MGLE01: JUMBLATT AND HAMADEH TRYING TO HEAD OFF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000386

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SUBJECT: MGLE01: JUMBLATT AND HAMADEH TRYING TO HEAD OFF
FEBRUARY 14 FIASCO

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Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) During a 2/9 meeting with the Ambassador, the two
Druze pillars of the "March 14" camp, Walid Jumblatt and
Marwan Hamadeh, were receptive to arguments that a large
rally marking the one-year anniversary of former Prime
Minister Hariri's would carry serious risks. They agreed
that creative alternatives were worth examining, but said
only Sa'ad Hariri (who is convinced of his own ability to
pull off a mass public display of support) could make the
final decision. Hamadeh suggested that Sa'ad Hariri must be
planning to return to Lebanon, finally, before 2/14. If so,
he needed to "appease" Christians. Hamadeh suggested that
the recent agreement between Aoun and Nasrallah might die a
quiet death because of Christian reservations. Jumblatt held
out hope that a clash between "March 14" forces and Aounists
in a coming by-election could be avoided. With Syria's
Lebanese allies on an "insult campaign" offensive, Jumblatt
and Hamadeh said that Arab mediation efforts needed to be
re-worked (Jumblatt may go to Egypt and Saudi Arabia to try
to do so) and the UN investigation into Rafiq Hariri's
assassination needs to "move." End summary.

PLANNING FOR FEBRUARY 14
--------------


2. (C) During a February 9 call on Jumblatt, the Ambassador
and emboff suggested to Jumblatt that, given the atmosphere
following the February 5 riots in Ashrafieh and this week's
Aoun-Nasrallah compact, it might be worth thinking about the
implications of organizing a mass demonstration to
commemorate the one-year anniversary of Rafiq Hariri's death
on February 14. The fact that Hizballah and its allies will
probably try to use trade unions to stage large, disruptive
anti-government rallies in the near future was another reason
to consider a different approach.


3. (C) Jumblatt said it would be "absolutely right" to
consider a different approach. In the current situation, it
would be impossible to recreate the massive, peaceful, and
confessionally mixed (mainly Sunni Muslim, Christian, and
Druze) crowd that assembled on Beirut's Martyrs' Square on
the one-month anniversary of Hariri's death. A decision to
do something different could only come from Sa'ad Hariri,
however.


4. (C) Jumblatt explained that Sa'ad Hariri wanted a massive
rally. (Comment: Hariri, in a secure telephone conversation
with the Ambassador prior to this meeting, directly expressed
his intent to do so.) This was easier said that done without
the participation of Christians, whose enthusiasm for
rallying together with Sunni compatriots considerably
diminished after Sunni mobs ransacked the Christian district
of Ashrafieh -- which adjoins Martyrs' Square -- on February

5. The Ashrafieh incident had been a "big setback," Jumblatt
said.


5. (C) The Hariri-led "March 14" forces had not exactly
helped themselves the next day with the statement its
leadership issued from Jumblatt's Beirut residence, sans
Jumblatt (who, out of security concerns, continues to confine
himself to his increasingly heavily fortified ancestral home
in the Chouf Mountains). It was a "ridiculous" statement,
Jumblatt said, appearing somewhat irked that it had been
issued from his house. Trying to explain the statement's
over-the-top assertions, Jumblatt explained that, "when you
stay in Qortaba" -- the Mount Lebanon village in which March
14 leaders Fares Soueid and Samir Franjieh, the statement's
principal authors, have confined themselves for security
reasons -- "you get strange ideas."


6. (C) As for the plans for this February 14, Jumblatt said,
"we'll work on it, Marwan and I." (Telecommunications
Minister and fellow Druze political ally Marwan Hamadeh,
together with MP Na'ameh Tomeh, had by this time arrived at
Jumblatt's mountain fortress to join the meeting.) He was
particularly concerned about the danger of February 5-style
provocations in the event of a large rally, and not only on
Martyrs' Square. Participants heading to a large rally from
the Chouf area, for example (comment: presumably mostly

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Druze, with some Sunnis) would have to cross predominantly
Shi'a areas on their way to central Beirut, so there would be
multiple potential trouble spots on the way.

IS SA'AD HARIRI ON HIS WAY BACK?
--------------


7. (C) The Ambassador said that Sa'ad Hariri -- who, also
for security reasons, has remained outside Lebanon for months
-- had conveyed unshakeable confidence in his own ability to
organize a massive rally on February 14. "That means he's
coming" (back to Lebanon),Hamadeh replied. He explained,
"to deliver, you have to be on the ground." He predicted
that Hariri's return would draw masses of people to his
residence in Beirut's Qoraytem neighborhood. Potentially,
this crowd would filter from Qoraytem to the site of the
explosion that killed Hariri's father -- which will be
reopened finally on February 14 -- turning it into a place of
"pilgrimage."


8. (C) Hamadeh and Jumblatt agreed that a smaller-scale
commemoration focused on the site of Hariri's death -- one in
which the "March 14" forces did not try to compete with their
performance last year -- had much to argue for it. They
agreed to try to make the case to Sa'ad Hariri in a secure
telephone call.

