BERRI TO UNVEIL NEW INITIATIVE; CABINET FORMULA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 003908

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/29/2026
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM PTER LE SY
SUBJECT: BERRI TO UNVEIL NEW INITIATIVE; CABINET FORMULA
APPEARS UNWORKABLE

Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY AND COMMENT
--------------


1. (C) In back-to-back meetings on 12/28 with the U.S.,
French, and Saudi ambassadors, Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri
revealed a "National Salvation Government" initiative that he
proposed to announce publicly over the Eid al-Adha holiday.
Describing Amr Moussa's diplomacy as dead, Berri claimed that
he had not yet cleared his new proposal with his Hizballah
partners. He hoped for international support in marketing
the idea to March 14 leaders. While the devil is always in
the details, in general the five tasks he assigns to his
National Salvation Government are sensible and already
included in various forms in other initiatives: finishing up
the tribunal, approving Paris III reform measures, electing a
new president (while rehabilitating Emile Lahoud throughout
the remainder of his extended term),completing legislative
electoral reform and discussing the possibility of early
legislative elections (which Berri clearly does not want),
and completing the process of renewing the constitutional
court. But Berri's initiative will undoubtedly falter on its
cabinet breakdown: a ten-member cabinet, with three from the
March 14 majority, three from the March 8-Aoun opposition,
and four "neutral" ministers. This would deprive the March
14 majority from even having a blocking minority, and the
initial reactions from March 14 leaders to hints of Berri's
proposal are predictably negative. We agree that Berri's
proposal requires too many concessions from the March 14
majority and that Moussa's proposed 19-10-1 cabinet breakdown
a far better deal. Nevertheless, we are encouraging our
March 14 contacts not to slam the door on Berri so hard as to
provoke a dangerous reaction from March 8-Aoun forces.
However constrained Berri is by his Syrian-Iranian-Hizballah
handcuffs, he seems eager to avoid street escalation. End
summary and comment.

BERRI PROPOSES 10-MEMBER
"NATIONAL SALVATION GOVERNMENT"
--------------


2. (C) With promises of revealing a new initiative, Berri
summoned the U.S., French, and Saudi ambassadors to
back-to-back meetings on 12/28. In his meeting with
Ambassador Feltman (the second of the series),Berri claimed
that "you are only the second person to hear this idea," as
he insisted that he had not shared the idea yet with his
Hizballah and Aounist allies. Drawing parallels to a 1984
cabinet headed by Rashid Karami, Berri said that he wanted to
solve the current political crisis through a 10-member
"National Salvation Cabinet" consisting of three ministers
from the March 14 majority, three ministers from the March
8-Aoun opposition, and four "neutral" ministers.


3. (C) Unfolding a piece of paper with handwriting scrawled
across it, he said that the cabinet, following Lebanon's
complicated confessional formulas, would consist of two
Sunnis, two Shias, a Druse, two Maronites, a Greek Orthodox,
a Greek Catholic, and an Armenian. March 14 would pick the
two Sunnis and the Druse. March 8 would pick the two Shias
and one of the Maronites (who should be, Berri said, Michel
Aoun). The remaining four Christians would be neutral, with
the mechanism for their selection still undetermined. Fouad
Siniora could remain as Prime Minister, although Berri hoped
that the Hariri family would choose someone "less
controversial" as PM. Someone like Bahia Hariri (sister of
Rafiq, aunt of Sa'ad) would be good, Berri said, chuckling
sheepishly (as if caught with his hand in the cookie jar)
when the Ambassador noted that Bahia's continued election as
a Sidon MP makes her dependent on Berri's support. As for
the neutral ministers, Berri indicated that Zahle MP Ily
Skaff -- currently allied with Aoun, although showing some
independence -- would be good, as would former nonagenarian
Minister Fouad Boutros (who, despite sympathies in the
direction of March 14, would be physically unable to maintain
a rigorous cabinet schedule).

FIVE TASKS
--------------


4. (C) The National Salvation Cabinet would have five
tasks, Berri continued:

-- Discuss the details of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon;
make any needed adjustments; work with the UN to incorporate

BEIRUT 00003908 002 OF 003


those adjustments; and submit the tribunal documents to
parliament for ratification. The parliament would open in an
extraordinary session to ratify the documents. When the
Ambassador tried to draw Berri out on exactly what were the
problems in the existing tribunal documents, Berri refused to
be drawn out, claiming (implausibly) that, still annoyed with
Siniora's handling of the issue, he had still not read the
papers.

-- Work quickly to "save" Paris III. When the Ambassador
noted that Paris III planning seems to be proceeding well and
not in need of salvation, Berri shook his head. Paris III
will require reforms. Reforms require new laws to be passed
by Parliament. This requires agreement among the Lebanese.

-- Elect a new President of the Republic ("like we did with
(Elias) Sarkis," who was also elected in advance) while
simultaneously rehabilitating Emile Lahoud for the remainder
of his term in office, until late November 2007. "You know I
can't stand Lahoud," Berri said (a statement we believe has
the virtue of being true),"but this has to do with the
constitution -- it is better to have the president sign" the
tribunal, laws, etc.

