MGLE01: AOUN PERPLEXED BY CRITICISM, MAINTAINS HE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 000413

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2016
TAGS: IS LE PGOV PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: MGLE01: AOUN PERPLEXED BY CRITICISM, MAINTAINS HE
HAS MADE HIZBALLAH COMMIT ITSELF


Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman. Reason: Section: 1.4 (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) In a lengthy meeting with the Ambassador and poloff,
Michel Aoun expressed astonishment that his February 6 joint
communique with Hizballah's Hassan Nasrallah has generated
such strong criticism. He was resolute in his belief that
the document was actually a significant step forward in his
under-appreciated attempt to pull Hizballah into Lebanon's
political mainstream. When asked to explain the tortured
language of Article 10, which appears to give open-ended
license to Hizballah to retain its militia, Aoun argued just
the opposite, saying the terrorist organization could keep
its arms "only if national consensus allowed it." He then
finessed criticism of the communique's statements dealing
with Shebaa Farms and the "Israeli threat" by arguing that
section was merely a statement of the Government's
responsibilities, not a list of conditions that had to be met
before Hizballah would relinquish its arms. At any rate, he
argued, the document was only a proposed way to move forward,
and it could be modified (and clarified, he admitted) when
all Lebanon's political factions entered into dialogue.
Finally, Aoun expressed deep regret concerning comments he
had made several weeks ago that suggested hostage-taking
during the civil war was justified -- he recounted how he had
worked hard to obtain the release of French hostages, and
honored the sacrifices made by Americans for his country.
End summary.


2. (C) Michel Aoun, leader of the Free Patriotic Movement
(FPM) and aspiring presidential candidate, received the
Ambassador and poloff at his home in Rabieh on February 13.
Senior advisors Gibran Bassil and Ziad Aabs, who served as
Aoun's emissaries in the protracted negotiations with
Hizballah representatives, attended the meeting and provided
explanation and context for the document's frequently
convoluted language.


3. (C) The Ambassador began the meeting with a detailed
critique of the document, emphasizing not only the
communique's troubling ambiguity and inconsistency, but also
the damage it had caused to the international community's
hard work in producing a unified UNSC resolution that
unequivocally called for the immediate and comprehensive
disarmament of all militias in Lebanon.


4. (C) The Ambassador compared the secrecy and lack of
candor in the preparation and release of the Aoun-Nasrallah
communique with the effort made by PM Siniora to keep all
parties involved when he was trying to get the recalcitrant
Shia ministers back to the government. While the USG was not
comfortable with some of Siniora's proposals, at least we
were not surprised and had the ability to offer comments on
the PM's paper (later abandoned). It was also brought to
Aoun's attention that while Hizballah demanded consensus on
almost any issue it wishes, hardly any mention was made of
the glaring lack of consensus when Hizballah decides on its
own unilateral action, whether it be participation in the
cabinet, or responding to perceived provocation along the
Blue Line.


5. (C) But the principal complaint of the U.S., and the
rest of the international community which had drafted and
passed UNSCR 1559, was the "political cover" the communique
appeared to give Hizballah to keep its arms as long as they
desired. The Ambassador reminded Aoun that just as Lebanon
was finding its voice to question the rationale for
Hizballah's state-within-a-state status, the communique had
done a good job of taking the wind out of everyone's sails
and given the terrorist organization an undeserved gift. If,
the Ambassador asked, the point of the document was to help
advance Lebanon's transition to an independent democracy, why
give this proxy of Syria and Iran an excuse to continue its
destabilizing influence.


6. (C) The critique ended with a overarching question: did
Aoun really believe that Nasrallah was sincere, and if so,
would he actually have the freedom of action to comply with
the commitments contained in the document? Lastly, Aoun was
asked to explain exactly what he meant when he said in a
recent interview that many of the hostages taken during the
civil war "were not mere tourists" and had suggested their
ordeals may have been somehow justified.

