MGLE01: LEBANESE FORCES MP DESCRIBES LEBANON'S

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000550

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2016
TAGS: IS LE PGOV PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: MGLE01: LEBANESE FORCES MP DESCRIBES LEBANON'S
"DELICATE EQUILIBRIUM"

Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) MP George Adwan, who represents Lebanese Forces
leader Samir Ja'ja' in inter-communal negotiations, said much
of the rhetoric coming from Michel Aoun and Samir Ja'ja
concerning the tenure of President Lahoud is irresponsible
and dangerous. Adwan believes the inexperience and excessive
emotional involvement of Saad Hariri has complicated matters
and set in motion an unnecessary countdown. He still
believes a "calm and reasonable" solution is possible, but
the wild card remains Michel Aoun, who is indicating by
public comments that he will do almost anything to prevent
the presidency from going to a rival. In Adwan's opinion,
the key to a peaceful resolution is the Maronite patriarch,
Boutros Sfeir, whose status in the community even Aoun would
hesitate to challenge. End summary.


2. (C) MP George Adwan met with the Ambassador and poloff
on February 22 at his office in East Beirut. Adwan, a former
leader in the Maronite Tanzeen militia during Lebanon's civil
war and now a trusted member of the Lebanese Forces political
bloc, moves easily between the various political figures in
Lebanon. He is considered one of the closest advisors to LF
leader Samir Ja'ja', but has enough confidence that he voices
differences with his political boss without much apparent
concern. In recent days, he has maintained close
communication with Aoun, Hariri, Sfeir, Jumblatt, and Ja'ja'.

RECKLESS STATEMENTS
--------------


3. (C) Adwan agreed that recent comments by Michel Aoun and
Samir Ja'ja' had recklessly increased sectarian tensions in
advance of next month's Hariri-inspired deadline for Lahoud
to leave office. (Note: Ja'ja apparently reverted to his
militia mindset when he called Lahoud's attention to the fate
of Romania's former leader Ceaucescu, while Aoun has
threatened to meet any demonstration with forceful
counter-demonstrations, declaring, "...the people of Baabda
(Aoun's supporters) will not let them (March 14
demonstrators) approach."


4. (C) Adwan said he had warned Ja'ja' to "calm down," or
he would dissipate all the goodwill the LF leader had built
up in the Christian community from his 11-year imprisonment.
Concerning the situation in Baabda palace, Adwan maintained
that President Lahoud's son, Emile Emile Lahoud, had just
returned from consultations in Damascus and had issued
instructions to the presidential guard to meet any
demonstrators with force. And finally, Aoun had reportedly
agreed with Hizballah's Hassan Nasrallah that if Aoun's
supporters were unable to turn back anti-Lahoud
demonstrations, Hizballah would respond and "close down the
Baabda region."

THE DELICATE EQUILIBRIUM
--------------


5. (C) Despite these developments, he remarked, there were
positives to consider. First, the just-announced decision by
Lebanese Forces and Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement to field a
"consensus candidate" in the upcoming Baabda-Aley by-election
had essentially removed that potential flashpoint from the
political scene. Additionally, Druze leader Walid Jumblatt
had in the last few days reduced the confrontational tone of
his statements and was working for a solution to the
presidential situation that would maintain peace and
stability.


6. (C) But Adwan rhetorically asked, "what is the price of
ridding ourselves of Lahoud?" Even though he sincerely
wished to see the Syrian-imposed president gone, Adwan said
he would refuse to participate in any effort if the price
were instability, or if Saad Hariri insisted on influencing
the choice of Lahoud's successor. In elaborating, Adwan
voiced a complaint often heard in the Maronite community that
the Hariri-led Sunnis "wanted it all."

A DEAL IN THE MAKING
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7. (C) As a result of intensive consultations, Adwan
believed a deal was possible for a peaceful, constitutional
transfer of presidential power. According to Adwan, the key

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to achieving this is the Maronite patriarch, Boutros Sfeir.
He acknowledged that up until this past weekend, Sfeir had
discouraged precipitous change in Baabda and had been
completely opposed to street demonstrations. But there had
been a sea change on February 20, when the Patriarch
conditionally approved demonstrations, as long as they did
not lead to confrontation with other communities. This
statement, because it was given in an interview with the
country's Arab nationalist newspaper, as-Safir, had resonance
across the political divide -- and made the idea of a
parliamentary election of a new president suddenly feasible.
Adwan maintained that not even Aoun would publicly oppose the
Patriarch if the cleric decided on an acceptable candidate.


8. (C) In the parliament, Adwan conjectured that the March
14 majority would need an alliance with either Aoun (21
delegates),Hizballah (14 delegates),or Amal's Nabih Berri
(15 delegates) to implement an agreement to replace Lahoud.
"We need a deal with one of them." he reasoned. But he also
acknowledged that there were many moving parts in the plan,
and the timeline unwisely set in motion by Saad Hariri did
not make things any easier. In an aside, he commented that
Hariri's relative inexperience in politics was clearly
evident in several of his recent decisions.


9. (C) Another significant unknown, particularly if the
Maronite patriarch expressed support for another candidate,
was whether Aoun would accept anything less than the
presidency. Adwan speculated that even though Aoun has
refused to even discuss the possibility, his recent
discussions with the former general made him think some other
participation in the government may be an option.

THREE STEPS
--------------


10. (C) Bemused about the tendency among March 14 Coalition
members to get far ahead of themselves (and reality),Adwan
said three steps were now needed: urge everyone to reduce
heated rhetoric; convince the Patriarch that conditions were
auspicious for Lahoud to leave; and finally, convene a
meeting of Christian political leaders to agree on an
acceptable replacement for the president. Returning to his
image of the "delicate equilibrium," MP Adwan expressed
cautious optimism that with some compromise from all parties
a peaceful solution was within reach.
FELTMAN