-- Complete the process of legislative electoral reform, by
submitting to the parliament the draft election law developed
earlier this year by the Boutros Commission. Parliament will
discuss early elections. Elaborating on the latter point,
Berri said that he did not want earlier parliamentary
elections, and he knows that the March 14-dominated
parliament would never agree. But, to satisfy some of the
pro-Syrian and Aounist politicians, the topic has to be
included among those to be discussed. "We can talk and talk
and talk about it," he laughed.

-- Complete the cabinet and parliamentary process to appoint
a new constitutional council.


5. (C) The Ambassador asked about the cabinet decree that
has to accompany any proposed cabinet slate to the parliament
for the vote of confidence: would the cabinet decree for the
National Salvation Government include the language in the
existing decree on "protection of the Resistance" that March
14 leaders would no longer publicly endorse? Berri said that
the cabinet decree should be "short and simple,"
concentrating on the five tasks before the government.
"Let's not make this too complicated. We can't solve
everything at once." The Ambassador asked whether Berri
would be able to deliver Michel Aoun, given that the
chronology of the five tasks seemed to preclude the
possibility of an Aoun presidency. Without answering, Berri
waved his hand dismissively, as if to indicate that Aoun did
not matter.

MOUSSA'S PROPOSAL "DEAD"
--------------


6. (C) When the Ambassador noted that in many ways the Amr
Moussa proposal seemed more attractive, Berri said that he
"never" supported Moussa's 19-10-1 cabinet formulation: it
would be "unconstitutional" for one minister not to vote.
Under Berri's new initiative, the four neutral ministers
could fulfill their constitutional roles fully, voting on
issues as each saw fit. Moreover, Berri said, Moussa's
initiative is "dead -- nobody likes it." The Ambassador said
that it not how we understood the situation; it seemed to us
that Berri's allies wanted to kill the initiative but that it
still enjoyed much support. "No, that's not true," Berri
responded; "nobody likes the idea." If Moussa returns in
early January, he will discover that he has nothing to work
with.

NO STREET ESCALATION
--------------


7. (C) The Ambassador asked Berri about some of the threats
to escalate March 8-Aoun actions after the completion of the
'Eid al-Adha/New Year's holiday. Suddenly pointing upwards
as if he remembered something, Berri said that, upon the
announcement of the National Salvation Government, all
protesters would leave downtown Beirut. And if Berri's
initiative is not accepted by March 14 leaders? While
admitting that he did not have other options, Berri rejected
the idea that people would close down the roads or overrun
the Grand Serail.


BEIRUT 00003908 003 OF 003


SELLING THE IDEA
--------------


8. (C) The Ambassador asked Berri how he planned to market
his initiative, which the Ambassador speculated would be an
extremely hard sell to March 14 leaders. Berri said that,
first, he needed to hear back from messengers he had sent
that day to see Hizballah and Aounist representatives, to
make sure that his own allies support the idea. He planned
to use Saudi Ambassador Khoja (who came back prematurely from
a Hajj trip upon Berri's request) to peddle the idea to the
March 14 leaders. The Ambassador questioned why Berri could
not speak directly with Fouad Siniora, Walid Jumblatt, Saad
Hariri and others. Shaking his head, Berri said that direct
talks would depend on knowing in advance that "we have
something to work with." The Ambassador expressed skepticism
that the proposed cabinet formulation would be acceptable to
March 14 leaders but noted that, if there was Lebanese
consensus behind a solution that preserved the tribunal and
Lebanon's constitution, we would likely be supportive.


9. (C) Subsequently, the Ambassador met separately with
Saad Hariri and Marwan Hamadeh, both of whom found much to
criticize in Berri's proposal. While the five tasks looked
reasonable, Hamadeh warned that "we have to watch the details
to avoid a trap." As we would have expected, the breakdown
in cabinet numbers is unacceptable to Hariri and Hamadeh.
Both the U.S. and French ambassadors (who compared notes in a
separate 12/28 meeting) suggested to Hariri and Hamadeh that
the door not be slammed shut in Berri's face so hard as to
provoke a street reaction. When Berri makes his proposal
public -- which could be as early as today -- we suggested,
do not reject it out of hand but keep the dialogue going.

COMMENT
--------------


10. (C) Assuming the tribunal is approved before any
cabinet change, Amr Moussa's proposal for a 19-10-1 cabinet
split is far more attractive than Berri's new initiative.
Even under Moussa's proposal, March 14 leaders have made some
important concessions: giving up the two-thirds "super
majority" needed for major decisions and agreeing to a
commission to look again at the tribunal documents (and thus
opening up the tribunal). There is also implicit acceptance
that Lahoud will remain in office for the remainder of his
term, even if early presidential elections occur. Now, Berri
proposes to go even further, by stripping March 14 of even
the blocking minority (one-third-plus-one) inside the
cabinet. The March 14 majority would vanish from the
executive branch. At this point, there is not even an
ironclad guarantee that the tribunal will be approved or that
the March 8-Aoun bloc will allow an acceptable presidential
candidate to emerge. The only tangible benefit we see from
Berri's proposal is the mere fact that it exists and that
Berri seems determined not to rely on street escalation.
FELTMAN