Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BEIRUT3810
2006-12-11 16:42:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

HINTS OF A DEAL IN THE AIR, BUT MARCH 14 LEADERS

Tags:  PREL PGOV KDEM LE SY 
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ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 111642Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6838
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
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RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0632
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 003810 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2026
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM LE SY
SUBJECT: HINTS OF A DEAL IN THE AIR, BUT MARCH 14 LEADERS
DOWNPLAY POSSIBILITY

Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 003810

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2026
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM LE SY
SUBJECT: HINTS OF A DEAL IN THE AIR, BUT MARCH 14 LEADERS
DOWNPLAY POSSIBILITY

Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Marwan Hamadeh told us today (12/11) that the rumors
circulating in Beirut about an imminent Sudan or Arab
League-brokered deal between March 14 and March 8-Aoun have
no basis in fact. While March 14 leaders will try to work
with Amr Moussa on an initiative, they do not believe that
Hizballah and Michel Aoun are serious about wanting a
negotiated compromise. The March 14 strategy is to offer a
19-10-1 cabinet expansion in return for Emile Lahoud's
ouster. As the National Dialogue unanimously approved the
Special Tribunal for Lebanon on March 2, March 14 is not
willing to offer deals to see the tribunal implemented.
Hamadeh confirmed that the cabinet will meet tomorrow (12/12)
to approve the tribunal documents -- exactly one year after
the cabinet first asked the UN to set up a special tribunal,
and the anniversary of the murder of Hamadeh's nephew Gibran
Tueni. According to Hamadeh, if the cabinet approves the
tribunal documents (with the only obstacle he sees being the
potential assassination of cabinet ministers between now and
tomorrow),then the GOL will send someone to New York
immediately to sign the documents with the UN, at which point
the GOL will submit them to parliament for the ratification
process. End summary.

CONTRASTING RUMORS:
IMMINENT ESCALATION OR IMMINENT DEAL
--------------


2. (C) The rumors and political conspiracy theories
circulating in Beirut in the aftermath of the massive 12/10
Hizballah-Aoun rally fall into two, entirely contradictory
categories. One category offers speculation on what the
escalation hinted at by Michel Aoun and others in the 12/10
speeches will include, when it will start, and how the
Siniora cabinet will react. The second category focuses on
the return of Arab League and Sudanese emissaries, with hints
that there is a "deal" in the air that includes some or all
of the following elements, in varying order: cabinet
expansion (with various formulas),acceptance of the special

tribunal for Lebanon, change in the presidency, unified
Lebanese position for Paris III, new legislative election
law, and early legislative elections. Some say that Salim
Hoss will be again dusted off to be the compromise PM in a
deal about to be struck.

SUDANESE COOKING NOT WORKING
--------------


3. (C) Meeting with the Ambassador on December 11, Minister
of Telecommunications Marwan Hamadeh rejected the rumors of a
breakthrough, insisting instead that there is no imminent
deal. Sudanese mediation, Hamadeh said, has been
particularly bad: "bits from Amr Moussa, bits from Bkirke
(i.e., the Patriarch's statement),bits picked up from Michel
Aoun and Hizballah, all mixed up together and cooked with
Sudanese spice. It's a mess. We all say, 'yes, yes, yes,
umm, it's good' but we know no one can eat the stew. Not us,
not them (Hizballah and Aoun)." As for Amr Moussa's return,
Hamadeh said that March 14 was not expecting much, although
he acknowledged that it was useful to keep hope alive
regarding Moussa's initiative. "We will work with Moussa."
And Saudi Ambassador Abdulaziz Khoja's hyperactive shuttle
diplomacy? "Crisis management," Hamadeh responded; "nothing
new."

MARCH 14 STRATEGY: TRADE
PRESIDENCY FOR EXPANDED CABINET
--------------


4. (C) Both Hamadeh and MP Boutros Harb, meeting later with
the Ambassador, said that March 14's strategy has
crystallized in recent days: no one is willing to trade
acceptance of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon for the
blocking minority in the hands of Hizballah and Aoun. The
March 14 position is that the Special Tribunal has already
been accepted unanimously in the March 2, 2006 inaugural
session of the National Dialogue chaired by Nabih Berri. So
March 14 leaders argue that decision merely needs to be made
operational and should not require a compensatory trade from
March 14 to happen.


