Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BEIRUT873
2006-03-20 16:44:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

MGLE01: ELECTORAL REFORM COMMISSION MEMBER:

Tags:  PGOV KDEM KMPI LE 
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VZCZCXRO5590
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHLB #0873/01 0791644
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 201644Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2643
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 000873 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH
DEPT FOR NEA - DAS DIBBLE AND DAS CARPENTER, NEA/ELA, AND
NEA/PI - KIRBY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/20/2016
TAGS: PGOV KDEM KMPI LE
SUBJECT: MGLE01: ELECTORAL REFORM COMMISSION MEMBER:
"MADLY PARANOIAC" MARONITES SABOTAGED ELECTORAL LAW

Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman. Reason: Sections 1.4 (b
) and (d)

SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 000873

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH
DEPT FOR NEA - DAS DIBBLE AND DAS CARPENTER, NEA/ELA, AND
NEA/PI - KIRBY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/20/2016
TAGS: PGOV KDEM KMPI LE
SUBJECT: MGLE01: ELECTORAL REFORM COMMISSION MEMBER:
"MADLY PARANOIAC" MARONITES SABOTAGED ELECTORAL LAW

Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman. Reason: Sections 1.4 (b
) and (d)

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) In a 3/16 meeting, national electoral reform
commission member Paul Salem blamed what he called a "madly
paranoiac" Maronite community for sabotaging efforts to
reform the electoral law. Had the commission's two Maronite
members -- Ziyad Baroud and Michel Tabet -- not resigned, he
claimed, the resulting draft law would have done more to
guarantee Christian communal interests than any single piece
of legislation in Lebanon's history. He said the two
resigned under mounting pressure from political heavies in
"Maronite-stan," and blamed them for remaining silent while
populist politicians exploited their community's fear of
disenfranchisement. Salem said that commission chair Fouad
Boutros is, because of his advanced age, unable to defend his
commission's work and deliver a completed draft law to
government. Meanwhile, according to Salem, Prime Minister
Siniora, Sa'ad Hariri, and Walid Jumblatt were only too happy
to sit back and watch the Maronites destroy any prospects for
electoral reform. Salem asked the USG and the international
community to help bring Baroud and Tabet back to the
negotiating table, and to persuade Maronite leaders,
particularly the Patriarch, that participation in the
electoral reform process is in their community's, and
Lebanon's, best interest. End summary.

POPULISM AND PARANOIA
--------------


2. (C) On March 16, emboffs called on national electoral
reform commission member Paul Salem. Salem -- who, along
with chairman Fouad Boutros, is one of the commission's two
Greek Orthodox Christians -- said he was amazed at what he
called the Maronite community's "madly paranoiac" penchant
for self-destruction. He said that, over the past two weeks,
Lebanon's Maronites had fallen into the grip of a collective
psychosis over the electoral law, seeing conspiracies in
every corner and obsessed with dark fantasies of betrayal at

the hands of Lebanon's other confessional groups. Even
educated, intelligent individuals were suddenly showing signs
of "stunning ignorance." For example, Aoun bloc MP Farid
al-Khazen, Salem's former colleague in the political science
department of the American University of Beirut, was publicly
denouncing the national commission's draft law as "another
Ghazi Kana'an law," referring to the former Syrian military
intelligence "proconsul" in Lebanon who crafted the unpopular
electoral law of the year 2000, still in effect.

ZIAD BAROUD, CAUGHT BETWEEN TWO WORLDS,
RESIGNS FROM THE COMMISSION
--------------


3. (C) Salem was obviously disappointed at the two
Maronites' resignation, especially that of Ziad Baroud, who
has been a longtime friend and colleague. Salem speculated,
however, that in the end, Baroud was unable to extricate
himself from Maronite communal politics, probably concluding
he would compromise himself if he stayed on the commission.
"Ziad just got stuck in the middle," Salem explained. "He's
always had one foot in civil society and one foot in
'Maronite-stan.' It just got to be too much. He felt that
he couldn't present the real Maronite desires to the
commission. He couldn't present the Maronite view and
maintain his credibility. So he resigned."


