LEBANON: MARCH 14 LEADERS SEE PRO-SYRIANS, AOUN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 BEIRUT 003895

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING
STATE FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/FO:ATACHCO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/24/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER EFIN LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: MARCH 14 LEADERS SEE PRO-SYRIANS, AOUN
ESCALATING

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Classified By: Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ambassador. Reason: 1.4 (d)

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Fouad Siniora, Marwan Hamadeh, and Saad Hariri report
that the March 8-Aoun opposition forces are hardening their
positions and that street demonstrations, despite the holiday
lull, are not going away. Despite Vladimir Putin's vocal
support for Lebanon and apparent warnings to Bashar Asad,
they believe that Syrian determination to stop the Hariri
tribunal remains as strong as ever and, coupled with
Damascus' tactic of using Lebanon as a bargaining chip with
Riyadh and the USG, could lead to further violence in
Lebanon's political crisis. Meanwhile, March 8-Aoun forces
continue to reject generous and elaborate compromise
proposals proffered by the GOL in conjunction with the Arab
League, and they threaten escalation in the near term
including possible road blockages and an airport shutdown.
Demonstrators in downtown Beirut are reportedly receiving a
minimum of $20 for each day they camp in the opposition's
tent city, but sanitary and social conditions there are
deteriorating. The rump cabinet is examining the possibility
of enacting the tribunal statute by cabinet decree, and is
considering other ways to cope with a government effectively
missing two branches: a parliament which has barely convened
in its now-expiring regular session and a president who
represents no one but Damascus. The cabinet has asked UNIIIC
to aid with investigations not only of the November 21
assassination of Industry Minister Pierre Gemayel but also of
the recent arrest-suicide of an Al-Qaeda leader at Beirut
International Airport and the seizure of explosives and
weapons in the hands of a pro-Syrian group that may have ties
to Gemayel's assassination. Saad Hariri and Justice Minister
Charles Rizk are actively engaging with Hizballah
representatives to attempt to arrive at a tribunal statute
that Hizballah can live with, but it remains unclear whether
Hizballah is negotiating in good faith or merely putting up
the appearance of accepting the tribunal. End Summary.


2. (C) The Ambassador and Polchief called on four of
Lebanon's top government leaders -- Prime Minister Siniora,
Communications Minister Hamadeh, Justice Minister Rizk, and
Mustaqbal Party leader Saad Hariri -- on December 23, the
Ambassador's first full day back in Lebanon since the Chiefs
of Mission conference. Despite the current relative lull in
Lebanon's political activity, none of our interlocutors were
optimistic. While unsure what opposition leaders' next moves
may be, they believe their positions are hardening and that
they are far from giving up and going home. Violence, our
contacts suggest, is more rather than less likely after the
New Year.

SINIORA SATISFIED
WITH RUSSIA TRIP
--------------


3. (C) The Prime Minister offered a readout of his Moscow
meetings and his followup conversation with Russian Foreign
Minister Lavrov. Siniora, who traveled to Moscow with
Justice Minister Charles Rizk, Information Minister Ghazi
Aridi and Culture Minister Tarek Mitri, told us with
satisfaction that he had been received "as a head of state."
He came away from his meeting with Putin pleased, convinced
he had "left an impression on him" and that the Russian
President had offered a lot of "eye contact." On the other
hand, Putin made clear to Siniora that his ability to
influence events in the region -- in particular Syria's
behavior -- was limited. He said he did not want to "make
Russia's Lebanon policy through Syria" and expressed his full
support for the tribunal. (According to Rizk, Putin added a
caution that the tribunal should not be used to attempt to
destroy the Damascus regime.)


4. (C) Putin joined Siniora in deriding Ayatollah Ali
Khamenei's declaration that Iran would "defeat the United
States in Lebanon" and expressed general irritation with
Iran. Siniora assured Putin that he did not intend to
forcibly disarm Hizballah, and Putin condemned assassinations
in Lebanon. The PM then had a 20-minute one-on-one with
Putin in which, among other things, Putin told Siniora that
he "respects American interests in the Middle East." (Note:

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It is not entirely clear what Putin was trying to tell
Siniora by this comment, although he may have been hinting
either at an increased GOR alignment with USG interests or
winking at the Lebanese opposition's characterization of
Siniora as an American ally or puppet. We asked Siniora for
his interpretation of this remark, which the PM clearly found
significant. Siniora shrugged and smiled ambiguously. End
Note.)


