Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BELGRADE1123
2006-07-12 13:36:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Belgrade
Cable title:
KOSOVO: BELGRADE WORRIED ABOUT ELEPHANT ROUND
how-toVZCZCXRO6646 OO RUEHAST DE RUEHBW #1123/01 1931336 ZNR UUUUU ZZH O 121336Z JUL 06 FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9002 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1160 RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE RXFEAA/HQ AFSOUTH NAPLES IT
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 001123
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TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM SR MW YI
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: BELGRADE WORRIED ABOUT ELEPHANT ROUND
BELGRADE 00001123 001.2 OF 002
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 001123
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TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM SR MW YI
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: BELGRADE WORRIED ABOUT ELEPHANT ROUND
BELGRADE 00001123 001.2 OF 002
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: In a July 11 meeting with Contact Group
representatives, Kosovo status negotiator Leon Kojen conveyed a
letter from PM Kostunica and President Tadic to UNOSEK Special Envoy
Ahtisaari. Kojen signaled profound Belgrade concern that the
upcoming high-level status meeting ("elephant round") would be a
one-time (fruitless) event that would lead to Ahtisaari moving
swiftly ahead with a final status proposal. The GOS letter aims to
ensure that the first elephant round meeting is the beginning,
rather than the end, of a status process. Kojen could not confirm
the availability of Tadic and Kostunica for a statuus meeting on
7/24. Kojen disassociated himself and Tadic from statements by a
Kostunica advisor critical of UNOSEK. Text of the letter to
Ahtisaari follows in paragraph 6. END SUMMARY.
2. (SBU) Kojen conveyed a July 10 letter co-signed by Kostunica and
Tadic to Ahtisaari. The letter reiterates many of the points as the
May 18 joint letter, in which they suggested a new format to Kosovo
status talks. Kojen said that both the President and Prime Minister
remain committed to the UNOSEK process but are QunclearQ about what
will happen after the initial round of talks between top leaders of
Serbia and Kosovo. Kojen stressed that knowing what will come after
the first round will will allow both sides to be more productive in
their preparations. Kojen said the talks are at Qa delicate moment
and hoped that Qprocedural concernsQ would not ultimately limit the
productivity of the talks or lead to a needless cessation of
negotiations (and by extension an imposed settlement in Kosovo).
3. (SBU) The German Ambassador asked Kojen about the perceived
contradictory messages coming out of Belgrade; on one side, the GOS
offers Ahtisaari suggestions about the format and process of talks,
and on the other, PM advisor Simic attacks UNOSEK. (Note: In an
interview with Belgrade daily Politika, Aleksander SimicQs said
Deputy Envoy Albert Rohan Qis doing a bad jobQ and the talks are
Qunsuccessful.Q End note.) Kojen said that he had not had time to
talk to Simic since the interview and personally he was Qtaken by
surpriseQ by SimicQs QbluntQ comments. Kojen said that Simic was
giving his personal opinion and not Qconsidered policy,Q and it was
certainly not the policy of President Tadic.
4. (SBU) Kojen emphasized that BelgradeQs commitment to the UNOSEK
process is sincere, and expressed hope that the Albanians would come
Qready to negotiate.Q According to Kojen, the Albanians followed
each Vienna round with public statements that an independent Kosovo
is inevitable. Kojen opined the international communityQs reaction
would be much harsher towards the GOS if the Serbs said similar
things about an autonomous Kosovo within Serbia being
predetermined.
5. (SBU) COMMENT: Despite the fact that Belgrade has absolutely no
intention of making any type of compromise on independence, the
ledership fears that the first elephant round will be the last and
that UNOSEK negotiations will quickly come to a close. This letter
is another attempt to prolong the UNOSEK process and delay
AhtisaariQs recommendation to the UNSC. We should not engage on this
latest maneuver and proceed on the agreed timeline.
6. (U) Begin text of letter to Ahtisaari.
Dear Mr. Ahtisaari,
Thank you for your letter of 3 July 2006, in which you replied to
our earlier letter of 19 June 2006.
We are fully convinced that direct talks on the future status of
Kosovo and Metohija will provide elements for a political compromise
and a negotiated solution to the question of the future status of
Kosovo and Metohija. We have been advocating such talks for some
months now, and we welcome the opportunity to discuss the central
issues of the entire status process and the future status itself
with the political leaders of the Kosovo and Metohija Albanians.
We believe that the importance of the question to be discussed
requires us to define together the procedural framework for direct
talks on the future status of Kosovo and Metohija. The suggestions
we shall make in this regard are motivated by our wish to do
everything possible to move the status process to a successful
conclusion, and with this in view we want to present to you the
following ideas and proposals:
1. Talks on the future status of Kosovo and Metohija should be
guided by democratic values and European standards, with full
respect of international law and the principles of the UN Charter.
In particular, they should be based on the UNSC Resolution 1244, the
validity of which must be recognized by all the parties to the
talks.
2. Any attempt to influence the talks by the use or threat of
violence, or through promoting or condoning violence, is completely
BELGRADE 00001123 002.2 OF 002
unacceptable.
