Serbian economy and prospects for investment during and after the
Kosovo settlement. We will be assembling primarily Serbian, rather
than international, businesspersons to give you a different
perspective. It will be off the record and without press.
MOORE
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O.12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM SR MW YI
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR JULY 25 VISIT OF AMBASSADOR WISNER TO
BELGRADE
BELGRADE 00001160 001.2 OF 003
Ambassador Wisner,
Since your last visit to Belgrade in mid-April, the State Union with
Montenegro has dissolved, the SAA talks with the EU have stalled,
there is a new Deputy Prime Minister, and Belgrade continues to
voice reservations with the UNOSEK-led Kosovo status process at the
highest levels in Contact Group capitals and in the press.
Your visit on July 25-26 will provide an important opportunity to
reinforce the very clear messages Secretary Rice and other senior
USG officials conveyed to Kostunica in Washington last week. You
will also have the opportunity to (again) try to convince Serbia to
accept our offers to help them in protecting the legitimate rights
of Serbs in Kosovo and, just as importantly, to focus them on the
big prize -- our sincere interest in facilitating their way to the
Euro-Atlantic community. You know as well as I do that this is not
an easy sell to interlocutors such as the PM, but as our private
messages increasingly (we hope) sink in, we need to do our best to
bring along the more flexible Serbian leadership. You will also
have the chance to explore strategies with business and Church
leaders on how best to support the "Serbia in Europe" vision during
and after the resolution of Kosovo status.
You will be arriving the day after the "Elephant Round" of status
talks. The GOS is very nervous about these talks -- which they
themselves have been vocally advocating for months -- and Kostunica
has not even confirmed his attendance as of the time of this
writing. In essence, the GOS is concerned that it has fallen into a
trap of its own making. By agreeing to the Elephant Round, they
fear that they will give Ahtisaari a pretext for dispensing with
further negotiations and proceeding more quickly to his status
recommendation. Ahtisaari's reply to the GOS that he is willing to
pursue additional talks on key issues does not reassure Belgrade.
Background:
PM Kostunica is on a "diplomatic offensive" to convey to the world
that Serbia cannot accept an independent Kosovo -- the message he so
emphatically delivered at Gracanica on June 28 (the anniversary of
the Battle of Kosovo Polje). He has personally delivered this
message in all the Contact Group capitals: Kostunica saw French
President Chirac on April 11, German Chancellor Merkel May 15,
Russian President Putin June 12, UK PM Blair on June 27, Italian
Premier Prodi on July 5 and came to Washington on July 11. In a
rare public interview relating to Kosovo on July 5, Kostunica said
categorically that he will never accept an independent Kosovo and
reported that his recent engagement with Contact Group leaders "has
shown results." Kostunica warned that an imposed solution in Kosovo
"cannot remain without consequences" and will be a threat to Serbian
democracy. Like several other Serbian leaders, he has emphasized
that Serbia will reject an "imposed" solution. Most Serbs know
little else about Belgrade's policy on Kosovo than what they hear
from Kostunica.
President Tadic, however, gave a more realistic viewpoint on the
same television program one week later. He said that although he
would fight against independence for Kosovo, "preventing
independence cannot be guaranteed." FM Draskovic offered a
similarly realistic viewpoint a day later, noting that "five of the
six" CG members supported some form of "conditional independence."
Tadic maintains his common policy on Kosovo with Kostunica, but you
will likely again hear hints of a more realistic perspectives during
your meeting with him.
Political landscape:
The dissolution of the State Union with Montenegro has been accepted
by Belgrade, although Kostunica was predictably resentful and bitter
over the results (indeed, he blames the EU SAA decision for the
defeat). Kostunica gave the ex-State Union Foreign Minister
Draskovic, among others, a 45-day extension in his job - something
of dubious legality that met with vehement protest by the Radicals
and Socialists, who want badly to unseat him. As it stands,
parliament is set to reconvene in September to make the legislative
changes necessary to bring the Foreign and Defense ministries in
line with other Republic ministries, which could lead to changes at
the top of both bodies.
The unexpected resignation of Deputy PM Labus, the only principled
stand by a Serbian leader in recent memory over Serbia's failure to
cooperate fully with ICTY, had little long-term effect on the War
Crimes and SAA issues, but did serve to solidify MINFIN Dinkic's
position as undisputed G-17+ party leader. Former Agriculture
Minister Ivana Dulic-Markovic (G-17+) is now Deputy PM and has
remained a progressive (if lonely) voice on Kosovo, ICTY and other
critical issues.
