MARCH 14, GOL LEADERS ON AMR MOUSSA'S PLAN, OTHER

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 003775

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2026
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV LE SY
SUBJECT: MARCH 14, GOL LEADERS ON AMR MOUSSA'S PLAN, OTHER
INITIATIVES

Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) In meetings with the Ambassador on December 6, March
14 officials reacted with skepticism to Amr Moussa's plan to
solve the Lebanese political crisis. They believed that
Nabih Berri, Michel Aoun, and Hizballah will find ways to
reject it. Or, if they do accept it, that will signal that
March 14 has been tricked on the cabinet balance.
Nevertheless, our contacts in March 14 and the GOL told us
that they will accept the Moussa initiative in principle if
the other side does as well. The details will still need to
be worked out by the Lebanese themselves through
negotiations. Such negotiations cannot take place under
duress, so acceptance in principle must trigger the end of
the demonstrations. Our contacts prefer a different cabinet
formula -- with three neutral ministers -- that would provide
better guarantees against the Hizballah-Berri-Aoun alliance,
and they hope Maronite Patriarch Sfeir blesses their
approach. Regardless of their skepticism, March 14 officials
find the Moussa proposal useful, in that Berri, Aoun, and
Hizballah cannot summarily dismiss a proposal from the Arab
League. In terms of USG reactions to Moussa's ideas, the
March 14 contacts urge us not to get bogged down into
details. Instead, the USG should force Moussa to focus on
the real issue -- not the cabinet allocations but rather that
one Arab League member strives to undermine its neighbor.
Moussa must consider the stakes for the Arab League, for
Sunni Muslims, and for Egypt, if an Iranian-backed plan to
take over Lebanon succeeds because of Syria. Remind him of
Iraq and Kuwait circa 1990, one contact argued, and what that
did to Arab credibility. Claiming it to be a Berri
initiative to show his usefulness to Damascus, our contacts
also dismissed the argument that Syrian-Saudi reconciliation
would help solve Lebanon's problems. End summary.

AMR MOUSSA'S INITIATIVE
--------------


2. (C) On December 6 in separate meetings, the Ambassador
saw several close advisors to March 14 leaders: Marwan
Hamadeh (close to Walid Jumblatt),Mohamed Chatah and Rola
Noureddine (advisors to PM Fouad Siniora) and Ghattas Khoury
(part of Saad Hariri's inner circle). While there were some
variations in the details, all described Amr Moussa's
proposal to address Lebanon's political crisis as containing
the following elements:

-- Quick study by all parties of the Special Tribunal for
Lebanon documents, with quick approval by Lebanon's cabinet
and parliament;

-- Expansion of the cabinet to 30 members, with 19 belonging
to March 14 and its allies, 10 belonging to the
Hizballah-Amal-Aoun alliance, and 1 neutral minister (picked
by Berri but approved by Siniora);

-- Early presidential elections, proposed for February, by
the existing parliament;

-- A new cabinet (required whenever presidential elections
take place),possibly with the "blocking minority"
(one-third-plus-one) given to Hizballah-Amal-Aoun at this
point;

-- Discussion and adoption of a new parliamentary election
law;

-- early parliamentary elections (or, some insisted,
discussion of this possibility but not yet a commitment to
early elections).

MARCH 14 SKEPTICAL
--------------


3. (C) Our contacts were skeptical about the Moussa
proposal. If it is serious, then Hizballah, Amal, and Aoun
will probably scramble in looking for politically acceptable
ways to reject it, they said: Hizballah doesn't want the
tribunal, Aoun will see how difficult it is for him to become
president, and Berri loathes the possibility of early
parliamentary elections in which he might lose his Speaker
position. If, on the other hand, Berri signals support, then
there's probably a trick that the clever Berri has inserted

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into the deal. Hamadeh said that he expected Berri has so
far remained studiously ambiguous about Moussa's proposal for
two reasons: first, he awaits the return of two Amal MPs he
sent to Damascus, to gauge Syrian reactions. Second, Berri
("a clever fox") is trying to come up with a way to assign
the neutral minister in way to be able to argue that the
19-10-1 cabinet split actually gives the March 8-Aoun
alliance the blocking minority they have sought all along.

