LEBANON: SENATOR NELSON'S MEETING WITH DEFENSE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 003843

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/SINGH
STATE FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/FO:ATACHCO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2016
TAGS: MARR PGOV PREL PTER LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: SENATOR NELSON'S MEETING WITH DEFENSE
MINISTER MURR

Classified By: Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ambassador. Reason: Section 1.4 (d
).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Elias Murr
explained to Senator Bill Nelson that Syria has three
immediate objectives in Lebanon: to produce political chaos
by supporting proxies like Hizballah, to regain its former
control of the Lebanese government, and to re-establish its
past hegemony over the surrounding region. Murr focused his
concerns and warnings on the reported interest by the USG to
improve relations with the Syrian government, in an effort to
gain Syrian help assistance in Iraq. Murr warned about
allowing Syria a "free hand" to interfere in Lebanon to
create political chaos and re-assert its control. He stated
that Syrian President Bashar al-Asad and his regime had not
changed its behavior or policies towards Lebanon and will
always treat it like a Syrian possession. Otherwise, Murr
indicated that since July 2006, there had been no reports of
arms smuggling across the Syrian border. Murr thanked the
Senator for the 300 HUMVEES that will be delivered by the
U.S. to the Lebanese Armed Forces(LAF) over the next year.
End Summary.

Murr: US/Syrian Cooperation Comes
at the Expense of Lebanon
--------------


2. (C) Senator Nelson and his staff, along with the
Ambassador and Emboffs, met with Deputy Prime Minister and
Defense Minister Elias Murr at his residence on December 14.
Senator Nelson started by giving a readout of his meeting
with Syrian President Bashar al-Asad on December 13. The
Senator expressed his concerns about Syria's behavior in the
region and indicated he remained firm about steps that Syria
had to take before further improvement in U.S. relations
could occur. Asad indicated the he was open to cooperating
on border control issues dealing with Iraq. The Senator
indicated that the Brammertz Report had also noted Syrian
cooperation in its investigation. Listening to Senator
Nelson's comments, Murr expressed his concerns and caveats
about the press reports that USG would open a dialogue with
the Syrian regime to gain its assistance in Iraq. Murr
cautioned against allowing Syria to regain control of
Lebanon. Murr was adamant that the Syrian regime, especially
President Asad, had not changed. Asad was taking advantage
of the USG's dificulties in Iraq for his own political
survival. Asad was "playing for time" in the hope that
political developments might relieve the international
political pressure on his regime.

Murr: Different Words,
But Same Regime
--------------


3. (C) Murr reiterated that nothing had changed in the Syrian
government, especially with regard to its behavior on
regional security issues. Murr cited the continued lax
security by the Syrian regime on the Syria/Iraq border,
allowing militants to enter Iraq, and Syria's continued
support of Islamic militants in Palestinian refugee camps in
Lebanon, describing this as more than conjecture. Murr
indicated that from 1998-2004, when he had been Interior
Minister, he had seen the Syrian connection with Hizballah
militant cells trained in the Biqa' Valley. He claimed that
during his tenure he broke up many of the cells. To make a
point of the dangers of confronting Syria over its militant
proxies in Lebanon, Murr claimed that his reward for breaking
up these cells was the "100 kilos of TNT" used to attack him
in an assasination attempt in July 2005.


4. (C) Murr indicated that the Syrian President has given him
the impression that he was "set on proving" that the Bush
Administration's Middle East policy is a failure. Asad,
while publicly signaling cooperation with the USG on regional
security issue in the region, still sees the U.S. as an
"enemy spy" that needs to be removed from the region. He
will continue to covertly promote anti-U.S. policy goals by
means such as support for Hizballah and Palestinian militant
groups, as well as al-Qaeda, and continue to interfere with

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pro-Western governments in the region, like Lebanon, all as a
way to regain Syrian influence in the region.

