MGLE01: CHIBLI MALLAT'S PLAN TO REMOVE LAHOUD

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TAGS: PGOV KDEM PHUM PTER SY LE
SUBJECT: MGLE01: CHIBLI MALLAT'S PLAN TO REMOVE LAHOUD


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Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Lawyer (and would-be Lebanese president) Chibli
Mallat described to us a plan to remove President Lahoud from
office according to the constitution. Rather than amending
the constitution yet again -- to void the 2004 amendment that
extended Lahoud's term in office -- Mallat called for
Parliament simply to elect a new president, on the grounds
that Lahoud's extension is null and void. The Sa'ad
Hariri-led Parliamentary majority can constitute a quorum,
and Speaker Berri cannot prevent them from meeting to vote.
Mallat said he doubted that even Michel Aoun or Hizballah --
who have both been Lahoud's insurance policy for remaining in
office -- would go all out to keep Lahoud in office in this
case. "March 14 forces" leader Marwan Hamadeh separately
told us he doubted Mallat's plan would work, but said that
the "March 14 forces" would use it as a "weapon" against
Lahoud. End summary.

MALLAT TO ANNOUNCE "SHOCKING" PLAN
--------------


2. (C) The Ambassador, emboff and senior political FSN
called on lawyer, Middle East scholar, and declared
presidential candidate (albeit one with no election, so far,
for which to run) Chibli Mallat at his Beirut law offices on
February 16. Mallat informed us that he planned to hold a
press conference that evening, in which he would announce
what he gleefully described as a "shocking" plan for removing
President Lahoud from office and electing a successor.

PUTTING ARTICLE 74 TO USE
--------------


3. (C) Starting from the premise that any successful attempt
to replace Lahoud must be "as simple as possible," Mallat
said that the key lay in article 74 of the Lebanese
constitution, which outlines the procedures for electing a
new president of the republic in the event that the office
becomes vacant as a result of the president's death or
resignation or -- a key phrase, Mallat pointed out -- "for
any other cause."

WHY LAHOUD'S EXTENSION IS NULL AND VOID
--------------


4. (C) Mallat argued that the "other cause" in this case is
the fact that President Lahoud's extension in office by three
years -- resulting from an amendment to the Lebanese
constitution made in September 2004 -- is null and void. Any
"audit" of the amendment would show that it had been done in
"a forced manner," through Syrian coercion of a large number
of the members of Parliament who voted for it. The extension
was therefore null in void on a number of levels, including
those of the Lebanese constitution, international law
(because it contradicted UNSCR 1559's call for presidential
elections to be held according to the Lebanese constitution),
and universal principles of democracy.


5. (C) It was not necessary to attempt to add yet another
amendment to the constitution that would nullify the
amendment that extended Lahoud's term, according to Mallat.
This would, in any case, be virtually impossible, because the
Sa'ad Hariri-led Parliamentary majority could not muster the
votes to do so. The constitutional requirement for a
two-thirds majority in this case would lead to "paralysis,"
and it was necessary to "avoid anything of a procedural
nature." At the same time, it would be "useless" for
Lahoud's opponents to try to force him out using mass
demonstrations, he added.

EVEN BERRI CAN'T STOP A NEW ELECTION
--------------


6. (C) Rather, Mallat said, the Parliament should simply
follow, to the letter, article 74, which calls for it to
"meet immediately and by virtue of the law elect a
successor." It would not even be necessary for Speaker of
Parliament Nabih Berri to cooperate for this process to
succeed. The Hariri-led Parliamentary majority simply had to
send him a message identifying the problem of a "void" in the

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presidency, and request that he convene Parliament to elect a
new president. If Berri refused to do so, members of
Parliament could meet nonetheless. There were enough in the
majority to form a quorum and elect a president (out of
two-thirds of the quorum on the first round or a simple
majority in subsequent rounds). If Berri tried to lock them
out of the Parliament building -- or if demonstrators tried
to block the way -- they could meet somewhere else. "Don't
give Berri a veto," Mallat warned -- "the moment you do," the
initiative to replace Lahoud would be "dead." (Mallat added
that he understood from MP Ghassan Tueni that Berri would not
oppose this approach, however.)