3. We think that you, as the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary
General, should chair the meetings directly concerned with the
future status of Kosovo and Metohija, and we are firmly committed to
seeking a mutually acceptable solution of the status question.
4. After the first meeting devoted to the issue of future status,
where the two parties should present their status platforms, talks
should continue with four tables concerned with the following
questions:
(a) Essential elements of a new constitution of Kosovo and Metohija,
including the political structure to be established in the province,
the guarantees of individual rights and liberties, and the
guarantees of the rights of communities.
(b) Broad security issues, including possible demilitarization of
Kosovo and Metohija, as well as the purpose, structure, size,
authority, and duration of the proposed international security
presence in the province.
(c) Crucial economic and financial issues, including privatization,
public and private property issues, Kosovo-related part of Serbia's
external debt, and the re-establishment of economic ties between
Serbia and Kosovo and Metohija.
(d) Decentralization, where talks to date have clarified the
positions of the two parties and suggested possible ways of reaching
an agreement.
5. In order to ensure that talks at the four tables should proceed
smoothly, we propose the establishment of four working groups, whose
task would be to prepare proposals to be discussed at each round of
the talks. The working groups should consider and clearly define the
positions of the two parties, identifying areas where agreement has
already been reached, areas where agreement seems possible, as well
as areas where the positions remain far apart. The meetings of the
working groups should be chaired by UNOSEK representatives, and they
should be held in turn in Belgrade and Pristina.
6. After assessing the results achieved at the four tables and
consultations with the two parties, the Special Envoy proposes a
further meeting of the highest political representatives of the two
sides. At such meetings of the highest representatives, there should
be no restrictions on the right to reply, either with respect to
time or the number of occasions one wishes to exercise this right in
the interest of clarification.
A verbatim record should be kept and given: or authorization to the
heads of the two delegations at such meetings, as well as at the
meetings of the four tables and the working group.
7. At the first meeting of the highest political representatives of
the Republic of Serbia and the Provisional Institutions of Kosovo
and Metohija, the two sides should present their status platforms
and together with the Special Envoy confirm the procedural rules for
the continuation of the talks. We think that at this first meeting
the representatives of the Republic of Serbia should speak first
with the order reversed at the next meeting directly concerned with
the future status of Kosovo and Metohija.
We want to assure you that the Republic of Serbia is firmly
committed to doing everything necessary to achieve a genuine
compromise through direct talks, a compromise which will be a
decisive contribution to the peace and stability in the region.
We are convinced that we shall succeed in this only if define
together an appropriate procedural framework, and it is for this
reason that we feel it important that crucial questions of procedure
with regard to the forthcoming Vienna meeting on status and the
structuring of talks after that be clarified in advance.
Yours sincerely,
/s/
Boris Tadic
President of Serbia
/s/
Vojislav Kostunica
Prime Minister of Serbia
End text of letter.
POLT
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O.12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM SR MW YI
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: BELGRADE WORRIED ABOUT ELEPHANT ROUND
BELGRADE 00001123 001.2 OF 002
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: In a July 11 meeting with Contact Group
representatives, Kosovo status negotiator Leon Kojen conveyed a
letter from PM Kostunica and President Tadic to UNOSEK Special Envoy
Ahtisaari. Kojen signaled profound Belgrade concern that the
upcoming high-level status meeting ("elephant round") would be a
one-time (fruitless) event that would lead to Ahtisaari moving
swiftly ahead with a final status proposal. The GOS letter aims to
ensure that the first elephant round meeting is the beginning,
rather than the end, of a status process. Kojen could not confirm
the availability of Tadic and Kostunica for a statuus meeting on
7/24. Kojen disassociated himself and Tadic from statements by a
Kostunica advisor critical of UNOSEK. Text of the letter to
Ahtisaari follows in paragraph 6. END SUMMARY.
2. (SBU) Kojen conveyed a July 10 letter co-signed by Kostunica and
Tadic to Ahtisaari. The letter reiterates many of the points as the
May 18 joint letter, in which they suggested a new format to Kosovo
status talks. Kojen said that both the President and Prime Minister
remain committed to the UNOSEK process but are QunclearQ about what
will happen after the initial round of talks between top leaders of
Serbia and Kosovo. Kojen stressed that knowing what will come after
the first round will will allow both sides to be more productive in
their preparations. Kojen said the talks are at Qa delicate moment
and hoped that Qprocedural concernsQ would not ultimately limit the
productivity of the talks or lead to a needless cessation of
negotiations (and by extension an imposed settlement in Kosovo).
3. (SBU) The German Ambassador asked Kojen about the perceived
contradictory messages coming out of Belgrade; on one side, the GOS
offers Ahtisaari suggestions about the format and process of talks,
and on the other, PM advisor Simic attacks UNOSEK. (Note: In an
interview with Belgrade daily Politika, Aleksander SimicQs said
Deputy Envoy Albert Rohan Qis doing a bad jobQ and the talks are
Qunsuccessful.Q End note.) Kojen said that he had not had time to
talk to Simic since the interview and personally he was Qtaken by
surpriseQ by SimicQs QbluntQ comments. Kojen said that Simic was
giving his personal opinion and not Qconsidered policy,Q and it was
certainly not the policy of President Tadic.
