Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BELGRADE1157
2006-07-20 06:11:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Belgrade
Cable title:  

Elections Timetable Speculations

Tags:  PGOV KDEM PREL SR 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO5809
PP RUEHAST
DE RUEHBW #1157/01 2010611
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 200611Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9032
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 001157 

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E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL SR
SUBJECT: Elections Timetable Speculations


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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 001157

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E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL SR
SUBJECT: Elections Timetable Speculations


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1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Despite previous pronouncements suggesting fall
elections, many of our interlocutors believe that the current
coalition will hold together until after a decision is made
regarding Kosovo's final status, with new elections occurring about
45 to 90 days later. Although elections before a Kosovo status
determination would probably most benefit a collaborative democratic
bloc, some cynics believe that the GOS parties' desire to cash in on
key privatizations is among the motivation for the government to
hang on. The unwillingness of the opposition Radical Party to push
for elections before a status decision also relieves pressure for
earlier elections. End Summary.


2. (SBU) Conventional wisdom in the analytical community and among
many politicians as recently as late May held that the GoS would be
best served by timing the announcement of new elections in part to
cause pressure on the International Community. The thinking had
been that Kostunica would use the threat of political instability
and a Radical takeover of the government if a Kosovo status decision
was made for independence during a Serbian election campaign. The
announcement of MINFIN Dinkic that G-17 Plus would withdraw support
from the government if EU SAA talks did not resume by the end of
September added to the speculation that a fall announcement of
elections might be unavoidable. (note: The last parliamentary
elections were held in late 2003, mandating new elections no later
than late 2007.)


3. (SBU) President Tadic's Democratic Party (DS),meanwhile, has
long held that the best chance for Serbia's democratic bloc would be
early elections before a status decision that would allow democrats
time under a new mandate to recover from the anticipated loss of
Kosovo. Sources tell us Tadic proposed to Kostunica a plan that
would have the government call for new elections in mid-November,
with an election date 45 days thereafter. The plan would rely on
the IC delaying a final status decision on Kosovo until late
February 2007. Kostunica did not bite.


4. (SBU) Meanwhile, however, a new calculus has appeared on the
political scene. The GoS hopes its "ICTY Action Plan," presented to
the EU on 6/17, will put SAA talks back on track in the near future,

even without handing over Mladic. A restart of SAA talks would
obviate Dinkic's threat to leave the government and help stabilize
the coalition. (Dinkic categorically reaffirmed to the Ambassador
recently that the G-17+ will adhere to its pledge to leave the
government, absent a resumption of SAA talks.) The Radicals, in
turn clearly have no interest in elections before Kosovo is
concluded, since obviously they want no part of the responsibility
for losing the province.


5. (SBU) Many pundits are now highlighting another,very practical,
motivator for the GoS to hang together for the next several months:
key privatizations. According to this scenario, the GOS seeks to
complete privatization of several major state-controlled companies,
including the state oil company (NIS),major telecoms interests
(notably MOBTEL, the second cellular provider formerly owned by
ousted tycoon Bogoljub Karic),and a few key banking and insurance
concerns. Analysts argue that government parties want to enhance
party coffers by skimming funds from these lucrative privatizations.


A POST-STATUS ELECTION SCENARIO?


6. (SBU) Interlocutors from all major democratic parties have told
poloffs recently that the current government -- with its tenuous
parliamentary majority -- could not last long after final status
talks are concluded. Once a status decision is made, they note, the
Radical party will no longer have a reason to stall. DS would try
to present itself as the only true alternative to the nationalists.
Analysts believe Kostunica will issue his "historical no" on Kosovo
and then call for new elections, which legally must occur 45 to 90
days later. The strategy would be to take some of the steam out of
Radical arguments about the current government giving up Kosovo and
run on a "victimization" platform of having stood firm against the
IC on Kosovo.

PREPARING FOR THE CAMPAIGNS


7. (SBU) Government parties, including the DS, are doing all they
can to position themselves for elections, whenever they occur.
MINFIN Dinkic, for example, has recently announced massive increases
to both the military budget (up 25 percent compared to last year)
and state sector salaries (pledging to raise them as much as 40
percent in some cases. Dinkic also is peddling a EURO 1 billion
investment plan, which many view as a vote-getting strategy.


8. (SBU) Despite all these preparations, the GOS continues to
attempt steps to dissuade the IC from moving ahead quickly on
status. Analysts argue that the government's push for a new
post-Milosevic constitution is intended to persuad the IC not to
undertake any steps on status that could undermine the adoption of
such a historic cornerstone of Serbian democracy. In addition,
Kostunica's diplomatic odyssey to Contact Group capitals and the UN
has heightened expectations in the Serbian public that the IC might

BELGRADE 00001157 002.2 OF 002


be willing to compromise on Kosovo's status. Analysts argue that
the GOS hopes the IC will be reluctant to "shock" the Serbian
electorate in such an atmosphere of heightened expectations.


9. (SBU) Comment: Speculation about early elections started nearly
as soon as this government took power, but have never gained
significant momentum. Today, Kosovo status remains a key factor in
arriving at a timetable. Kostunica so far remains as determined to
hold on to power as he is to reject Kosovo independence. Unless his
government falls earlier due to yet another miscalculation about EU
intentions without Mladic action, elections will be next year. What
kind of coalitions will enter that political fight has not yet been
decided. The hope of many is a democratic critical mass, but
whether it can be achieved is far from certain.

POLT