MGLE01: SPEAKER BERRI SAYS HE'S READY TO REMOVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000517

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2016
TAGS: IS LE PGOV PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: MGLE01: SPEAKER BERRI SAYS HE'S READY TO REMOVE
LAHOUD, BUT NEEDS A NAME


Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (d).

SUMMARY
--------------

1. (C) Nabih Berri stated that his "national dialogue
conference," scheduled to run March 2-9, could seal the fate
of President Lahoud, if the participating political blocs can
agree on a consensus replacement. As he has throughout his
career, Berri has assiduously counted the votes and has
concluded that if either Amal (15 deputies) or Aoun (21
deputies) join forces with the March 14 coalition (71
deputies),it would create the two-thirds majority in
parliament needed to replace Lahoud. Although Michel Aoun
remains opposed to any candidate except himself, Berri
indicated he is ready to commit his Amal delegates (which
would create a two-thirds majority) if an acceptable
replacement can be found. Berri is annoyed with the "stupid"
behavior of Saad Hariri in calling for street demonstrations
on March 14 to oust Lahoud, but believes such a
confrontational strategy can be avoided if agreement on a
replacement can be achieved -- an agreement he feels is
within reach because it requires neither Aoun nor Nasrallah.
End summary.


2. (U) Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri met the Ambassador
and poloff on February 21 at his office in Ayn Tine in West
Beirut. Amal political affairs advisor Ali Hamdan also
attended the meeting. Berri indicated he would soon be
leaving for Amman for a meeting of the Arab League, but would
be back in Beirut well before next week's scheduled opening
of his "national dialogue conference."

"I WILL COOPERATE ON ONE CONDITION"
--------------


3. (C) Following a remark on how rapidly things were
changing on the political scene, Nabih Berri referred to a
statement made on February 20 by the religious leader of
Lebanon's Maronite community, Patriarch Boutros Sfeir.
Unlike his previous stated position that street
demonstrations designed to remove Lahoud would be unwise and
damaging to the institution of the presidency, Sfeir had now
declared that demonstrations were permissible, but "not in
front of Baabda Palace" -- to avoid potentially dangerous
counter-demonstrations. According to Berri, by making such a
statement, the Maronite leader moved one step closer to
joining a growing consensus to replace the Syrian-imposed
president. When asked if the patriarch will name a
candidate, Berri commented that the cleric was "too clever"
to publicly declare an acceptable replacement, because if he
did he would antagonize the numerous Maronite candidates not
chosen. All the candidate need be, Berri continued, is
"moderate" and acceptable to the country's diverse
communities.


4. (C) Berri expressed frustration and annoyance that Saad
Hariri, in emphasizing a March 14 deadline, had needlessly
compressed the time available for a consensus solution, but
even so, indicated there was a way to achieve Lahoud's
removal peacefully, "if Saad is smart enough" to seize it.
Berri indicated that preparations for the planned dialogue
conference were moving ahead and it appeared the necessary
parties would attend. As a result, the pieces were in place
for consensus reQlution of the situation.


5. (C) The speaker, who has previously beaten political
odds by astute management of leverage, indicated there were
presently two blocs that, if aligned with the 71 deputies of
the March 14 coalition, could create the two-thirds majority
needed to remove Lahoud and select his replacement.
Acknowledging the obvious, Berri said that unless the
replacement candidate was Michel Aoun, it was doubtful that
the general would ally himself with the Hariri-led coalition.


AVOIDING A POLITICAL VACUUM
--------------


6. (C) But unexpectedly, Berri then said he would consider
taking his deputies into such an alliance on one condition:
"I have to know who it (candidate) is." Berri indicated he
really didn't have a preference, but wanted at all costs to
avoid the dangerous political "vacuum" that would result if
the president were removed without a consensus replacement.
In essence, Berri's deputies would prevent a dangerous
political impasse. More importantly, Hizballah, with its 14
deputies, would not be able to block a Amal/March 14

BEIRUT 00000517 002 OF 002


parliamentary alliance.


7. (C) Similarly, Berri explained it was important to have
a two-thirds parliamentary majority even if Lahoud decided
(unexpectedly) to simply resign, because under Lebanon's
constitution, matters such as the selection of a new
president still required the presence of two-thirds of the
deputies for a legal quorum. Thus, Hizballah would be unable
to subvert the process simply by refusing to attend the
pertinent parliament session.


8. (C) Even though Berri insisted "it would not be
difficult," he conceded that if his "national dialogue"
strategy failed and Lahoud survived past March 14 -- Saad
Hariri's deadline -- there would be a crisis for the March 14
coalition, and the country, if competing street
demonstrations broke out in the already tense capital. In an
aside, Berri said the still-to-be-released ISF investigation
of the violent Sunni demonstration on February 5 would
indicate Syrian and Palestinian involvement was much less
than originally stated, and that Sunni extremism was the real
culprit.


9. (C) Berri concluded, "I accept that Lahoud must go, but
in the street you can do nothing." He said that even though
the timeframe was short, the scheduled March 2-9 dialogue was
the only real solution to the increasing sectarian pressure.
He expressed hope that once the presidential issue was
resolved, Lebanon could begin to address the many pressing
issues it confronted: the truth behind Hariri's
assassination, implementation of UNSCR 1559, and normalizing
relations with its most important neighbor, Syria.

COMMENT
--------------


10. (C) The confidence of Berri is interesting when viewed
in connection with Saad Hariri's similar frame of mind (see
septel). There is the possibility that Berri and Hariri have
already decided to join forces (to create the theoretically
safe two-thirds parliamentary majority) that would explain
their public statements and comments to this Embassy. If
that is the case, it would appear they are playing with an
awfully thin margin for error. But the slight, nuanced shift
in the patriarch's position and the new-found independence of
Berri to consider new alliances could be construed as key
developments that may lead to the constitutional removal of
Lahoud. In addition, it would be good news for Lebanon if
Berri's suggestion that he might split from Hizballah is
sincere. An Amal-Hizballah split would allow other Shia
politicians to emerge, if the current Shia monolith
splinters. But we are not holding our breath at this point.
End comment.
FELTMAN