LEBANON: U/S FORE MEETS WITH PM SINIORA, WHO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 003727

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER LE IS SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: U/S FORE MEETS WITH PM SINIORA, WHO
URGES ACTION ON SHEBAA


Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (b)
and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Prime Minister Siniora expressed his appreciation
for the U.S. support extended to his government, but stated
that if Islamic extremism is to be countered, it is
imperative to see movement on the Middle East peace process,
and in the specific case of Lebanon, some sign that the UN
will take action on Shebaa Farms, as mentioned in UNSCR 1701.
Concerning the International Tribunal and the difficulty in
getting it through the Lebanese cabinet and Parliament,
Siniora said he is speaking with the Russian ambassador to
gauge what Russia's reaction would be if his government asked
the UN Security Council to establish the international
Tribunal under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Siniora wants
to be certain that such a proposal would be adopted by the
UNSC before he risks the political controversy it would
create in Lebanon. End summary.


2. (U) Prime Minster Fouad Siniora received Under Secretary
Henrietta Fore and the Ambassador at the Grand Serail in
Beirut on November 28. The confident and relaxed prime
minister was accompanied by senior advisors Mohammad Chattah
and Roula Nouraddine. Minister of Telecommunications Marwan
Hamadeh, a close political ally of Siniora who was the target
of an assassination attempt in october 2004, joined the
meeting while it was in progress. NEA Executive Director
Edward Alford, M Staff Assistant Alison Shorter-Lawrence and
emboffs also attended.

"I WILL DEFEND LEBANON'S DEMOCRACY
TO THE LAST DROP OF MY BLOOD"
--------------


3. (C) Siniora welcomed Under Secretary Fore and expressed
his gratitude for the support the U.S. has extended to his
government, specifically pointing to statements made by
President Bush after the assassination of Industry Minister
Pierre Gemayel. Siniora remarked that when he looked around
at the funeral of Gemayel, he couldn't help but reflect on
the many families which have suffered from assassinations
over the past two years in Lebanon. Despite the violence
inflicted, however, Siniora assured his guests that
democratic Lebanon would persevere in its quest for full
sovereignty and independence. Siniora confided that he has
no great thirst for the office he occupies, but as long as he
remains prime minister, he promised to defend his country's
democracy with his life. Referring to the imminent start of
street demonstrations by Hizballah, Siniora indicated that
while any group in Lebanon has the constitutional right to
campaign for its causes, "no one has the right to take our
country over the edge into violence."

SHEBAA FARMS - A MEANS TO AN END
--------------


4. (C) While appreciative of U.S. efforts, PM Siniora
emphasized that deeds would be more effective than words at
this critical juncture. Specifically, he asked for movement
on the issue of Shebaa Farms, using UNSCR 1701 as the vehicle
for progress. Siniora argued that not only was withdrawal of
Israeli forces from Shebaa "long overdue," but it may now be
almost too late. He maintained that each month that passes
without even discussion of the issue by the international
community makes it appear to the Lebanese people that its
inclusion in UNSCR 1701 was not made in good faith. Siniora
argued that 1701 authorizes the UN Secretary General to raise
the issue for discussion and that such action would be in
line with the international community's calls for the
resolution to be implemented in its entirety as soon as
possible.


5. (C) As he has in many other meetings, PM Siniora
contended that even simply addressing the issue would be an
extremely useful tool with which to combat Syrian
interference in Lebanon. Arguing that it would be "a small
price for a large result," Siniora said it would prove to the
skeptical Arab street that the forces of moderation,
negotiation, and democratic process were more effective at
achieving results than the violence of the Syrian regime or
the threats of Hizballah. Siniora underscored that he was

BEIRUT 00003727 002 OF 003


not asking Shebaa be handed to the Lebanese but, per his
"seven points" of July, rather be placed under UN
custodianship until border demarcation can be done sometime
in the future.


6. (C) In response to a question on how he felt the
political situation would develop in the coming days, Siniora
said that his country and its democratic government had
survived an extremely difficult war, the pressures of a
humanitarian crisis, and now, the demands of reconstruction.
He also believed his democratic government had achieved a
just end to the war and hope for the future, if 1701 could be
fully implemented. But those achievements were now under
serious threat from Syria, Iran, and Hizballah -- all of whom
were being foolishly assisted by Michel Aoun.


7. (C) Accordingly, not only was visible movement needed on
Shebaa, but the U.S. and the other Western nations had to
send clear, strong messages to both Iran and Syria that
interference in Lebanon would be resolutely and
unhesitatingly opposed. Siniora stated that Syria, in
particular, had to be unmistakably warned that its campaign
of intimidation and violence against democratic forces in
Lebanon ("...actually a coup d'etat...") would elicit a steep
and unavoidable price. He suggested that Turkey and Pakistan
in particular would be useful messengers in warning the
Syrians.