5. (C) March 14, however, is willing to give Hizballah-Aoun

BEIRUT 00003810 002 OF 003


ten ministers in a 30-member cabinet (with 19 for March 14
and one neutral) in return for a new, credible president.
The essential deal that can resolve this crisis, Hamadeh
said, is a trade between a new president in March 14's favor
(compared to the incumbent) and cabinet expansion in the
favor of Hizballah-Aoun (compared to the present cabinet).
Harb argued that the one "neutral" minister in the 19-10-1
cabinet breakdown should be picked by Maronite Patriarch
Sfeir (vice Moussa's proposal that Nabih Berri selected and
Fouad Siniora approve),because neither Hizballah nor Michel
Aoun could easily reject the Patriarch's choice. But Hamadeh
and Harb both agreed that Hizballah and Michel Aoun show no
signs of wanting to enter into serious negotiations at this
point. Laughing at Aoun's curious all-ORANGE outfit for his
speech the previous day, Harb said that Aoun is starting to
grasp that the presidency is slipping out of his hands,
"making him crazier than ever."

CABINET MEETING TUESDAY
TO APPROVE TRIBUNAL;
--------------


6. (C) Hamadeh assured us that March 14 leaders and PM
Siniora are not blinking, despite the unexpectedly large
attendance at the Sunday March 8-Aoun rally. As for next
steps, Hamadeh said that Lebanese Armed Forces Commander
Michel Sleiman and Deputy Prime Minister/Defense Minister
Elias Murr have both assured PM Siniora that the LAF will be
able to protect the cabinet at its scheduled 4 p.m. meeting
on Tuesday to approve the Special Tribunal on Lebanon.
Hamadeh said that all ministers are keeping low profiles
between now and Tuesday, to minimize the chances for
assassination. (The cabinet will rely exclusively on the LAF
for security, as the "human shield" idea was dropped when the
memorial mass for Gibran Tueni was moved to a church away
from the cabinet room and nearby March 8-Aoun sit-ins.)

GOL WANTS TRIBUNAL
SIGNED IMMEDIATELY
--------------


7. (C) Hamadeh said that the cabinet also has to decide who
to authorize to sign the tribunal on behalf of Lebanon. If
either Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs Tariq Mitri or
Minister of Justice Charles Rizk goes to New York, then UNSYG
Kofi Annan will sign the tribunal documents, Hamadeh said he
had learned from UN envoy Geir Pedersen. But the cabinet may
opt for a lower-key signing, with Judge Ralf Riachi and
Ministry of Justice DG Omar Natour signing for Lebanon and
Nicolas Michel signing for the UN. Whoever ends up going,
Hamadeh said that they plan to rush them on a flight early
Wednesday morning for a signing in New York as soon as
possible. Harb agreed that, under Lebanese constitutional
rules, the signing of a treaty can take place before
parliamentary approval.

COMMENT
--------------


8. (C) We tend to believe Hamadeh's statement that, despite
lots of diplomatic activity, there is no deal about to be
consummated to solve Lebanon's political crisis. (But, as we
readily admit, we've been wrong before in our predictions,
and nothing should surprise us any longer about the Lebanese
talent for muddled compromises.) The essential factor in any
deal will be Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah's
agreement to sell it to his zealous followers. He was able
to persuade them that having their houses destroyed and
losing Hizballah's freedom of action in the south constituted
a victory this summer, so he has the power to persuade them
that a compromise less than his current demands is a victory.
But he, of course, needs to be convinced first that he
cannot get what he seems to want, which is control of the
cabinet.


9. (C) On the tribunal, we note that there are now two
entirely parallel realities in Lebanon. One, symbolized by
the Siniora cabinet, has patiently gone through the legal and
constitutional procedures to approve the tribunal documents,
losing one minister to assassination in the process. On the
other, Hizballah, Emile Lahoud, Michel Aoun, and Nabih Berri
reject Siniora's cabinet as illegitimate and its decisions
null and void. These two parallel interpretations will come
into collision when the cabinet submits the signed documents
to the parliament for ratification. The majority of the MPs
will clamor for a parliamentary session to approve the

BEIRUT 00003810 003 OF 003


tribunal, while Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri will maintain
the position that no cabinet existed to approve the tribunal
first. We should work with the UN, Europeans, and others to
welcome the cabinet's decision to approve the tribunal and
the actual signing, in order to reinforce in Lebanese public
opinion the reality and legality of these steps.


10. (C) But we also should keep in mind that the Syrians
(or at least their proxies in Lebanon tend to be sore losers:
when UNSCR 1559 was passed, the Syrian answer was to blow up
Marwan Hamadeh (who survived, of course) and kill Rafiq
Hariri. When the Syrian troops were forced to leave Lebanon
in April 2005, Samir Kassir and George Hawi were killed.
When parliamentary elections resulted in an anti-Syrian
majority, Elias Murr was attacked. After Siniora's
government was sworn into office, then Syria imposed an
economic blockade and May Chidiac was blown up. And the list
continues, including the murder of Pierre Gemayel (11/21)
answering the cabinet's 11/13 decision to approve the
tribunal the first time. So it is unfortunately safe to
assume that there will be a dangerous response to the cabinet
decision to approve the tribunal tomorrow.
FELTMAN