BUT MARCH 14 STILL FINDS
MOUSSA INITIATIVE USEFUL
--------------


4. (C) Nevertheless, our contacts agreed, March 14 would
accept the Moussa proposal in principle, if the other side
does the same. Acceptance of the proposal by both sides in
principle should trigger the dismantling of the sit-in in
downtown Beirut and an end to the March 8-Aoun
demonstrations. March 14 refuses to discuss the details with
(as Khoury put it, referring to ongoing demonstrations) "guns
pointed at our heads," At that point, the two sides can sit
down together to flush out the details of how this might
work. As Chatah and Noureddine argued, the Moussa proposal
is useful in that Berri, Aoun, and Hizballah cannot reject an
Arab League initiative out of hand, as they have the
proposals forwarded by March 14 and GOL officials. Hamadeh
speculated that the Higher Shia Council communique that
afternoon, calling on the Arab League to be "neutral," was,
however, an ominous sign, as that hints at a Shia campaign to
brand Moussa's initiative as unacceptably Sunni in nature or
too close to GOL positions.

LOOKING FOR PATRIARCH'S BLESSING
ON ANOTHER IDEA FOR CABINET SPLIT
--------------


5. (C) Chatah and Hamadeh briefed the Ambassador on another
initiative that they are hoping Maronite Patriarch Sfeir will
bless: most of the elements echo Moussa's plan, but the
cabinet would split 18-9-3, a variation on Siniora's earlier
proposal of a 19-9-2 division. The three neutral ministers
(who would not vote in the case of a split between March 14
and March 8-Aoun) would represent the Sunni, Shia, and
Christian communities. March 14 would give up one of its
ministerial portfolios to increase the number of seats for
the neutral ministers. In this way, while March 14 would not
be able to push through any decrees without support from some
of the March 8-Aoun ministers, it would be less likely that
March 8-Aoun could find a way to get an additional minister
to topple the cabinet at will, as would be possible in the
split proposed by Moussa. Chatah reported that Sheikh Michel
Khoury, the octogenarian/senior statesman son of Lebanon's
first president, would meet with Patriarch Sfeir to seek his
blessing. (Note: The Ambassador will dine with Sheikh
Michel on 12/7 for a read-out. End note.) But all of these
cabinet changes depend on acceptance of the special tribunal,
Chatah and Hamadeh emphasized.

SAUDI-SYRIAN RECONCILIATION
A TRICK TO PROMOTE BERRI?
--------------


6. (C) Khoury noted that Moussa had proposed a second
initiative that was immediately rejected by March 14: an
Arab quadripartite delegation (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan,
and Syria) to come to Beirut and negotiate a settlement among
the Lebanese. This, Khoury said, moves Lebanon exactly in
the wrong direction. Hamadeh and Chatah expressed deep
skepticism as well about Nabih Berri's push for a
reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and Syria as key to
solving the problem in Lebanon, In their view, a
Saudi-Syrian rapprochement will just embolden the Syrians,
but it will prove to the Syrians the value of Berri himself.
With Syria relying ever more on Hizballah and less on Berri,
the Speaker is "desperate" to show that he is useful to
Bashar. Thus, Hamadeh concluded, Berri is exploiting
people's concern about Lebanon in order to advance something
Syria wants and for which he can then claim credit. "Don't
fall in this trap," Hamadeh urged, referring to the logic
that Syrian-Saudi friendship might help Lebanon.

USG URGED TO FORCE MOUSSA
TO FACE "REAL ISSUE" OF SYRIA
--------------


7. (C) Asked what the USG reaction should be to the Moussa

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plan, our four interlocutors were united: we should not get
drawn into the details. Discussing what the details mean or
the possible variations should be left to the Lebanese.
Moreover, engaging Moussa on the details gets Moussa off the
hook regarding what is actually going on and what should be
the focus of Arab League concern. Lebanon's political crisis
actually has very little to do with cabinet allocations,
Hamadeh noted, especially since all but two of the 4,800-plus
cabinet decisions taken by the Siniora government since July
2005 were taken by consensus, with the Shia on board. So the
U.S. should not talk about cabinet allocations with Moussa.
"Don't let him pretend that's the real issue."


8. (C) Instead, the U.S. should force Moussa to acknowledge
that the real problem is Syria -- one Arab League member is
using all tools at its disposal in order to undermine the
democratically elected, constitutional government of another
Arab League member. "Remind him of Iraq and Kuwait, circa
1990," Hamadeh urged, "only this is worse because of Iran's
ambitions" Moussa should be made to see clearly the negative
implications for the Arab world, for the Arab League, for
Sunni Muslims, for Egypt, and for Moussa himself, should Iran
succeed because of Syrian actions to take control of Lebanon.
Arab credibility and especially Arab League credibility
should be Moussa's real concern. "Get Moussa to focus on the
cause, not the symptoms," Chatah said, "that's where his
value-added should be." There are lots of initiatives that
can be floated, but if Syria orders it allies to reject them
all, then nothing can be done.



FELTMAN