4. (C) Salem dismissed the impact of Tabet's resignation,
saying he primarily did it to show solidarity with Baroud,
and because it presented a way to exit a commission on which
he had never been enthusiastic about serving. "His heart was
never in it. Tabet has always wanted to resign since the
moment we started."

PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE
DRAFT LAW,S FUTURE, AND MAYBE TA,IF TOO
--------------


5. (C) Salem, normally one of the most optimistic members of
the commission, was pessimistic that the current electoral
reform project would have any success at all. He criticized
Baroud and Tabet for initiating a dangerous game by playing

BEIRUT 00000873 002 OF 004


the "sectarian card." In resigning from the commission,
Salem explained, they not only put an immediate halt to the
reform process, but also potentially undermined the basic
foundation of the 1989 Ta,if Agreement. That is, by making
such an aggressive play to maximize Maronite representation,
they encouraged other confessions to do the same, Salem said.



6. (C) It is widely acknowledged, Salem continued, that the
Shi'ites are still under-represented in the Ta,if formula.
If Hizballah and Amal decide to follow the Maronite precedent
set by Baroud and Tabet, it would shatter the sectarian
balance that has been the foundation of Lebanon's (relative)
stability for the past 15 years. "This is a dangerous game,"
Salem cautioned, especially considering that either of the
two major districting plans considered by the commission
would have been the best electoral law the Christians have
ever had, allowing pluralities of Christian voters to select
as many as 58 of the 64 seats allotted to Christians in
Parliament.


7. (C) Now, Salem speculated, Lebanon has one or two weeks
to convince Baroud, Tabet, and the Maronites to come back to
the commission, resume talks, and agree on a districting
plan. Otherwise, he said, the damage to the commission's
credibility will be so great as to scuttle the project
entirely. Salem argued that the Maronites are convinced the
electoral law is a plan to destroy them, that Fouad Boutros
is too weak to defend the law, and that the Sa'ad Hariri-led
majority in Parliament is eager to let electoral reform die
on the vine.


8. (C) Salem has been performing daily newspaper and
television interviews to mollify Maronite fears that the
electoral reform process will disenfranchise Christians, but
he is frustrated at being the lone voice. Boutros is too old
and tired to do so, while none of the Muslim members can step
in because they would not enjoy credibility with the Maronite
community on the matter. "I'm the only one," said Salem,
frustrated at the silence of Baroud and Tabet. He argued
that their media silence only fed Maronite fears that the
election law was a plot against them. "If they really
resigned for technical reasons, they need to come out and say
it."


9. (C) Salem agreed that the call by Fayez Hajj Chahine --
the commission's Greek Catholic member -- to replace Baroud
and Tabet was unrealistic in the face of a Maronite
solidarity. The only chance for success, he said, was to get
Baroud and Tabet back to the table. Otherwise, Salem warned,
"We'll see a collapse of the whole effort. There will be no
election law. No early elections. No good elections. In
2009 they'll just slap something together a few weeks before
the elections and we'll be stuck with the same system."

PUTTING ELECTORAL REFORM BACK ON TRACK
--------------


10. (C) Salem said the Maronites must be convinced that it
is in their best interest to return to the table and
negotiate in good faith. The problem, he said, is that there
are no responsible Maronite leaders with the clout to
convince the Maronites to come back. He dismissed Michel
Aoun and Samir Ja'ja' as populists who are cheaply exploiting
Maronite fears of marginalization. Salem thought that Nassib
Lahoud could be reasonable enough, but that he doesn't have
the credibility to convince Maronite extremists.