AOUN RESPONDS

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--------------


7. (C) Aoun, who glanced often at his advisors during the
Ambassador's presentation, took a few moments to collect his
thoughts and then responded that he was surprised by the
reaction and felt much of it was due to misunderstandings.
While his advisor distributed an official version of the
communique, Aoun said he had, for the first time, been able
to make Hizballah commit itself on paper to exactly what type
of country it envisioned. And that vision, argued Aoun, was
a country based on a "civil society" (which he contends was a
major concession for Hizballah),with defined borders, a
strong central government free of corruption, normal
diplomatic relations with its neighbors, and free of foreign
domination. Aoun insisted this document was a major
breakthrough that will eventually force Hizballah to become
Lebanese. He said he has no illusion that Syria will not try
to influence Hizballah to advance Syrian interests, but the
former general said he had countered this threat by making
Hizballah respond to developments that took place only within
the borders of Lebanon, and not connected to regional
developments. He asked his critics to compare these
purported achievements to what he described as the inability
of the Siniora government to attain even the smallest
concession from the politically powerful Shia community.


8. (C) The former general then made the unexpected
statement that he believes Nasrallah is genuinely committed
to breaking Hizballah away from the Syrian orbit, as well as
its Iranian paymasters. When asked to explain his reasoning,
Aoun stated it was clear from the approach Hizballah took in
the protracted negotiations. Bassil commented that the
Hizballah representatives were seriously engaged in each and
every article of the communique -- he maintained they fought
as hard over national structure as they had over the threat
from Israel. Aoun asked: if Nasrallah only wanted an excuse
to keep his arms, why would he engage so thoroughly on issues
that were outside that domain? Even though the document
represented "only a start," Aoun said he was convinced that
the terrorist organization eventually wanted to come in from
the cold. In support of his theory, Aoun noted that the
document even referred to Israel, not "Occupied Palestine,"
in describing the location of the former SLA fighters and
families.


9. (C) Concerning the Byzantine wording of the communique's
Article 10, "The Protection of Lebanon and the Preservation
of its Independence and Sovereignty," Aoun admitted it may
have been preferable to have clearly broken these ideas into
their separate components: limits on Hizballah's rights to
possess arms; the responsibilities of the Government to
protect Lebanon, and lastly, the formulation of a national
defense strategy through national dialogue.

BINDING HIZBALLAH
--------------


10. (C) When asked if the wording didn't effectively create
an open-ended excuse for Hizballah, Aoun firmly countered
that a careful reading of the text locked in Hizballah with
"two bounds": the organization could only keep its weapons
if the rest of Lebanon agreed, and only until such time as
"objective conditions" (defined by national dialogue) were
achieved. At that point in the text, according to Aoun, the
focus shifts completely to the responsibilities of the
government. These were defined as: the liberation of Shebaa
Farms, obtaining the release of "resistance members" (i.e.,
prisoners) from Israel, and protecting the country from the
threat from Israel. When questioned whether Nasrallah and
Hizballah's leadership interpret the text in the same manner
as he just did -- as consensus could mean that Hizballah
could always veto any disarmament desires by the rest of
Lebanon -- Aoun and Bassil vigorously affirmed tht this was
the case. Bassil argued that the intensity of the
negotiations underlined the fact that a sea change was
occurring.


11. (C) When asked why Hizballah would concede such a
significant point (i.e., placing the justification of the
resistance in the hands of the entire body politic),Aoun
again returned to his belief that this document was a
breakthrough and would eventually lead to an integration of
Hizballah into a democratic Lebanon. Admitting somewhat the
possible remoteness of this happening, Aoun hastily added
that Article 10 was only a "framework" that required
continuing dialogue with the government and all the
communities of Lebanon.

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12. (C) Aoun completed his defense of his "breakthrough" by
rhetorically asking what was actually being accomplished by
constantly attacking Hizballah. Aoun said that his
experience over the past several months had convinced him
Nasrallah was serious. He re-emphasized that he understood
the difficulties, especially the ties that bound Hizballah to
Syria and Iran, but he argued that the organization was not
going away anytime soon, and his plan was merely a beginning
that perhaps could yield highly desired results. He then
took one last swipe at the government by asking what else
could one do "in the absence of government policy."

MISINTERPRETED COMMENTS
--------------


13. (C) The former general also responded to the
Ambassador's question regarding his recent statements on
foreign hostages taken during Lebanon's civil war. Aoun
expressed deep regret that his words had caused such concern.
He professed himself to be "America's friend" and said he
respected and honored the many sacrifices Americans had made
for his country. He related how during the war, he worked
hard to resolve French hostage situations. Aoun maintained
that he understood the "pain" the situation had caused in
America and was sorry his words were "misinterpreted" and
taken out of context. He assured the Ambassador he had
"denounced hostage taking before, and he would again."