4. (SBU) Kojen emphasized that BelgradeQs commitment to the UNOSEK
process is sincere, and expressed hope that the Albanians would come
Qready to negotiate.Q According to Kojen, the Albanians followed
each Vienna round with public statements that an independent Kosovo
is inevitable. Kojen opined the international communityQs reaction
would be much harsher towards the GOS if the Serbs said similar
things about an autonomous Kosovo within Serbia being
predetermined.
5. (SBU) COMMENT: Despite the fact that Belgrade has absolutely no
intention of making any type of compromise on independence, the
ledership fears that the first elephant round will be the last and
that UNOSEK negotiations will quickly come to a close. This letter
is another attempt to prolong the UNOSEK process and delay
AhtisaariQs recommendation to the UNSC. We should not engage on this
latest maneuver and proceed on the agreed timeline.
6. (U) Begin text of letter to Ahtisaari.
Dear Mr. Ahtisaari,
Thank you for your letter of 3 July 2006, in which you replied to
our earlier letter of 19 June 2006.
We are fully convinced that direct talks on the future status of
Kosovo and Metohija will provide elements for a political compromise
and a negotiated solution to the question of the future status of
Kosovo and Metohija. We have been advocating such talks for some
months now, and we welcome the opportunity to discuss the central
issues of the entire status process and the future status itself
with the political leaders of the Kosovo and Metohija Albanians.
We believe that the importance of the question to be discussed
requires us to define together the procedural framework for direct
talks on the future status of Kosovo and Metohija. The suggestions
we shall make in this regard are motivated by our wish to do
everything possible to move the status process to a successful
conclusion, and with this in view we want to present to you the
following ideas and proposals:
1. Talks on the future status of Kosovo and Metohija should be
guided by democratic values and European standards, with full
respect of international law and the principles of the UN Charter.
In particular, they should be based on the UNSC Resolution 1244, the
validity of which must be recognized by all the parties to the
talks.
2. Any attempt to influence the talks by the use or threat of
violence, or through promoting or condoning violence, is completely
BELGRADE 00001123 002.2 OF 002
unacceptable.
3. We think that you, as the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary
General, should chair the meetings directly concerned with the
future status of Kosovo and Metohija, and we are firmly committed to
seeking a mutually acceptable solution of the status question.
4. After the first meeting devoted to the issue of future status,
where the two parties should present their status platforms, talks
should continue with four tables concerned with the following
questions:
(a) Essential elements of a new constitution of Kosovo and Metohija,
including the political structure to be established in the province,
the guarantees of individual rights and liberties, and the
guarantees of the rights of communities.
(b) Broad security issues, including possible demilitarization of
Kosovo and Metohija, as well as the purpose, structure, size,
authority, and duration of the proposed international security
presence in the province.
(c) Crucial economic and financial issues, including privatization,
public and private property issues, Kosovo-related part of Serbia's
external debt, and the re-establishment of economic ties between
Serbia and Kosovo and Metohija.
(d) Decentralization, where talks to date have clarified the
positions of the two parties and suggested possible ways of reaching
an agreement.
5. In order to ensure that talks at the four tables should proceed
smoothly, we propose the establishment of four working groups, whose
task would be to prepare proposals to be discussed at each round of
the talks. The working groups should consider and clearly define the
positions of the two parties, identifying areas where agreement has
already been reached, areas where agreement seems possible, as well
as areas where the positions remain far apart. The meetings of the
working groups should be chaired by UNOSEK representatives, and they
should be held in turn in Belgrade and Pristina.
6. After assessing the results achieved at the four tables and
consultations with the two parties, the Special Envoy proposes a
further meeting of the highest political representatives of the two
sides. At such meetings of the highest representatives, there should
be no restrictions on the right to reply, either with respect to
time or the number of occasions one wishes to exercise this right in
the interest of clarification.
A verbatim record should be kept and given: or authorization to the
heads of the two delegations at such meetings, as well as at the
meetings of the four tables and the working group.
7. At the first meeting of the highest political representatives of
the Republic of Serbia and the Provisional Institutions of Kosovo
and Metohija, the two sides should present their status platforms
and together with the Special Envoy confirm the procedural rules for
the continuation of the talks. We think that at this first meeting
the representatives of the Republic of Serbia should speak first
with the order reversed at the next meeting directly concerned with
the future status of Kosovo and Metohija.
We want to assure you that the Republic of Serbia is firmly
committed to doing everything necessary to achieve a genuine
compromise through direct talks, a compromise which will be a
decisive contribution to the peace and stability in the region.
We are convinced that we shall succeed in this only if define
together an appropriate procedural framework, and it is for this
reason that we feel it important that crucial questions of procedure
with regard to the forthcoming Vienna meeting on status and the
structuring of talks after that be clarified in advance.
Yours sincerely,
/s/
Boris Tadic
President of Serbia
/s/
Vojislav Kostunica
Prime Minister of Serbia
End text of letter.
POLT