BELGRADE 00001160 002.2 OF 003
Regarding domestic politics, parties across the spectrum have begun
to prepare for a chaotic political period and possible early
elections in 2007 in the aftermath of a Kosovo settlement. Across
the board, democratic parties remain unprepared and divided,
although they are undergoing an eleventh hour push to rectify their
problems. The nationalist parties remain strong (polling a possible
majority, according to our own surveys) with a dedicated following,
but have failed to attract additional supporters to their ideology
of hate. They are hoping that even a modest backlash to Kosovo
independence could ensure for them a majority in the national
assembly. The results of the next parliamentary elections will
likely be determined by voter turnout, and the ability of democratic
bloc parties to rally a largely democratic electorate that feels
increasingly disenfranchised by weak leadership from the government.
Your meetings:
Your official calls will be with PM Kostunica, President Tadic, FM
Draskovic and DPM Dulic-Markovic. You will also have a working
lunch with GOS negotiators Leon Kojen and Slobodan Samardzic and a
meeting with Orthodox Church representatives. In addition to a
press event and roundtable with Serbian business leaders, you will
outbrief the Contact Group Chiefs of Mission.
What to expect:
PM Kostunica: The Prime Minister is consistent Q he has never
wavered from his assertion that he will never accept an independent
Kosovo, and has indeed turned up the volume in recent weeks. His
op-ed in the Washington Post and remarks at the UNSC illustrate his
continued intention to play the legal card with regards to Kosovo
status. He will likely stick to similar themes raised at the UNSC,
and by extension what comes out in Vienna. To him, the Serbs are
the victims and the international community is treating Serbia as if
Milosevic were still in power.
President Tadic: The President maintains the same position on
Kosovo as the Prime Minister, but less convincingly. Tadic will
hint at a more realistic understanding of the state-of-play, but has
so far been reluctant to engage on post-status strategizing. To a
significant degree, Tadic views the Kosovo question through the
prism of domestic politics and the fortunes of his own party. In
contrast to the PM, President Tadic has said publicly that Kosovo
independence might be unstoppable. He may have signaled a further
step in the right direction when he told the media in Brussels on
7/19 that protecting the Serbs (i.e., not independence) in Kosovo
was his "main demand." Advisors Leon Kojen and Vuk Jeremic will
attend.
FM Draskovic: Draskovic sincerely would like Kosovo to remain
within Serbia and is still touting his idea of keeping the fig leaf
of a Serbian flag on the external borders. That said, he is more
realistic than the PM. The Foreign Minister echoed Tadic's public
comments with an interview of his own. Draskovic said that "five of
six" countries in the Contact Group have decided on supervised
independence, implying Russia has not agreed. Unlike Tadic, however,
Draskovic has a faltering party and imperiled cabinet position. SPO
getting more than 5% of the vote and parliamentary representation
remain a long shot. He will likely have to partner with other
party(ies).
DPM Dulic-Markovic: We are heartened by the Deputy Prime Minister's
constructive approach to issues in the way of Serbia's path to
Euro-Atlantic integration. In fact, you may hear a more realistic
view of Serbia's vision, and Kosovo's fate, from her than from any
other GOS official. Unfortunately, she wields little real power at
present, with Finance Minister Dinkic the real shot-caller in her
party. The Radicals have attacked her viciously for her Croat
background (calling her an "Ustasa" - basically, a Nazi collaborator
- on the Parliament floor),but she has not withered. She has
called for Mladic to be arrested and is one of the only GOS
officials to renew condemnation of the Srebrenica massacre during
the recent anniversary. To her and her G-17+ colleagues, an
unresolved Kosovo represents an impediment to growth and investment
in Serbia. We are exploring ways in which the international
community can bolster her and other progressive voices within the
Government Q your meeting provides a significant opportunity.
Kojen and Samardzic: This working lunch with be an opportunity to
discuss in details the results of the July 24 meetings, and next
steps.
Church leaders: Although he was just consecrated as Bishop to
Australia and New Zealand, Iriniej Dobrievic will still be involved
with Kosovo status talks on behalf of the Serbian Orthodox Church
(SOC) in the near term. Irinej of Backa, Bishop Artemije and
BELGRADE 00001160 003.2 OF 003
Metropolitan Amfilohije will likely also attend. The SOC's official
stance is very close to the Prime Minister's. Privately, we know
moderate elements are committed to planning for the future of the
SOC in a Kosovo separated from Serbia, and some have privately
criticized the GOS' politicizing of their issues. However, given
its probable composition, this group will likely take a less
enlightened approach.
Business leaders: In response to your successful meeting in
Washington, we have arranged for a small group of business leaders
in Serbia to convene for discussion with you on how best to help the
Serbian economy and prospects for investment during and after the
Kosovo settlement. We will be assembling primarily Serbian, rather
than international, businesspersons to give you a different
perspective. It will be off the record and without press.
MOORE