5. (C) Following Syrian President Asad's visit to Moscow
December 20, Lavrov phoned Siniora to tell him that Putin had
emphasized Lebanon's independence to Asad and urged him to
"play a constructive role in Lebanon." Asad had "played the
same old broken record" in Moscow, Lavrov told Siniora.
Later, Lavrov would hold a press conference to declare that
Russia would not take sides in Lebanon's political dispute,
that the tribunal should not be "politicized," and that Syria
should open an embassy in Beirut forthwith. For his part,
after his return from Moscow Asad publicly acknowledged that
he had received "advice" from Putin and commented that
"advice is different from orders."

BUT AFTER ASAD SEES PUTIN,
HIZBALLAH'S POSITION HARDENS
--------------


6. (C) Siniora commented that, according to Arab League
Secretary General Amr Moussa, who had just returned to Beirut

SIPDIS
from Damascus, Asad's positions on the tribunal and on
Lebanon had "hardened" since his Moscow visit. Similarly,
Siniora claimed that Sudanese envoy Mustapha Osman Ismail had
told him that Hizballah leader Hassan Nasrallah's position
was also getting tougher. Nasrallah now demands to be the
one to choose the "independent" minister in the Arab League's
proposed 19 10 1 formula for an expanded cabinet (in essence
turning the formula into a 19-11 proposal, which would not be
acceptable to March 14),and also seeks reapproval of the
tribunal by an expanded cabinet, Siniora found out from
Ismail. The Ambassador noted the strange chronology of the
past week: Siniora has a positive visit to Moscow, Asad has
a reportedly negative visit, and then both Asad's and
Nasrallah's positions on key questions in Lebanon harden.
Siniora added that Moussa told him only a Saudi-Syrian deal
could bring resolution in Lebanon.


7. (C) Siniora told Moussa that his approach to the political
crisis rested on two principles: 1) that neither side should
come out of it either completely victorious or completely
defeated; and 2) that all steps in any eventual bargain
should be taken simultaneously, so that neither side would
suspect it is being deceived. Earlier in the week, he and
Moussa had discussed a solution in three phases. In Phase
One, the cabinet's earlier approval of the tribunal would be
withdrawn, an extraordinary session of Parliament would be
declared to discuss the tribunal, a group of six (including
two neutral jurists and two representatives from each
political camp) would convene to address the tribunal's legal
aspects, and demonstrators would be asked to leave the
streets. In Phase Two, the independent minister and new
opposition ministers would be chosen and the cabinet (either
the existing cabinet or the expanded cabinet) would address
the tribunal again. In the third and final Phase, Parliament
would vote on the tribunal and the PM would sign the decree
to expand the cabinet (unless that had already taken place in
Phase Two).


8. (C) Siniora noted that the pro-Syrian/Aounist opposition
had already rejected this proposed solution and he cast doubt
on its interest in accepting a solution or a tribunal. The
opposition is pushing things toward further deterioration and
doing all it can to tarnish the reputation of the Prime
Minister and other March 14 leaders, including the spreading
of vicious (and sometimes risible) rumors about collaboration
with Israel and involvement in assassination of their own
members. On the other hand, the opposition's options are
narrowing; any escalation in tactics, including blocking
roads or shutting down the airport, will bring them in direct
confrontation with the Army. Meanwhile, Free Patriotic
Movement Leader Michel Aoun is losing support among
Christians and becoming more desperate.

REPORTED MUALLEM THREAT

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AGAINST LEBANON AND IRAQ
--------------


9. (C) "The country is being hijacked" Siniora said, despite
his and his government colleagues' having acted in good faith
and shown extraordinary flexibility, and the fault lies with
Damascus. Siniora related to us that Syrian Foreign Minister
Walid Muallem had told a group of Emiratis that "if there is
a tribunal we'll close our border with Lebanon and open our
border with Iraq," wreaking havoc on the economy of the first
and the security of the second. Even aside from the tribunal
issue, Damascus wants to use Lebanon as "bait" or a
bargaining chip to obtain whatever benefits it might obtain
from Saudi Arabia and other countries. Furthermore,
Siniora's advisor (and former Washington Ambassador) Mohammed
Chattah speculated that should the USG embark on an effort to
aid Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas in his
conflict with Hamas, Iran and Syria will strike at Lebanon as
a way to retaliate against the USG. Syria will likely
respect some limits in Iraq, he noted, but Lebanon remains a
soft target.