RETURN OF SAAD HARIRI
--------------


14. (C) As the meeting concluded, Michel Aoun said he had
spoken by phone with Saad Hariri, who had just returned to
Lebanon from a six-month absence, and said that Saad would
soon be sending a representative to the General's home. Aoun
expressed hope that much-needed discussions would soon take
place, but he demurred on specifics.

COMMENT
--------------


15. (C) Aoun seemed mystified, even hurt at times, that the
USG was critical of a document that he argued, with seeming
sincerity, he had used to corner Hizballah. But, whatever
his intentions vis-a-vis reining in Hizballah, we still
believe that there was another agenda at work, too. Given
Aoun's undisguised unhappiness with Hariri et al., it seems
certain that the meeting between Nasrallah and Aoun was also
intended to be a blow to the March 14 coalition. After all,
Nasrallah was able to settle scores with Walid Jumblatt
(intensely disliked by Aoun) over Jumblatt's "betrayal" of
Hizballah, and with Sa'ad Hariri and Fouad Siniora for their
relationships with the United States and France. In just one
meeting, Aoun secured the backing of up to a third of
Lebanon's population -- and a key non-Christian bloc -- for
his presidential quest. In Lebanon's complicated and
sensitive confessional system, Aoun won what would be in
practice essentially a Shia confessional veto against any
other presidential candidate.


16. (C) Even though a week has passed since the
Aoun-Nasrallah summit, how this will play on the Christian
street, Aoun's primary base of support, remains to be seen.
On the one hand, Christians are generally skeptical about
Hizballah's aims and worried about Hizballah's
state-within-a-state status. Our public questioning of the
Aoun-Nasrallah document has given some Christians second
thoughts, we understand. Also, some Christians may be
disgusted at the unseemly pictures of Aoun joyfully embracing
Nasrallah and smiling broadly throughout Nasrallah's press
comments. On the other hand, Christians remain fearful and
furious over the ostensibly anti-Danish riots on 2/5. The
Sunni leaders of Lebanon -- Sa'ad Hariri and Fouad Siniora --
were unable or unwilling to prevent their fellow Sunnis from
vandalizing churches and Christian-owned property.


17. (C) In contrast to the ugly images of Sunni rioters, a
day later, another Muslim leader of Lebanon -- Nasrallah --
showed deep respect for Christians by agreeing to go to a
church to see Aoun. As if that gesture was not sufficient to
boost Aoun at the expense of the March 14 forces, Nasrallah
then hinted publicly that it may be time to see how to bring
home the families and fighters of the South Lebanese Army,
who are predominately Christian and who have been in exile
since Israel's May 2000 withdrawal from southern Lebanon.
While we doubt Nasrallah is really prepared for an SLA

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amnesty, the clear message to Lebanon's Christians is that
the March 14 majority produced Sunni riots in Christian
neighborhoods, whereas Aoun can get the most powerful single
Muslim leader to show respect and address a nagging issue of
the Christian community. Many Christians, reeling from the
2/5 riots, will no doubt find this message appealing.


18. (C) If Lebanon's presidential elections were held today
and conducted by popular vote, Aoun would probably win: The
Shia, roughly a third of the population are with him, thanks
to yesterday's meeting. To get over the 50 percent mark, he
would only need to get about half the Christian voters. This
is not good news for the March 14 parliamentary majority.
But presidents in Lebanon are elected by the parliament, not
the population at large. The 73-member (out of 128 seats
total) March 14 majority would never elect Aoun, meaning that
we need to watch for calls for early parliamentary elections
that could, in the current climate, create a majority that
would be a coalition of pro-Syrian and pro-Aoun MPs to
parliament.


19. (C) As for the document that Aoun and Nasrallah
blessed, we note that it contains some of the very language
that we had cautioned Hariri and Siniora to abandon when they
were drafting language to end the Shia cabinet boycott. With
his presidential ambitions overriding any other concern, Aoun
appears to us -- but apparently not to him -- that he has
given Hizballah a green light to keep its arms for as long as
Israel could pose any plausible threat. Whatever he may tell
us or believe himself, in practice, Aoun has moved a long way
from his earlier support of UNSCR 1559.
FELTMAN