11. (C) The Maronite Patriarch, according to Salem, does not
even understand the electoral law. In a sense, however, "he
doesn't have to. He just needs to understand that it won't
hurt (the Maronites)." Salem thought that the Patriarch's
sermon two Sundays ago, in which he refused to select two new
Maronite commission members and called on Baroud and Tabet to
rejoin the commission, was helpful. Salem said that the
Patriarch would need a lot of encouragement, however, to
continue making the same message, and to make it strongly
enough that it could be persuasive. In the meantime, Salem
warned, the Patriarch is visited by a "parade of fools" who
try to convince him that the electoral law is a plot to
destroy the Maronites.


12. (C) Barring any clear Maronite leader to bring Baroud
and Tabet back to the table, Salem argued that Lebanon's NGOs

BEIRUT 00000873 003 OF 004


and the international community would have to take the lead.
He said that this was exactly the right time for Lebanon's
civic-minded non-governmental organizations to step in and
persuade the Maronite community to rejoin the electoral
reform process for their own good and for the good of
Lebanon. He said that this is the wrong time to start a
public media campaign emphasizing the importance of electoral
reform; he warned that the Maronites would figure someone was
trying to shove a dangerous law down their throats. But he
argued that a subdued yet persistent campaign by the NGOs to
bring the Maronites back would have a positive effect.


13. (C) Salem also argued for USG help in restoring the
electoral reform process: "See the Patriarch, and see the
ones who seeing him, too," he urged us. Salem said the
United States and the international community could deliver a
strong message without violating the Maronites, sense of
independence by emphasizing the importance of electoral
reform for Lebanon's Christians and Lebanon as a whole.
"Tell them they should be helpful, but that what they're
doing now is not helpful. Explain that the options we have
are the best they've ever seen. If they have concerns, fine.
Bring them to the table. Explain what they want, and what
they're afraid of. But let them know that they are being
ridiculous, and that for something this important, they have
to behave responsibly. They should know that their behavior
now is irresponsible and dangerous."


14. (C) Salem suggested that the United States and the
international community should also communicate some of our
own displeasure that the Maronites are sabotaging an
electoral reform process that we have all supported and
endorsed, and that, if they pull out now, it will make
everyone look bad. "They should know everyone has supported
them on this, but that they are frittering away their best
opportunities now, and that they are making the Christians
look very bad."

SALEM OFFERS TO HELP
--------------


15. (C) Salem admitted that, for the United States to
assuage Maronite concerns, we would need a detailed
understanding of the proposals under consideration. Salem
then offered to see Emboffs again early next week to explain
the major districting proposals, and why they would not
marginalize the Maronites. "I have charts and maps. You'll
need to see these so you can counter their arguments."
Emboffs took Salem up on his offer, and will see him again on
March 21.

COMMENT
--------------


16. (C) Paul Salem's dark pessimism during this meeting was
an almost 180-degree turn from his previous forecasts for
electoral reform. Usually positive and optimistic about the
national commission's progress, Salem's newfound pessimism
suggests the seriousness of the current impasse. True to
form, however, he never showed any personal signs of
resentment or distress, as Baroud had a few days before.
Salem also seems to have a reasonable interpretation of the
political events surrounding the resignations (Baroud and
Tabet's explanation of "technical disagreements" was never
really convincing). In requesting the international
community's help in bringing the Maronites back to the
negotiating table, Salem seems to have a practical
understanding as to how the current situation might be
resolved. His offer to share the details of the commission's
top districting plans demonstrates his bona fides, and it
should give the Embassy a detailed understanding of the
national commission's draft law held by few outside of the
commission itself.


17. (C) Comment, continued: It is also worth noting that
none of the other commission members interviewed by emboffs
in the past few days have been quite as pessimistic as Salem
himself (these meetings will be reported septel). So while
the situation remains serious, it may not be quite as bad as
Salem seemed to think. Baroud and Tabet reportedly met with
Prime Minister Siniora and Commission Chair Fouad Boutros
this weekend, and may be closer to rejoining the commission.
Embassy staff will meet with Baroud for a further update.
End comment.

BEIRUT 00000873 004 OF 004


FELTMAN