BUT GOL MOVING FORWARD ON TRIBUNAL;
REQUESTS UNIIIC HELP ON OTHER CASES
--------------


10. (C) Siniora noted that the GOL is pushing forward with
the tribunal anyway. Its 70 MPs have signed a petition
demanding that Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri convene an
extraordinary session to vote on the tribunal. Meanwhile,
government lawyers are exploring options to make the tribunal
law without resort to the Parliament -- according to Siniora,
the Lebanese constitution allows the cabinet to make law as
long as no fiscal or multi-year implications are involved,
and if the financing and duration elements of the tribunal
can be smoothed, the tribunal might be passed by the rump
cabinet alone. Finally, the PM has asked the United Nations
International Independent Investigating Commission (UNIIIC)
to give its assistance not only in investigating the
assassination of Industry Minister Pierre Gemayel but also in
the investigation of two more recent developments: the
suicide of an Al-Qaeda leader by cyanide while attempting to
leave Lebanon through the Beirut International Airport and
the December 21 seizure of a cache of weapons and explosives
belonging to the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) in
Koura.


11. (C) Similarly, the PM concluded, the government is
pushing forward with its preparations for the proposed
January 25 Paris III donors conference, and has shared its
economic reform paper with Treasury, the International
Financial Institutions, and with other donors. The GOL has
also continued its reconstruction efforts, the PM added,
disbursing funds for the reconstruction of several villages a
day on average.


HAMADEH SEEKING TO RELY ON CABINET,
NOT PARLIAMENT, TO ADOPT TRIBUNAL
--------------


12. (C) Druze Minister of Telecommunications Marwan Hamadeh
amplified the PM's gloomy outlook and determination to find
creative ways for the GOL to survive. Hamadeh, who asked his
"Liqa Demokrati" (Democratic Gathering) bloc's lawyers to
examine the PM's proposed enactment of the tribunal by
cabinet decree, opened his copy of the Lebanese constitution
with us and read the relevant passages. Hamadeh acknowledged
that the Chamber of Deputies would eventually have to pass
the tribunal, in particular to deal with elements including
the death penalty and financing. He seemed confident,
however, that the cabinet could find the authority to enact
the tribunal at least on a year-by-year basis.

HAMADEH REMAINS OPPOSED TO GIVING
BLOCKING MINORITY TO PR0-SYRIANS, AOUN
--------------


13. (C) Hamadeh previewed for us that the next cabinet
session would address three important issues: 1) a bonus for
the Army, which has been stretched to the breaking point by
its deployments to the south and to downtown Beirut; 2) the

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long-overdue telecommunications reform, by appointing a
telecommunications regulatory board Emile Lahoud had long
opposed; and 3) the Paris III economic reform package. Apart
from conducting such normal business and avoiding its own
dissolution, Hamadeh noted, there is another reason the
cabinet must avoid at all costs granting the opposition a
blocking one-third-plus-one share. With his copy of the
constitution still open, Hamadeh showed us that a two-thirds
cabinet vote would be needed to dissolve the Parliament in
the event it fails to meet during its normal session. As the
Parliament has met only twice during its (now-expiring)
session and as the Speaker may be reluctant to convene the
body when its next session begins in mid-March, that is a
step the cabinet might eventually see fit to take. The
one-third-plus one is not just a blocking minority, Hamadeh
said, but also a "toppling minority."


14. (C) Hamadeh hailed the LAF's seizure of the SSNP weapons
cache, and noted that two Druze arrested in the raid -- one a
known contract killer -- may have been implicated in Pierre
Gemayel's assassination. On the regional implications of the
crisis, Hamadeh accused the opposition -- Hizballah, Iran,
and Syria -- of plotting the downfall of the Lebanese way of
life and of the West's vision for the Middle East in general.
Although for now the Saudis are for now satisfied that they
have blocked the opposition's advance in Lebanon, Iran is
approaching Riyadh with deceitful proposals regarding its
proxies in Lebanon and elsewhere. Meanwhile the Saudis are
trying to find out Hizballah's and Syria's bottom line on the
tribunal -- in particular, whether it is the tribunal's
connection of 14 (now 15, with Gemayel's murder) crimes which
represents a problem for them, or whether it is the statute's
provision making superiors culpable for the crimes of their
subordinates.


15. (C) Finally, Hamadeh condemned Marada Party leader and
ex-Interior Minister Suleiman Franjieh's December 22
statement to the press that the opposition might begin
blocking roads and closing the airport. Hamadeh sent word to
Franjieh that if he took such actions he would only block his
own constituents' movement and disrupt the economic life of
the country, with terrible "boomerang" effects on his north
Lebanon region as well as on the south and the Beqaa.
Hamadeh added that an essential element of the government's
strategy must be to split Michel Aoun, or a substantial
number of his followers, off from Hizballah.

