MOUSSA INITIATIVE FALTERING; SINIORA WARNS US TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 003834

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2026
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM LE SY
SUBJECT: MOUSSA INITIATIVE FALTERING; SINIORA WARNS US TO
STAY OUT

Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) While Moussa tried to project optimism during his
press conference here this afternoon, March 14 leaders report
on 12/14 that Hizballah and Nabih Berri have rejected Amr
Moussa's initiative to solve Lebanon's political crisis.
Berri blames the breakdown instead on inflexibility by March
14 figures. PM Siniora told the Ambassador that the sticking
point for now is Hizballah/Berri revisions to the Moussa
proposal for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. The two sides
also have not agreed upon how to choose the "neutral"
minister in a 19-10-1 cabinet split. While Berri has asked
the Ambassador to get the USG to get involved in the details,
Siniora and Jumblatt have urged the opposite -- that we stay
on the sidelines for now. Berri's game, they argue, is to
point to high-profile U.S. shuttle diplomacy as the cause of
any breakdown in the talks, to deflect attention from their
own roles. On a related matter, Siniora told us that he
plans to probe the Russians during his 12/15 meeting with
Vladimer Putin on the idea of the UNSC establishing the
Special Tribunal under Chapter VII. Berri continues to press
us on trying to get March 14 to back off using the parliament
for now. End summary.

MOUSSA INITIATIVE FAILS
TO ACHIEVE BREAKTHROUGH
--------------


2. (C) Although Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa's
just-concluded press conference suggested that diplomatic
efforts will continue, the Moussa initiative has as of 12/14
failed to bridge the gap between the March 14 majority and
the March 8-Aoun forces. PM Siniora, Minister of
Communications Marwan Hamadeh, MP Walid Jumblatt, and MP Saad
Hariri, speaking with the Ambassador by phone, all blamed
Hizballah and Nabih Berri for rejecting Moussa's idea. By
contrast, Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, who initiated a
call to the Ambassador, countered that March 14 had been "too
stubborn and inflexible" in rejecting proposed revisions
submitted by March 8 forces.

OPPOSING VIEWS ON SCENARIO
FOR ESTABLISHING TRIBUNAL
--------------


3. (C) From what we understand at this point, Moussa's
multi-part initiative faltered on the element related to the
Special Tribunal for Lebanon, although -- as Siniora noted --
had that issue been solved, other obstacles remain,
especially related to the selection process for the "neutral"
minister in an expanded cabinet. Moussa proposed that a
six-person legal commission, divided equally between March 8
and March 14 experts, would study the tribunal documents.
The commission would work with the UN on any proposed
changes, to make sure that UN/OLA and UNSC members were on
board. After that, the commission would submit the documents
directly to the parliament for ratification, without further
reference to the cabinet or President. Under Moussa's
initiative, the cabinet expansion to thirty ministers
(divided 19-10-1) would take place more or less
simultaneously with the establishment of the commission to
study the tribunal documents, but the cabinet expansion and
the tribunal study commission are two entirely separate
tracks that, while part of a larger, comprehensive package,
do not have a direct bearing on each other.


4. (C) Berri and Hizballah countered with a revision of
Moussa's proposal: once the commission studying the tribunal
finished its work and won UN/OLA and UNSC concurrence for any
changes, the tribunal documents would return to the cabinet
for a new approval process, including submission again to
President Lahoud for consideration. Moreover, because the
cabinet expansion would be complete by the time the
commission finished its work, the March 14 majority would no
longer have the two-thirds majority needed to approve the
tribunal documents. In Hamadeh's view, this gives the
pro-Syrians multiple opportunities to block the tribunal: by
slowing or hindering the commission's work, by preventing
cabinet approval, by invoking the presidential powers to
complicate the issue, and then preventing the second cabinet
decision needed to override Lahoud's inevitable objections.
When questioned by the Ambassador about the intentions of the
proposed revision, Berri claimed that the cabinet would have

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to re-approve the tribunal documents anyway, as the Siniora
cabinet "doesn't legally exist and its decisions don't count."


5. (C) March 14 rejected Berri and Hizballah's proposed
revisions (which Hamadeh was quick to note Moussa had never
adopted as his own but passed on as ideas to consider). In
Hamadeh and Jumblatt's analysis, the Berri and Hizballah
revisions show clearly what most people suspected all along
-- that stopping the tribunal is the immediate goal of the
March 8-Aoun demonstrations. Speaking to the Ambassador on
the margins of Codel Nelson's meeting with PM Siniora,
Mohamed Chatah (senior advisor to Siniora) said that he had
further "hints of Syrian guilt" when he was on consultations
in Turkey earlier this week. The Turks, Chatah claimed,
shared with him concerns about the tribunal that the Syrians
had given them. The Syrians reproduced all of President
Emile Lahoud's objections, with special emphasis on two
points: the Syrians insisted on removing all references that
could widen the tribunal's authority beyond the single case
of Hariri's assassination, and the Syrians wanted to ensure
that senior officials would bear no responsibility for
subordinates' actions.

SINIORA, JUMBLATT URGE
USG TO STAY ON SIDELINES
--------------


6. (C) Berri, both directly by phone and via his foreign
policy advisor Ali Hamdan, has today asked the Ambassador
insistently for USG direct involvement, to help get March 14
to be "more flexible" regarding the tribunal. Approached by
the Ambassador for how the USG could play a constructive role
in the immediate negotiations, both Siniora and Jumblatt said
that they smelled a trap. They believe that Berri ("who
after all can pick up a phone and call me directly," Siniora
said) is trying to lure the Ambassador and USG more broadly
into playing a shuttle-diplomacy role that would be a win-win
situation for March 8 forces: if the USG succeeds in getting
March 14 leaders to bend to March 8 ideas, that would be good
for the pro-Syrians. But, even if March 14 stays firm in
rejecting the Hizballah-Berri revisions on the tribunal and
the Moussa initiative fails definitively, then Berri and the
pro-Syrians can point to all of the USG interventions to
argue that the two sides were on the verge of a deal, but the
USG scuttled it. This would distract people from the real
story, which is Hizballah and Berri's rejection of the Moussa
initiative. Stay on the sidelines for now, Jumblatt urged.
"We'll let you know when you can play a constructive role,"
Siniora said,

USING RUSSIA TRIP
TO PROBE ON CHAPTER VII
--------------


7. (C) Siniora also told the Ambassador that, when he is
received by Russian President Putin on 12/15, he plans to
discuss the tribunal. He wants to probe the Russians about
having the UNSC invoke Chapter VII to establish the tribunal.
If the Russians look at this idea favorably, Siniora said,
then maybe "we can give Nabih what he wants" -- an avoidance
of using the parliament altogether. Berri, in his
conversations with us today, kept up the steady drumbeat of
warnings that provoking the parliament now would lead to even
greater problems.

COMMENT
--------------


8. (C) Moussa told the Lebanese that he would return early
next week to try again; by refusing to admit failure, Moussa
helped prevent a deeper crisis that would have been provoked
by a total breakdown in talks. As for USG involvement, we
see circumstantial evidence that Siniora and Jumblatt's
suspicions might be well-founded: the pro-Syrian press has
been running articles already claiming that the USG has been
involved in heavy-handed interventions aimed at derailing the
Moussa initiative and specifically its elements on a National
Unity Government. In any case, with Siniora out of the
country until sometime over the weekend, we expect the
diplomatic channels to quiet down temporarily.
FELTMAN