CALL ON PATRIACH, APPEASE THE CHRISTIANS
--------------


9. (C) Assuming Sa'ad Hariri really does return to Lebanon
in time for February 14, all agreed that it would be
important for him to call on the Maronite Patriarch. This
would provide incentive for Christians to join pro-Hariri
Sunnis and others in a rally that might otherwise see only
the hard core of the Lebanese Forces representing the
Christian community. Hariri needed to "appease" the
Christian community after what had happened in Ashrafieh,
Hamadeh said.


10. (C) Hamadeh reflected on the alternative of banning
large rallies altogether and having the March 14 forces come
up with another, more creative way of commemorating Rafiq
Hariri's death, one that would avoid the risks inherent in a
large rally. The government would need to base any decision
to ban large rallies on the findings of acting Interior
Minister Fatfat's investigation of the events of February 5.
Otherwise, the government would just be seen as conceding
that its supporters cannot gather a large enough crowd. "We
have to succeed in this operation, no matter how big or small
it is," Hamadeh said, "we can't afford a defeat."

READING THE AOUN-NASRALLAH DEAL
--------------


11. (C) Hamadeh said that the Aoun-Nasrallah deal "should be
enough for Christians to put question marks" over Aoun, who
had wound up giving Hizballah "more than what (Prime
Minister) Siniora was ready to give." Confronting the
Aoun-Nasrallah deal directly might backfire; it was better
simply to let Christians "ask questions about what it
includes." While the potential failure of the deal would do
nothing to bring Shi'a Muslims into the "March 14" camp, it
at least offered the possibility that "March 14" would stop
hemorrhaging its Christian support. Some "hints from
outside" might help in this regard, Hamadeh said, nothing
that Lebanon's Christians have historically been more open to
the West.


12. (C) Hamadeh said he expected Aoun, as a next step, to
attempt to get the "March 14 forces" on board with the same
agreement. He also questioned the political acumen of Prime
Minister Siniora's advisors. (Comment: Since this meeting,
we have heard credible reports of back-channel negotiations
between Siniora's chief of staff, Mohamad Chatah, and Aoun's
son-in-law and advisor, Gebran Bassil. Hamadeh's two
comments here make more sense in light of this. End
comment.)

BA'ABDA-ALEY RACE: NO COMPROMISE YET
--------------


13. (C) While he was skeptical of recent polls indicating
that Aoun's supporters would soundly defeat the "March 14

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forces" in the upcoming by-election in the Ba'abda-Aley
district, Jumblatt repeated his conviction that it was better
to avoid a confrontation. Whether a compromise candidate
could be found depended on Lebanese Forces leader Samir
Ja'ja'. He was not certain of the status of the efforts to
reach a compromise, but expected an update from two Aoun bloc
MPs coming to brief him on the Aoun-Nasrallah agreement.

ARAB MEDIATION NEEDS IMPROVEMENT
--------------


14. (C) Referring to last month's ill-fated, ill-received
"Saudi initiative" to mediate between the SARG and the GOL,
Jumblatt said that "we need an Arab context" for a solution
of Lebanon's current problems. However, the "Saudi
initiative" would do nothing to restrain the SARG. It was "a
trap." "We have to work again on the Saudis," said Jumblatt,
who hinted that he might travel to Saudi Arabia and Egypt in
the near future.

UNIIIC NEEDS "TO MOVE"
--------------


15. (C) "We'll work on the Saudis," Hamadeh said, "but we
also need the UN investigation to move." Doing so could
boost the "March 14" forces. "We need just one warrant
against one Syrian" issued by the UN International
Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC),even if it
does not lead to an arrest, in order to shift the momentum
that has been going in the direction of the SARG and its
allies in Lebanon. The Ambassador urged that Sa'ad Hariri
agree to meet UNIIIC Commissioner Brammertz in Europe.
(Hamadeh mentioned that he had had a one-and-a-half hour
interview with Brammertz, and came away impressed that
Brammertz "is after winning this case.")

THE "INSULT CAMPAIGN" -- WHERE'S WAHHAB?
--------------


16. (C) Describing how the SARG's allies in Lebanon were on
a multi-front offensive, Jumblatt said that "the insult
campaign" against the "March 14" forces continues. We asked
about the now-ubiquitous former "loyalist" minister and
"renegade Druze," Wi'am Wahhab. He seemed to be everywhere,
we noted. "Especially Damascus," replied Hamadeh. Wahhab
appeared to be "involved in all the plots," added Jumblatt.

COMMENT
--------------


17. (C) Following the meeting, Hamadeh contacted the
Ambassador. He had attempted to make a case to Sa'ad Hariri,
along the lines described above, to reconsider plans for
February 14. However, Hariri remained unshakeable in his
faith in his own ability to pull off a massive, peaceful
rally. Hamadeh recounted Hariri describing a plan to have
the crowd flow from the site of the explosion to the Hariri
grave in central Beirut, but steering clear of the Christian
neighborhoods on the far side of Martyrs' Square so as to
avoid any provocations. We wish we were as optimistic as
Hariri as to the success of the rally.
FELTMAN