HARIRI ARGUES THAT IRAN
DOESN'T MIND THE TRIBUNAL
--------------


16. (C) Mustaqbal Party leader Saad Hariri and his ally,
former MP Ghattas Khoury, struck a defiant tone in their
meeting with us. Hariri differentiated between the Syrian
and Iranian interests in Lebanon and their backers. The
Iranians have no concern regarding the tribunal, he
speculated, and noted (as Hamadeh had hinted) that Tehran was
talking to Riyadh about the subject. Iran is eager to avoid
the perception that it is responsible for stirring up
Shia-Sunni tensions in Lebanon, Hariri said, and for that
reason the opposition has been speaking almost entirely
through Christian leaders such as Michel Aoun and Suleiman
Franjieh lately.


17. (C) Despite this, the Christian community has become
increasingly aware and alarmed about the Iranian "project" in
Lebanon, and only a reluctance to embrace Lebanese Forces
leader Samir Geagea has kept Aoun's support as strong as it
is. Meanwhile March 14 leaders have agreed that in their
public statements they would largely refrain from taking
opposition leaders on directly, referring instead to the
Iranian-Syrian plot toward Lebanon. The Sunni community in
Lebanon is more united than ever, Hariri claimed.

DISMISSING BERRI, PRAISING MOUSSA
--------------


18. (C) Hariri dismissed Speaker Berri: "There is no longer a
Nabih Berri -- he is a section, not even a branch, of
Hizballah." Berri's rejections on Hizballah's behalf are
what has scuttled Amr Moussa's initiative. Despite this,
Moussa's intervention has been helpful. His statement that

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Lahoud should serve out the remainder of his presidential
term was clever, Hariri believes; Moussa maintains that
presidential elections should precede parliamentary
elections, and that proposed sequencing would virtually rule
out parliamentary elections before the end of 2007.

DEBATING MERITS OF USING PARLIAMENT
TO APPROVAL SPECIAL TRIBUNAL
--------------


19. (C) On the tribunal, Hariri floated the idea of convening
a parliamentary session to address the issue. With Berri
wanting nothing to do with the tribunal, the session would be
led by Deputy Speaker Farid Makari and consisting of March
14's 70 MPs (all of whom have already signed a petition to
Berri seeking such a session). Parliamentary ratification of
the tribunal is important, Hariri maintained, because
international treaties supersede national law under the
Lebanese constitution. Nevertheless if the tribunal is
enacted by the cabinet alone, it can receive state funding as
long as it is not multi-year funding, Khoury claimed, and
yearly renewal of the tribunal would require no more than a
simple majority of the cabinet.


20. (C) Hariri told us that Hizballah had sent him a message
to the effect that the linkage of the 15 crimes was not a
problem for them. He hinted at ongoing negotiation with
Hizballah on the tribunal, saying that the next few days
represented a "window of opportunity to find a solution based
on what we want and what they want." Hizballah is concerned
the text is too broad and could eventually be used to pursue
Hizballah for attacks not related to the 15 recent cases.

URGING THAT SYRIA UNDERSTAND
POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF MISBEHAVIOR
--------------


21. (C) Despite the ongoing engagement with Hizballah on the
tribunal it remains a target for them, along with the
implementation of Resolution 1701, because Hizballah resents
losing control of south Lebanon, Hariri believes. In order
to implement both the tribunal and the resolution the
international community needs to put much more pressure on
Damascus. Syria withdrew from Lebanon in 2005 because Asad
feared for the survival of his regime, but he does not feel
that fear anymore. Repeating his frequent refrain that the
Syrians need to understand the consequences of potential
misbehavior, Hariri proposed to us that the USG should meet
back-channel with Asad and share with him a list of specific
Syrian military and infrastructure targets that would be
subjected to a military strike in the event Asad continues to
frustrate the implementation of the tribunal and Resolution

1701.


22. (C) On engagement with Syria, Hariri indicated he
understood that USG policy was unlikely to reverse in the
near future. He told us that Paris had obtained EU agreement
that any approaches to Syria would be undertaken by EU
Foreign Minister Javier Solana, and that the EU member states
would exercise more discipline in dealing with Damascus to
avoid the exploitation of any differences in their policies.
Finally, he mentioned to the Ambassador that he had told
Senators Dodd and Kerry during their December 18 visit that
engaging with Syria is the moral equivalent of engaging with
Al-Qaeda.

