Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BEIRUT3745
2006-12-01 17:32:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

LEBANON: MARCH 14 LEADERS ASK CODEL NOT TO TALK

Tags:  PGOV KCRM PREL LE SY 
pdf how-to read a cable
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PP RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHLB #3745/01 3351732
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 011732Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6707
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0575
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 003745 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2016
TAGS: PGOV KCRM PREL LE SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: MARCH 14 LEADERS ASK CODEL NOT TO TALK
WITH SYRIA, SHARE STRATEGIES FOR NEXT STEPS

Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman. Reason: Sections 1.4 (b)
and (d).

SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 003745

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2016
TAGS: PGOV KCRM PREL LE SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: MARCH 14 LEADERS ASK CODEL NOT TO TALK
WITH SYRIA, SHARE STRATEGIES FOR NEXT STEPS

Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman. Reason: Sections 1.4 (b)
and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) On November 29 the Ambassador and CODEL Hoekstra met
March 14 leaders and others to discuss the current crisis in
Lebanon and the possible impact of reopening a U.S.-Syrian
dialogue. The CODEL heard March 14 figures pledge to resist
peacefully the coming demonstrations and to keep their
government running. Defense Minister Murr and Patriarch
Sfeir were optimistic that the army could maintain calm and
protect the government. Walid Jumblatt and Saad Hariri were
more pessimistic, believing that further violence is likely.
UN Special Representative to Lebanon Geir Pedersen called the
situation "hopeless" and envisioned the next Lebanese
government as strongly influence by Hizballah. All March 14
leaders vowed to maintain calm and resist countering
Hizballah demonstrations with their own.


2. (C) March 14 leaders and Pedersen suggested that
international creation of the tribunal under Chapter VII of
the UN Charter would help. They also suggested dialogue with
Syria would be best left until after the tribunal was
implemented and a clear set of "sticks" and "carrots" were
identified to compel Syria to change its behavior. End
Summary.

DIVERGENT VIEWS OF THE NEXT STEP
--------------


3. (C) On November 29 the Ambassador, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence Chairman Peter Hoekstra, committee
member Darrel Issa, and professional staff member James Lewis
met with a variety of March 14 leaders and later with the UN
Special Representative to Lebanon Geir Pedersen to discuss
the current crisis in Lebanon and the possible effects on
Lebanon of reopening a U.S.-Syrian dialogue. The CODEL heard
March 14 figures pledge to stand strong against coming
demonstrations and to refuse to allow their government to be
toppled.


4. (C) Defense Minister Murr and Patriarch Sfeir were
cautiously optimistic that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)
could maintain calm, prevent violence, and hold together the

government. Murr said March 14 would not bring in new Shia
ministers, but let the resigned ministers appear responsible
for the problems they've caused while March 14 puts forth an
image of openness. The LAF is ready to protect the
government and citizens amidst the "severe turbulence" that
is coming, but Murr expects that increased Syrian influence
will precipitate more assassinations. Patriarch Sfeir is
working to reunite Christians under common principles, and to
build support for the next president who should be
equidistant between the two camps. He asked for U.S.
assistance in rebuilding GOL institutions such as the LAF.


5. (C) Walid Jumblatt and Saad Hariri were more pessimistic,
believing that further violence is likely as March 14 tries
to continue governing, stay out of the streets, and setup the
tribunal. Jumblatt said that without external pressure on
Syria, the Syrians will prevent any political compromise in
Lebanon and with that, they will block passage of the
tribunal. Hariri suggested that Syrian-facilitated terrorist
violence will increase in Lebanon, and that UNIFIL is a
likely target.


6. (C) Most pessimistic was Geir Pedersen, the UNSYG,s
personal representative to Lebanon, who described the
situation in Lebanon as "hopeless." He sees legal passage of
the tribunal as impossible, and envisions a government in
which Hizballah indirectly controls the state through allies
who will seem moderate and not pro-Syrian. While March 14
could still give Aoun the presidency to force the March 8
alliance to collapse, Lebanon would be stuck with a
pro-Syrian president for 6 more years and Aoun would try to
destroy March 14 and the Hariri family.

