MGLE01: ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT SAYS LAHOUD WILL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000482

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR WERNER/DORAN/ABRAMS/SINGH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/18/2016
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PINS LE SY
SUBJECT: MGLE01: ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT SAYS LAHOUD WILL
STAY, REGARDLESS OF CONSEQUENCES


Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador. Reason section 1.4 (b).


1. (C/NF) Summary: Speaking with Polstaff on February 17,
presidential spokesman and advisor Rafiq Chelala said the
President, convinced of the injustice of calls for his
departure, intends to remain in office despite popular
protests. Chelala acknowledged that Lahoud's continued
mandate was sparking a dangerous confrontation in Lebanon.
However, he said the President refuses to leave or accept
responsibility for any friction that arises from his tenure.
Chelala said that Lahoud is being singled out for attacks
because he is an easy target. Politicians like Speaker of
Parliament Nabih Berri, who have just as much history with
Syrian occupation, have been given a pass. The furor around
the presidency is a distraction from Lebanon's real problems
and the continued pressure to remove Lahoud will only lead to
a dangerous confrontation between opposing political forces
that use the presidency as an excuse. With or without
Lahoud, Lebanon faces major problems that cannot be resolved
by the presidency. The majority should move to real dialogue
and allow Lahoud to finish his term. End Summary.

Lahoud is justified in not leaving early
--------------


2. (C/NF) Chelala said the President is firm in his
conviction that he should remain in office for the full
length of his extended mandate, through November 2007. He
rejected the notion that UNSCR 1559 or other legal
maneuvering could render Lahoud's mandate illegitimate. The
President's position is simple; he believes his departure
would create the impression that he was complicit in the
assassination of Rafiq Hariri. He is innocent so he will not
leave office. Perhaps Lahoud's position was hardened by Saad
Hariri's assertion that Lahoud was guilty in the
assassination as the "head of the security apparatus."
Chelala distanced himself from the President, saying he
disagrees with Lahoud on Syria issues, but he added, "Lahoud
represents the Maronite Christian population. If he resigns,
his history will say the Maronite President killed the Sunni
Prime Minister."

Going to the street is dangerous
but not Lahoud's fault
--------------


3. (C/NF) Chelala said he was concerned about talk of a
March 14th demonstration near the presidential palace. "If
there is a demonstration from the March 14th group, maybe
there will be a demonstration from the other side (meaning
Michel Aoun's Christians and Hizballah's Shia)." Chelala
said he did not believe the majority of the Christians wanted
Lahoud removed from office by street demonstrations. He
reviewed the numbers from the recent February 14
demonstration and concluded that only a small minority of the
Christian population took part in the demonstration. "This
was seen as a Sunni and Druze event," he claimed. He
explained that if that same group marched on the presidential
palace calling for Lahoud's ouster, it would be seen as a
Muslim attempt to remove the president. "Do you think that
Christians could unseat the Prime Minister, or Berri? Why
should Christians allow Sunnis to unseat the President?"
That argument was only underscored for Chelala by the
February 16 statement by the Maronite Patriarch restating the
church's long-standing objection to popular protest as a
means to dislodge Lahoud.


4. (C/NF) If the March 14 coalition marches, they will
provoke a reaction from the forces that now oppose them,
Chelala asserted. He was convinced that Michel Aoun's Free
Patriotic Movement and Hizballah would make common cause in
turning out their supporters to demonstrate against the March
14 movement. Referring to Nasrallah's February 16 statement,
Chelala said Hizballah's position is clearly in opposition to
Saad Hariri.


5. (C/NF) "The Army will stop protesters from reaching the
palace," Chelala claimed. He insisted that the Army could
not react as it did on March 14 2005, allowing protesters to
pass barriers against standing orders; "this is the palace,
not Solidere." But he said the responsibility for avoiding a
clash between the army and protesters, which might lead to
bloodshed, lay with the March 14 movement; "They must not
allow this."

Lahoud is not the problem
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6. (C/NF) Chelala repeatedly denied that Lahoud was the
chief problem in Lebanese politics today. He said that if
the majority were serious about political and economic
reforms, it must enter into a national dialogue with all
other parties to reach real programs for change. The
President, Chelala insisted, has done nothing to stand in the
way of this much needed dialogue. He said the President had
offered no opposition to the parliamentary majority in any of
its programs. The single point of contention between the
forces continues to be high-level appointments. Lahoud has
refused to agree to key changes in the upper ranks of the
security and civil services because these changes would ruin
the balance of confessional power in the their respective
services. Chelala defended the President's decisions as
justified by Lebanese tradition and political practice. All
reference to Lahoud was a distraction. Chelala made note of
the fact that the investigation into the death of Rafiq
Hariri has lost currency as an issue on the street. Saad
Hariri has nothing himself to offer the people, Chelala said,
so he offers them Lahoud.


7. (C/NF) The president is an easy target, and his
departure would allow Saad Hariri to count himself victorious
in Lebanon without much effort, according to Chelala. But
after the victory, what could the new president do to address
the real problems of Lebanon, he asked rhetorically. Chelala
also discounted accusations that Lahoud was the last remnant
of Syrian influence. He did not deny that Lahoud was
pro-Syrian, but offered that Nabih Berri was no less
pro-Syrian in his attitudes yet remained immune from
criticism. Chelala pleaded for Lahoud, saying that during
the Syrian occupation he was helpless to act or resign
because of Syria's pervasive influence. Now, with Syria out,
Lahoud is helpless to act because he has no deputies, or
political power. Lahoud's fear of history's condemnation and
his personal pride prevent him from leaving office.


8. (C/NF) Comment: Chelala is one of the last people left
in the presidential palace who can claim to be an insider.
His description of the President, indignant in innocence, and
fearful of his legacy, fits other accounts of Lahoud's
thinking. Now, the stage is set for confrontation; Lahoud is
very unlikely to leave office before March 14. Lahoud
supporters are poised to make the confrontation a
confessional one, portraying the Sunni as trying to remove
the Christian president. A successful march on the Baabda
palace would also test the resolve and cohesion of
Hizballah's Hassan Nasrallah and the FPM's Michel Aoun. For
Lahoud, a key question is whether conservative Christians and
fundamentalist Shia activists would respond to being called
on to demonstrate, arm in arm, in support of him. End
Comment.
FELTMAN