DIFFICULT EXISTENTIAL BATTLE FOR LEBANON LOOMS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 003766

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/05/2026
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER LE SY
SUBJECT: DIFFICULT EXISTENTIAL BATTLE FOR LEBANON LOOMS

Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d).

PRO-SYRIANS, AOUN ON THE ASCENDENCY
--------------


1. (S) With Nabih Berri's Amal movement trapped as an
unenthusiastic partner, Hizballah, Michel Aoun's Free
Patriotic Movement, and various pro-Syrian politicians are on
the ascendency. They appear prepared to use all available
means to implement an agenda hostile to U.S. interests in
Lebanon: destroy Fouad Siniora's cabinet (or render it
impotent by controlling it); dismantle and discredit the
March 14 pro-independence movement; prevent the establishment
of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon; roll back UNSCR 1701
implementation and restore Hizballah freedom of action along
the Israeli border; pave the way to early parliamentary
elections in hopes of reversing the pro-independence gains of
2005; ensure a pliable replacement for President Emile Lahoud
in 2007; and -- last but not least -- deliver a blow to U.S.
interests and prestige in the Middle East. The growing
perception on the ground is that the March 8-Aoun alliance is
winning or will win, and that time favors the pro-Syrians.

MARCH 8-AOUN WILLING TO USE ALL MEANS
--------------


2. (S) In February and March 2005, the leaders of the
pro-independence movement (which later acquired its March 14
name),recognizing that mob action against the presidential
palace risked plunging Lebanon into sectarian violence,
stayed within Lebanon's constitutional framework and accepted
their inability to remove President Emile Lahoud by legal
means. The feeling at the time -- that we shared -- was that
leaving a discredited and isolated Lahoud in place was
preferable to the armed confrontation that would have been
necessary to oust him (and that might have failed, given the
Syrian presence in Lebanon at the time and the potential for
Hizballah to use its arms domestically to defend their man in
Baabda). Today, the March 8-Aoun alliance, in its efforts to
topple the Siniora cabinet, respects no such red lines.
Lacking the legal ability to change Siniora's cabinet or to
trigger early parliamentary elections, the March 8-Aoun
alliance nevertheless has the advantage of flexibility.
Adhering to the philosophy that the ends justify the means,
March 8-Aoun will use non-constitutional ways in an attempt
to force ministerial resignations and create vacuums in the
constitutional system. And everyone knows that Hizballah is
heavily armed.

PRESSURE ON SINIORA CABINET TO RISE
--------------


3. (S) So far, the Siniora cabinet shows no signs of
imminent collapse. Thus, all signs indicate that March
8-Aoun will respond to this unexpected perseverance by
greatly escalating pressure over the coming days and weeks.
Last Friday's brief siege of the Grand Serail was only a
dress rehearsal. Soon, we predict, Hizballah and Amal will
order Shia members of the civil service, army, and police to
follow the 11/11 ministerial resignations and walk off their
jobs. Few would dare defy such an order. Shia bloc and
Aounist MPs will resign from parliament if March 14 MPs try
to use their parliamentary majority in any kind of
counteroffensive. Resiognations resulting in an absence of
Shia representatives in parliament and public institutions
rob them of political legitimacy and create exactly the kind
of gross inequity March 8 accuses the Siniora cabinet of
promoting. Michel Aoun, repeating his circa 1989 knack for
irresponsible leadership, has already publicly announced that
blocking roads, cutting off access to the airport, and
generally shutting down Lebanon economically will be employed
if needed. We find credible the "Avignon papacy" rumors that
Lahoud is meeting with legal advisors to figure out how to
underscore the March 8-Aoun dismissal of Siniora's cabinet as
null and void by appointing a replacement prime minister.

SECURITY INCIDENTS INCREASE
--------------


4. (S) In the meantime, security incidents -- so far mostly
clashes between Sunnis and Shia -- are starting to break out
wherever opposing camps meet, with increasing frequency and
intensity. The March 8-Aoun camp has successfully (and
unfairly) discredited the Internal Security Forces (national
police),branding it a Sunni militia, making any ISF
intervention by definition a provocation to the Shia and
Aounists. Lebanese Armed Forces contacts offer varied

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estimates about how long the overstretched army units can
function without relief, equipment, and supplies (and with
the specter of schism in the ranks or of fifth-column
activity sapping LAF morale). But all estimates talk of
days, not weeks, before the situation exceeds the LAF's
ability to maintain control. Based on current trends,
Lebanon -- with state institutions weak even at the best of
times -- is weeks, not months, away from becoming
ungovernable. Siniora might be able to continue to receive
visitors and well-wishers at his Grand Serail office
indefinitely, but March 8-Aoun forces will use the street to
render him practically irrelevant until such time as he is
finally legally or physically eliminated.

MARCH 8-AOUN FORCES
UNLIKELY TO BACK DOWN
--------------


5. (S) While March 14 leaders hope to wait out the March
8-Aoun alliance, we do not see Hizballah and Aoun backing
down. For Aoun, Hizballah, and the pro-Syrians, the stakes
are too high to give up: they either prevail now, or their
ability to control Lebanon diminishes sharply over the next
year. For Aoun, life expectancy suggests that 2007 is his
last realistic shot at the presidency -- and his last chance
to destroy the Hariri power he hates as intensely as he
desires Baabda Palace. Moreover, Aoun's MPs and party
officials must know that their fortunes are linked completely
to his success in this last gambit; his party, while
seemingly well-resourced, does not appear to possess the
organizational strength to survive his political retirement,
after which they can be expected to disunite quickly.


