Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BEIRUT3756
2006-12-04 17:14:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

LEBANON: POLITICAL ADVISOR TO SFEIR SEES LITTLE

Tags:  IS LE PGOV PREL PTER SY 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 003756 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2016
TAGS: IS LE PGOV PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: POLITICAL ADVISOR TO SFEIR SEES LITTLE
HOPE TO RETRIEVE AOUN FROM HIZBALLAH

Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (b).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 003756

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2016
TAGS: IS LE PGOV PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: POLITICAL ADVISOR TO SFEIR SEES LITTLE
HOPE TO RETRIEVE AOUN FROM HIZBALLAH

Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (b).


1. (C) For the past two weeks, Emir Hares Chehab, co-chair
of the Islamic/Christian Dialogue Committee and a long-time
political advisor to Maronite Patriarch Sfeir, has been
relaying messages from Sfeir to the leading Maronite
political leaders, Michel Aoun, Samir Ja'ja' and Amin
Gemayel, in an attempt to unify the fractured Christian
community. Sfeir's effort has thus far been to no avail.


2. (C) Chehab, who when necessary also acts as intermediary
between the Patriarch and representatives of Hizballah,
indicated the primary challenge in any effort to create a
unified Christian bloc was to somehow reconcile the excessive
ambition of Michel Aoun with the distrust of Samir Ja'ja'.
This past week, Sfeir has circulated a proposed agreement
that contained three principal points: acceptance of the
Special Tribunal, an expeditious removal of President Emile
Lahoud, and a new power sharing arrangement in the Council of
Ministers that would reallocate the so-called "Christian"
seats in the cabinet to give Aoun a substantial and respected
voice in the government.


3. (C) The Patriarch's advisor stated that the agreement
was not as much an acknowledgment of the still-considerable
power of Aoun in Lebanon's Christian community, as it was a
final attempt to preserve the authority of the presidency --
the one remaining national position that "belonged"
exclusively with the ever-diminishing Christian minority. If
the present political crisis continues, or if Hizballah wins
its current confrontation with the Siniora government, the
presidency will become no more than an afterthought in the
governing of Lebanon, and as a result, the Christian
community, in his view, would be relegated to second-class
status.

TRYING TO CONVINCE AOUN
--------------


4. (C) Chehab stated the key argument being used with Aoun
in particular was that if the Maronite leaders could agree on
a unified set of principles, the Christian community would be
able to function as a viable political force, independent of
both Sunni and Shia control. Although there is still
considerable bad blood between the Patriarch and Aoun, the
Patriarch believes the only way to shake off the dominance of
Saad Hariri and resist the growing power of the Shia is to
pull Aoun away from his alliance with Hizballah. To the
cleric's dismay, his entreaties thus far have fallen on deaf
ears.


5. (C) According to his advisor, Patriarch Sfeir now
wonders if Aoun's resistance to appeals for Christian unity
are due to more than just presidential ambition. Sfeir has
allegedly asked his closest advisors if they believe Aoun is
receiving funds from Iran, which if true, would intensify his
seemingly unbreakable bond with Hassan Nasrallah. Emir
Chehab opined that if this suspicion is accurate, it would be
near impossible to retrieve the former general back into the
Maronite fold.

LEBANON AT THE CRITICAL MOMENT
--------------


6. (C) According to Chehab, the current stand-off between
Hizballah/Aoun and the Siniora government will quickly come
to a head, because a prolonged static position would be
politically unacceptable to Hassan Nasrallah. Therefore,
only a limited amount of time remains available to reach a
compromise and peaceful outcome to the crisis. The key
question for the Patriarch is whether Aoun is still within
reach.


7. (C) Chehab ventured his faint hope that Hassan Nasrallah
and Michel Aoun may have misjudged the temper of the street
and the willingness of the Christian community to be used as
the means to bring down the Siniora government. He
acknowledged the surprising fortitude of the Prime Minister
and his proven ability to withstand enormous pressure, but
pessimistically remarked that at any time, the Syrian regime
could step in, and with another act of violence, place the
government under almost impossible strain.


BEIRUT 00003756 002 OF 002



8. (C) The influential advisor (who drafted the unification
poposal for Sfeir, as well as some of the earlier satements
from his office) said he has urged Sfei to make public his
efforts to re-unite the Chrisian community, but thus far the
Patriarch is anxous that such a move would embarrass Aoun to
suc an extent that relations with the prickly generalwould
be irreparable. As a final point, Chehab sked if the UN
Security Council would consider esablishing the Special
Tribunal under its own autority, because doing so, in his
view, would consderably diminish Syrian pressure and was
well woth the associated political risk.
FELTMAN