The Roots of Asad's Behavior
--------------


5. (C) Murr went further to describe the personality of
Syrian President Asad and the roots of his behavior. Murr
indicated he knew "Bashar" since he was a young man. He
related his personal views on Asad. Bashar al-Asad had an
inferiority "complex" and was living in the shadow of his
father, Hafez al-Asad. Due to his educational background, in
medical science, he had grown up outside the normal paths to
power in Syria, which are the military and intelligence
services. After becoming President, he has tried to
overcompensate, in large part for political survival, by
trying to appear tougher on traditional Syrian political
issues like Palestian statehood and Syrian influence in
Lebanon. He had learned a perverse policy lesson from his
father, specifically, that a "burned" Lebanon means a secure
Syria. Murr had to admit that even after all these years,
talking to Asad is like talking to someone in a "different
language" and he sees Lebanon as Syria's "Hong Kong." Murr
has told Asad that Syria could have "many friends in the
Lebanon" if it would stop trying to maintain its dominance
through military and covert actions.

Real U.S./Syrian Cooperation
Requires Change in Regime
--------------


6. (C) Murr was frank about prospects for the U.S. engaging
with the Syrian regime. He indicated that it would take a
wholesale change in the government before any real diplomatic
opening will produce a safer and secure region. Murr argued
that if an election were held today in Syria, the "Alawite
regime" would be replaced immediately with a moderate "Sunni"
regime. Murr felt that a Sunni government in Syria would be
more conducive to regional stability and less interested in
meddling in Lebanese internal affairs.

Murr: No Arms Smuggling
Across Syrian Border
--------------


7. (C) Senator Nelson asked whether arms smuggling across the
Syrian border continues. Murr stated that no arms smuggling
had taken place or had been reported since July 2006. He
went further to say that this cut in arm supplies was one of
the reasons why Hizballah was publicly attacking the Siniora
government. Hizballah was finding it difficult to smuggle
arms into Lebanon. He pointed out that for the first time in
30 years, a "free" Lebanese government is controlling the
Lebanese military. Syrian-supported militant groups are
finding it hard to re-supply their inventory. When the
Senator brought up the Israeli claims of arms smuggling to
Hizballah across the Syrian border, Murr countered that with
all the overflights of Israeli combat jets, drones and
satellites, if "one truck of arms tried to cross that border,
Israeli F-16 jets would destroy it." (Note: Murr has made
this claim in other meetings. It is not clear on what sources
he is basing his positive assumption about the absence of
arms smuggling. End note.)

LAF are Stretched Monitoring the Border,
Request for Surveillance Equipment
--------------


8. (C) Senator Nelson brought up the future delivery of 300
HMMVWs to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). Murr thanked the
Senator and Ambassador for the assistance. Murr stated that
his forces are currently stretched to the limit. He
specifically cited the 8,000 troops deployed to monitor the
Lebanon/Syrian border. He said he was looking for assistance
in obtaining radar and surveillance equipment to help reduce
the number of troops required. Murr stated that he would
prefer that this equipment come from the U.S., but with the
needs of his forces so great, he would consider European
sources if necessary.

The Outlook for Hizballah Integration
into the Ranks

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--------------


9. (C) Murr stated that current LAF strength stands at 59,200
troops. The sect breakdown for the armed forces stands at
84.5 percdent Christian, Druze and Sunni and 15.5 percent
Shia. The officer corps is set at a 50-50 split between
Muslims and Christians. Murr recounted for us that when he
came on as Defense Minister, Shia soldiers accounted for
approximately half of the LAF's then-40,000 troops.
Recognizing that Hizballah's fighters are almost all Shia,
Murr allowed the LAF to shed several thousand Shia troops, on
the pretext that Hizballah would one day be folded into the
LAF. In so doing, he reduced the Shia component of the LAF's
troop strength to less than the "legal" requirement of
one-third. He gave the impression that he did not expect
Hizballah ever to join the LAF. When the Senator inquired
about the likelihood of Hizballah laying down its arms, Murr
in a quick response, said "never."


10. (U) This message has been cleared the staff of Senator
Nelson.


FELTMAN