MGLE01: INFLUENTIAL AOUNIST MP ACKNOWLEDGES FLAWS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000488

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2016
TAGS: IS LE PGOV PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: MGLE01: INFLUENTIAL AOUNIST MP ACKNOWLEDGES FLAWS
IN FEBRUARY 6 COMMUNIQUE

REF: BEIRUT 00413

Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Free Patriotic Movement MP Farid El-Khazen conceded
that the February 6 joint communique of Michel Aoun and
Hassan Nasrallah was a flawed document with ambiguities and
omissions, but should be used as a starting point to prompt a
passive government into action. According to El-Khazen, it
also marked the first time Hizballah's previously open-ended
claims had been confined to specific and measurable
objectives. Concerning the possibility that Nasrallah was
playing Aoun for a fool, El-Khazen emphasized that if it
turns out the Hizballah leader "was bluffing, we should tear
up the communique." El-Khazen agreed that Nasrallah's
sincerity with regard to the commitments made in the document
should be put to the test as soon as possible. He stated the
two most likely issues would be: the status of Lebanese
prisoners being held in Syria, and amnesty for SLA members
who fled the country following Israel's withdrawal in 2000.
El-Khazen admitted the document has several faults and could
have been drafted more carefully, but he reaffirmed an
earlier contention made by Michel Aoun that it was better
than the "evident inaction" of the Siniora government. End
summary.


2. (C) MP Farid El-Khazen met with the Ambassador and
poloff on February 16. El-Khazen, who is a professor and
chairman of the political studies department at the American
University of Beirut, is regarded as the most politically
astute member of Aoun's bloc. Unlike Aoun's close advisor
Gibran Bassil, who consistently demonstrates animosity toward
Saad Hariri and disdain for PM Siniora, El-Khazen's analysis
of the political situation is more measured and places
greater value on cooperation and coordination among the
pro-reform elements in Lebanon.

FLAWS IN THE DOCUMENT
--------------


3. (C) MP El-Khazen voiced concern that the Aoun-Nasrallah
joint communique was a flawed document and its roll-out had
more to do with scoring political points than sound strategy.
He regretted that the document failed to refer to the 1989
Ta'if Accord, which established communal balances in Lebanon,
and is essentially considered an integral part of the
country's constitution. He also admitted the article dealing
with "consensual democracy" could be interpreted to be a
one-way street, particularly when one considers the frequent
unilateralism exercised by Hizballah, such as when it decides
to initiate hostilities along the Blue Line.


4. (C) But El-Khazen emphasized his belief that Hizballah
was the product of 25 years of mistakes and miscalculations
by the Lebanese government, culminating in the July 2005
decision to bring the terrorist organization into the
government. He rebuffed the argument that the February 6
communique gave Hizballah political cover by postulating that
last July's decision was far more egregious in that regard.
As Michel Aoun had argued earlier in the week, El-Khazen
insisted that the communique was a necessary first step to
"fence Hizballah in" and make it commit itself to achievable
benchmarks that would lead to disarmament and the elimination
of Lebanon's state-within-a-state.

EARLY AND CONSISTENT SUPPORT FOR 1559
--------------


5. (C) He argued that Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement (FPM)
was the earliest and most consistent Lebanese advocate of the
disarmament provisions of UNSCR 1559 -- and continues to be a
firm supporter of that fundamental document. The MP from
Jbeil asked that the international community continue its
pressure for comprehensive 1559 implementation, because that
would help maintain momentum for the national dialogue the
Aounists were proposing. It would help propel the process to
move from the communique's "blueprint" to a comprehensive
resolution acceptable to all Lebanon's communities.


6. (C) "This paper is costing us," he insisted, referring
to the widely acknowledged loss of support for Michel Aoun
among the Christian community since the release of the
communique. Like his FPM colleagues, he criticized the lack
of progress by Siniora's government to address the numerous

BEIRUT 00000488 002 OF 002


issues involved in transitioning the country into a stable
democracy. "Perhaps this is a flawed document, perhaps
Nasrallah is not sincere, but at least its a serious
attempt," he commented.


7. (C) El-Khazen, who has represented the FPM across
Lebanon's sectarian divides, was clear that the communique
should have a deadline. He said that Hizballah's commitments
in the document should be put to the test. He agreed with
the idea that the articles dealing with the hundreds of
Lebanese prisoners still held in Syrian jails, and the fate
of the SLA fighters who fled Lebanon in 2000 following the
Israeli withdrawal, would be good starting points. The
influential MP said that if Nasrallah was not willing to
abide by his commitments, "...we should tear up the
communique."

UPCOMING ELECTION IN BAABDA-ALEY
--------------


8. (C) Concerning the contentious by-election in
Baabda-Aley scheduled for mid-March, the moderate El-Khazen
insisted the selection of a "consensus candidate" that could
unify Aoun's forces with the March 14 coalition was still
possible, but the Hariri-led majority was not cooperating.
El-Khazen said that he, along with four other Aounist MPs,
would be meeting with Saad Hariri tomorrow for a condolence
call, but he did not believe the by-election would be
discussed, even though the deadline for filing a candidacy
was only days away.


9. (C) In a new development concerning the by-election,
Aounist MP Ibrahim Kanaan told poloff on February 17 that he
had been representing Michel Aoun in negotiations with
Lebanese Forces MP George Adwan to determine if a "consensus
candidate" was possible. Kanaan indicated that on Sunday,
February 19, the two political parties would make a joint
statement agreeing on such a candidate. Although the deal
was "90 percent" assured and he expected it to go through, he
also expressed anxiety that when dealing with Michel Aoun and
Samir Ja'ja' on any issue, one could never be certain of the
final outcome.

COMMENT
--------------


10. (C) The reasoning used by El-Khazen was similar to the
arguments put forth by Michel Aoun (reftel),but the
El-Khazen was much more willing to put Hizballah to the test,
while Aoun appears more ready to trust his new political
ally. With the growing realization in the Aoun camp that the
communique may not have been the political coup they
celebrated on February 6, the more analytical position of
El-Khazen may prevail, resulting in calls for Hizballah to
deliver on the commitments it has made.


11. (C) Concerning Baabda-Aley, if Ibrahim Kanaan's and
George Adwan's efforts actually come to fruition, the
agreement on a mutually-acceptable candidate may prove to be
an opening that could lead to greater cooperation and
coordination between Michel Aoun and the members of the March
14 Coalition -- which in turn could produce increased
pressure on Hizballah. In an atmosphere of rapidly
escalating tensions that some are starting to fear will
inevitably lead to civil clashes (if not war),we would
welcome a decision on a "consensus candidate," even if that
is not the most democratic solution. End comment.
FELTMAN