MARCH 14 RESISTING THE URGE TO DEMONSTRATE
--------------


7. (C) Murr, Jumblatt, and Hariri view the Hizballah
demonstrations scheduled to begin on December 1 as a
psychological tool that March 14 can overcome. Their
strategy is for March 14 to remain calm, refuse to match

BEIRUT 00003745 002 OF 003


Hizballah's demonstrations, and retain the government while
the opposition's more radical actions work against it. They
cited concerns, however, that they might lose control of some
confessional leaders. The LAF is prepared to deal with March
14 followers who don't restrain themselves in the same way it
will deal with Hizballah demonstrators, Murr noted.


8. (C) Jumblatt described Hizballah's recurrent threat of
demonstrations as "psychological warfare," and his refusal to
specify a location or date as a message that Hizballah is
able to target March 14 anytime, anywhere. Perhaps Nasrallah
has hesitated to call demonstrations because he is afraid to
rouse what could become uncontrollable Sunni-Shia tensions,
or afraid that he will not be able to bring any Christians or
Sunnis into the street. Hariri suggested that the rigidity
of Hizballah's demand to topple the government is forcing a
gradual shift in public opinion back toward March 14. Street
clashes and blocking the international tribunal will cause
Hizballah to lose supporters in the Arab world.


9. (C) Pedersen assessed that Hizballah and Aoun are playing
"Russian roulette" with street demonstrations they know they
are likely to lose control of. They think that this powerful
message as well as their superior organization will force the
majority to give in. But support for Nasrallah is weakening
in the Shia community as fatigue and resentment set in. Murr
suggested that Hizballah bowed to Shia workers' pressure,
delaying the strike until employees could collect their
salaries at the end of the month.


10. (C) Jumblatt assessed that Aoun is afraid to demonstrate
because he risks the Patriarch's condemnation, potential
clashes with the Lebanese Forces, and a decrease in his
popularity among the Christians. Patriarch Sfeir reported
that Aoun on November 28 sent a message to say he would
boycott demonstrations.

INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL IMPLEMENTATION
--------------


11. (C) Pedersen passed a request from the Saudis that the
U.S. enlist international support for the creation of the
tribunal under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Nabih Berri,
acting under Syrian influence, will not allow the tribunal to
be passed in parliament. For Prime Minister Siniora to
request that the tribunal be implemented under Chapter VII
would be tantamount to issuing his own death sentence.
Therefore the Saudis hope the U.S. can persuade likely
objectors not to veto the Chapter VII authorization.


12. (C) Pedersen also noted Hizballah's public comments and
private motivations for blocking the tribunal. While
Hizballah is still "committed in principle" to the tribunal,
and offers to discuss it, they insist that March 14 give them
a blocking minority in Cabinet before they agree to the
tribunal. Pedersen assess that Syria is forcing Hizballah
and Amal to take this position because it is a "life or
death" issue for the regime. If even a single Syrian
official is implicated, the regime will be threatened. Syria
needs to hear that the international community is united
behind Lebanon, Pedersen noted, but even that may not stop
them from bringing down the Lebanese government.

REQUESTING THAT TALKS WITH SYRIA
AWAIT INTERNATIONAL LEVERAGE
--------------


13. (C) Pedersen and March 14 leaders agreed that launching a
U.S. dialogue with Syria before a tribunal is created would
create despair among March 14, and would not likely result in
improved Syrian behavior. Indeed, Syrian behavior might very
well worsen, as Syria believes it has cover for more
killings. Hariri suggested that calls for U.S. dialogue with
Syria are increasing the already strong and organized Iranian
and Syrian pressure in Lebanon. Is the U.S. willing to give
Syria what it wants -- an end to UNSCR 1701, cancellation of
the tribunal, and assurances of regime stability and Syrian
influence in the region -- in exchange for dialogue? If the
U.S. must open dialogue with Syria it must be through a
unified voice via the UN.


14. (C) Jumblatt wondered why the U.S. would consider talking
to Syria without a clear new message, a "stick," or a
"carrot"? The tribunal is the only available threat when
talking to the Syrian regime, so dialogue should not go
forward without linkage to passage of the tribunal. The

BEIRUT 00003745 003 OF 003


return of the Golan Heights is one possible carrot. Jumblatt
suggested symbolic actions would have a greater effect on
Syrian than dialogue, including military operations along the
border and opening a door to the Syrian opposition.


15. (C) Murr described U.S. dialogue with Syria as
"capitulation." Patriarch Sfeir pointed out that Lebanon's
attempts to establish diplomatic relations with Syria had
failed, suggesting that U.S. attempts to restore a sincere
relationship might not be well received.
FELTMAN