UN INVESTIGATION STRENGTHENS THE CASE
--------------


7. (C) Mallat noted that opponents of this plan might ask
that, if Lahoud's extension in office has been null and void
all along, why Lahoud's opponents are calling for redressing
this problem only now. In fact, there was a valid reason, he
said. The work of the UN International Independent
Investigation Commission, formed to investigate the February
2005 assassination of Prime Minister Hariri, had focused on
Hariri's meeting with Syrian President Asad in August 2005,
in which Asad allegedly threatened Hariri, in order to clear
the way for Lahoud's extension. Syrian intimidation, and the
link between it and subsequent incidents in Lebanon, namely
Hariri's assassination, made Lahoud's extension in office
illegitimate from all angles -- those of criminal law,
constitutional law, international law, and democratic
practice.


8. (C) Consequently, Mallat said, "there's a legal void"
where Lebanon's head of state should be. The fact that
visiting foreign officials, high-ranking USG officials among
them, have avoided calling on President Lahoud testified to
this. It was an "extremely strong argument" that was pushing
the Maronite Patriarch, Cardinal Mar Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir,
among others, to favor ousting Lahoud, he said.

TIME RUNNING OUT
--------------


9. (C) While there may well be a stronger case for removing
Lahoud on these grounds than there was earlier, Mallat warned
that time was of the essence. Lahoud's remaining in office
meant further "deadlock" at a time when the country could no
longer afford it. The riots in Ashrafieh on February 5 were
a warning of what might yet be to come. "Deadlock creates
its own logic," he said. Without breaking the deadlock,
increasing tensions -- with the government unable to handle
security challenges -- would continue, "slowly turning us
into another Iraq."

DEALING WITH HIZBALLAH AND AOUN
--------------


10. (C) Mallat agreed that there was "absolutely" a danger
that the immediate aftermath of such a process might at least
briefly see two sitting presidents of the republic: Lahoud,
bunkered in the Ba'abda Palace, and whoever the Parliament
chose as his legal successor. However, it "doesn't matter,"
he argued. Most of the country's political actors --
including Michel Aoun and Hizballah, who till now have served
as Lahoud's insurance policy for staying in office -- have an
interest in Lebanon remaining "a normal country." Even they
would start to add pressure on Lahoud to respect the
Parliament's decision. If Lahoud remained defiant, the
government could order his arrest.


11. (C) Hizballah ultimately wants to keep a stake in the
political process and "will not put its life on the line" for
Lahoud, Mallat said. He recommended that the USG approach
seek to "mellow" both Hizballah and Aoun's anxieties about
their own futures in the event of Lahoud's removal. At the
same time, Mallat said, the USG needed to leave no room for
ambiguity about its position that Lahoud must step down.
Otherwise, Lahoud would use this ambiguity against his
opponents, claming that Washington in fact wanted to keep him
in office.

TELL OTHER CANDIDATES: BE LIKE CHIBLI
--------------


12. (C) Mallat took credit for convincing "March 14 forces"

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leaders Sa'ad Hariri and Walid Jumblatt about the necessity
of making Lahoud's removal a priority now. In the event that
his plan succeeded and Parliament held a presidential
election, he urged that the USG and its European allies both
be scrupulous in avoiding the appearance of backing one
candidate or the other and, at the same time, be vocal in
calling for the election to take place on an open, level
playing field. Specifically, the USG and EU governments
should tell other would-be Lebanese presidential contenders
to "run your campaign like Mallat!" That is, he explained,
Mallat's rivals should emulate his unprecedented (for
Lebanon) efforts to run a genuinely public campaign -- with a
platform, press releases, speaking engagements, and the like
-- rather than resort to the old-fashioned -- if tried and
true -- Lebanese approach of striking deals with
Parliamentary backers behind closed doors.

HAMADEH: IT WON'T WORK, BUT IT'S A "WEAPON"
--------------


13. (C) In a subsequent meeting on February 16, Minister of
Telecommunications Marwan Hamadeh told the Ambassador and
emboff that the "March 14 forces" would meet that evening to
launch a campaign to remove Lahoud. He smiled and nodded
when the Ambassador mentioned Mallat's plan, saying he was
familiar with it. Mallat's plan "won't work," Hamadeh said,
"but it will be one of our weapons."
FELTMAN