6. (S) For Hizballah leaders, implementation of UNSCR 1701
has stripped them of freedom of action along the Israeli
border and must be reversed. They are also suspicious
(rightly, we believe) that the March 14 movement was losing
patience with foot-dragging on serious discussion of
Hizballah's weapons in the aftermath of the summer war. For
the pro-Syrians including Hizballah, the establishment of the
Special Tribunal for Lebanon is a potential blow to Syria
that they seem to be under order to derail, lest they lose
their Alawite allies and patrons. The 2007 presidential
elections are key to the ability of pro-Syrians to restore
political primacy in Lebanon. We note that, according to
Lebanon's constitution, Nabih Berri faces a vote of
confidence as Parliament Speaker in July 2007, too. For all
these reasons, March 8-Aoun are determined to win, here and
now.

SINIORA'S CABINET EMBATTLED
SINCE DAY ONE, IN JULY 2005
--------------


7. (S) Like the March 8-Aoun alliance, March 14 leaders
understand this fight for what it is, an existential battle
over the kind of state Lebanon will become. But March 14
leaders are exhausted and out of innovative ideas, having
been in battles ever since the Siniora government took office
in late July 2005: inter alia, the cabinet faced a Syrian
economic blockade, disruption of electricity supplies, a near
fatal bomb attack against a prominent broadcaster (with
associated smear campaign against Siniora, who asked for FBI
assistance in the investigation),the murder of MP Gibran
Tueni, a seven-week walk-out by Shia ministers (even before
the current resignations),a Hizballah-provoked war, and so
forth. All March 14 attempts at political and economic
reform have been stymied by President Lahoud, exposing them
to the additional March 8 charge of being an incompetent,
do-nothing government. We can now see that the pattern of
escalating pressure precedes the current, ferocious campaign
against Siniora.

WHAT THE BLOCKING MINORITY MEANS
--------------


8. (S) At its most basic level, the struggle is about the
blocking minority in the cabinet that would enable March
8-Aoun to veto any government decision and to threaten to
topple the cabinet at any time (triggered constitutionally by
the resignation of one-third-plus-one of the cabinet). March
8-Aoun representatives all insist that there is no
flexibility in this demand. While uniformly refusing to
concede the blocking minority under threat, March 14 leaders
are divided about whether they will ultimately have to give
in. Some argue that, if certain principles -- primarily the
Special Tribunal -- can be part of the deal, then the

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potential for cabinet vetoes is less problematic. After all,
they note, the existing Siniora cabinet passed nearly 5,000
decrees since July 2005, and all but two were adopted by
consensus. (Hizballah's complaints about Siniora's cabinet
being weak are intentionally misleading: Siniora tried to
govern by consensus in order not to offend the Shia by using
the cabinet majority to overrule them.)


9. (S) Other March 14 leaders argue that trading
establishment of the tribunal for the blocking minority gives
March 14 very little beyond an immediate easing of tension.
While buying time in this critical atmosphere may be the best
one can hope for, the crisis is put off, not eliminated.
Even with the tribunal, they note, the cabinet will have to
pass additional decrees on annual financial contributions,
assignment of judges, etc. The skeptics fear that March
8-Aoun will be able to use the blocking minority to cripple
the tribunal even once it is established. (We would be very
interested in State/L and USUN's views on what additional or
recurring GOL actions will be needed if the existing tribunal
documents are signed.)


10. (S) But the bigger fear regarding the blocking minority
demand among March 14 skeptics is the ability of March 8-Aoun
to trigger a constitutional cabinet collapse via
resignations. Flipping madly through Lebanon's convoluted
constitution, March 14 representatives build a case that, in
the hands of March 8-Aoun forces, this power to topple the
cabinet can be used to create quasi-legal scenarios to
prevent the 2007 presidential elections (if March 8-Aoun
dislikes the expected outcome) and even permit the president
to dismiss parliament, to trigger early parliamentary
elections expected to result in gains for March 8-Aoun.
Seemingly innocuous phrases in the constitution -- such as
the president's ability to dismiss parliament if parliament
doesn't meet in its regular session (an outcome Nabih Berri
can guarantee, if he chooses) -- become tools in the March
8-Aoun hands to strip March 14 from its ability to govern,
especially if March 14 has also lost the ability to use the
cabinet.

UNPALATABLE OPTIONS BEFORE MARCH 14
--------------


11. (S) Unless real pressure can be put on March 8-Aoun
forces and their foreign backers to lower the pressure now,
March 14 leaders and Siniora's cabinet will very rapidly face
unpalatable choices: stand fast indefinitely and try to
govern, including by reaffirming passage of the tribunal
documents and nominations of new Shia ministers (actions
which will provoke the March 8-Aoun crowd into further action
of its own); give in to the blocking minority concept (while
getting as many guarantees as possible about its use and
about the tribunal); watch March 8-Aoun propel Lebanon toward
civil war; try to mount counter demonstrations that could
lead to clashes; propose a separate deal with either Aoun or
Hizballah to break down the alliance (which in Aoun's case
would surely require an Aoun presidency); or opt for a
caretaker government and early parliamentary elections,
which, in this tense environment, would in themselves
probably lead to violence.


12. (S) For now, March 14 leaders are simply holding firm
and trying to win some tactical advantages. But the public
expressions of support to Siniora and the many visitors
(foreign and Lebanese) he receives in his besieged Serail
offices, however welcome, are not sufficient to get March
8-Aoun forces to back down. The current status quo strikes
us as dangerous and unsustainable and not in either our or
March 14's favor. Now that Hizballah and Aoun have proven
their point that they, too, can turn out large numbers of
people in the street, sufficient pressure can be brought to
bear to force them to leave the streets in favor of a return
to dialogue with the March 14 leaders. Unfortunately, we
believe that the March 8-Aoun alliance aims to win this time
once and for all.

FELTMAN