SUBSIDIZED STREET DEMONSTRATIONS,
POSSIBLE PARLIAMENTARY DEFECTIONS
--------------


23. (C) On street action, Hariri conveyed to Speaker Berri
that March 14 leaders are not afraid of the opposition's
threat to escalate their activities. Khoury told us that the
opposition demonstrators are receiving $20 each for spending
the day in Riad al-Solh Square, and slightly more than that
for each night they spend, along with a stipend for each
tent. March 14 can also send supporters into the street, he
informed Berri. Hariri told us, though, that March 14 would
not demonstrate against the Speaker's Ain al-Tine
headquarters for fear that such a move could inflame Shia
resentment and suspicion, but demonstrations targeting
President Lahoud in Baabda could "hit them where it hurts,"

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he judged.


24. (C) Recent Sunni pro-government demonstrations in the
Beqaa might help to calve Zahle MP Ily Skaff off from the
Aoun-Hizballah axis. (Note: Skaff controls four seats out of
seven "Aoun allies" in Parliament, and their defection would
reduce Aoun's bloc from 21 to 17, removing his justification
for demanding one-sixth of the cabinet seats. Should the
Armenian "Tashnaq" party, which has with only one day's
exception notably absent from March 8 demonstrations, also
take its two seats out of the bloc, Aoun's count could drop
from second-largest in the Parliament to fifth place. End
Note.) Finally, Hariri and Khoury told us that March 14
leaders intend to plan "something big" on February 14, 2007
to mark the second anniversary of Rafiq Hariri's
assassination.

RIZK, PESSIMISTIC, SEES TIME
0N THE SIDE OF THE PRO-SYRIANS
--------------


25. (C) Finally, Ambassador and Polchief lunched with Justice
Minister Charles Rizk at his home. Rizk, for security
reasons, has been working since the beginning of the crisis
mostly from his apartment in the multi-story apartment block
his family owns. He had installed several security upgrades
in the past few weeks, including a guard shack at the
entrance to the building's small parking lot and a metal roof
over the lot to prevent observers from noting his movements
into and out of the building. Polchief believed Rizk looked
tired and grey compared with the last time he had seen him,
in mid-November.


26. (C) Rizk was clearly depressed and pessimistic on the
subject of the demonstrations. He felt that the opposition
was capable of keeping its supporters in the square
indefinitely, pressuring and slandering the government and
ruining Beirut's business district, and that eventually
something would have to give. He decried sanitary conditions
in the tent city as deplorable, and noted that the
demonstrators had intentionally defiled parts of the Solidere
area because of the project's image as part of Rafiq Hariri's
legacy. (Note: A member of Solidere's Board told Polchief
two days earlier that Solidere's stock price had fallen by
10% since the demonstrations began, and that the outlook was
very negative. End Note.) The demonstrators have the
advantage over the government in terms of motivation and
stamina, Rizk believes.

TRYING TO GET HIZBALLAH
ON BOARD FOR TRIBUNAL
--------------


27. (C) Rizk showed us official, ready-to-sign copies of the
tribunal agreement on UN stationery, but told us he would be
meeting with Hizballah representatives later that evening to
discuss modifications. Rizk could not tell whether Hizballah
would accept the tribunal text at all, regardless of how it
might be edited, but told us there was no alternative but to
try. Rizk told us that Hizballah's apparent main concern
about the tribunal's eventual ability to reach back in time
to prosecute their operations in the 1980's and 1990's was
completely unfounded. The tribunal text clearly delineates
the scope of its authority as beginning with the October 2004
assassination attempt on Minister Hamadeh, and he planned to
make that argument clearly with them. If, as Hizballah
claims and as Rizk believes, Hizballah had nothing to do with
the wave of attacks that began with the Hamadeh attack, they
have nothing to fear from the tribunal.


28. (C) Rizk shared the PM's assessment (as had all our
interlocutors) that the two remaining tribunal elements that
may be problematic for Hizballah or for their Syrian allies
are the linkage of the 15 crimes (which would imply a Syrian
campaign against Lebanon's political leaders) and the
tribunal's authority to try superiors for the actions of
their subordinates. Rizk's approach to Hizballah is intended
to explore which of these elements, if not both, represents a
red line for them and Damascus.


29. (C) Rizk hinted at flexibility on both elements, but
insisted that the tribunal must remain meaningful. Finally,

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the Minister expressed weariness, frustration and
disappointment with Prime Minister Siniora's leadership. He
feared the PM would dither on his suggested modifications for
the tribunal instead of moving quickly to signature with the
UN. He described a PM who is more a technical mind than a
born politician, and said that Siniora has remained far too
inflexible during the crisis. Siniora needs to find a way to
bend more to opposition demands without breaking on crucial
issues.

FELTMAN