8. (C) The Prime Minister related how in his recent phone
call with President Bush, following the assassination of
Pierre Gemayel, the President had assured Siniora that the
U.S. and its allies would not "trade away" Lebanon under any
circumstances. Siniora said he believed that promise, but
urgently asked that this message be made unmistakably clear
to the Syrians. He indicated he understood the debate in the
United States about whether to engage with Syria and possibly
Iran on regional issues, but Siniora trusted that the U.S.
would not "sacrifice" his country.

ARAB WORLD INCREASINGLY MORE POLARIZED
--------------


10. (C) The Prime Minister declared that the Arab world was
becoming dangerously polarized between moderates and radical
fundamentalists, with the fundamentalists gaining ground.
Whether justified or not, he spoke of the increasing sense of
desperation and humiliation on the Arab street that boded ill
not only for the U.S. role in the region, but also for
overall East-West relations. And although he conceded that
valid arguments could be made for alternative causes, the
fact remained that underlying the growth of Islamic
fundamentalism was the widely-accepted Arab perception that
the persistence of the Arab-Israeli conflict was the primary
cause for their distress.


11. (C) PM Siniora urged the U.S. to consider a concerted
new effort to resolve this nearly 60-year-old conflict. He
asked how many more wars were necessary before Israel
realized it would never achieve peace and security through
conflict. He insisted that Arab moderates, who were under
increasing pressure, already accepted the existence of Israel
and were willing to make the hard choices that would come
with a just peace agreement, but he also warned that time was
running out before the growth of radical Islam would
overwhelm any chance for success.


12. (C) Siniora stated that he trusted the "good offices"
of the U.S. in the search for peace and believed it was still
within reach, but a genuine effort had to be started soon and
pushed as hard as possible toward a just resolution. As a
veteran politician and close associate of many leaders in the
region, Siniora assured his guests that a successful peace
process would change the region in almost unimaginable ways
-- opening the region to real progress, democratic rule,
openness to other cultures, and not least, the inevitable
demise of religious extremism. And as a further consequence
important to America, he concluded the future of democracy in
both Iraq and Afghanistan would be immeasurably strengthened.

INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL -
AN APPEAL TO THE UNSYG
--------------


13. (C) When asked whether he would consider sending a

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letter to UNSYG Kofi Annan that would request the Security
Council to direct the establishment of the International
Tribunal (without the requirement for further GOL approvals),
PM Siniora acknowledged he was seriously considering such an
initiative. But before taking such a provocative step (for
Lebanon),Siniora first wanted to know its chances for
adoption by the Security Council. He wanted to be assured of
success. Toward that end, Siniora said he is currently in
contact with the Government of Russia through its ambassador
to determine their position. The Prime Minister indicated he
was also speaking with other countries, mentioning Egypt and
Saudi Arabia, to further gauge reaction. He also said that
he wanted to be scrupulously correct constitutionally, so he
was seeking legal advice on how he might be able to send such
a letter to the UN directly.


14. (C) He dispassionately analyzed the chances of
shepherding further approval for the Tribunal through the
complex Lebanese process: a staunchly pro-Syrian president,
a feckless speaker of parliament, a committed foe in Hassan
Nasrallah, and an opportunistic and ambitious Michel Aoun.
Those factors, combined with a deadline of the soon-to-expire
parliamentary session, made it imperative to have an
alternative means to establish the Tribunal -- critical,
because its successful establishment and operation would send
an unmistakable and unexpected message to Syria that
political violence could no longer be committed with impunity.


15. (C) PM Siniora said the initial indication from the
Russian government was "neither yes, nor no" -- a position he
did not consider altogether discouraging. The Prime Minister
indicated he may soon visit Russia to further explore the
issue and hopefully, to receive a favorable commitment. He
also said that his legal advisors were researching the
constitutionality of the issue so that he did not
inadvertently find himself in a corner of his own making.


16. (C) Regardless of the fate of the Tribunal, Siniora
assured the Under Secretary that democratic forces in Lebanon
were determined to protect their country's sovereignty. He
stated with confidence that the majority of the people of
Lebanon were behind the governing March 14 group and referred
to recent elections in various universities and labor unions
as tangible proof of this support. But once again, he urged
the U.S. to complement its words with deeds, specifically on
the all-important issues of Shebaa and the issuance of clear,
strong messages of non-interference to Syria and Iran.
FELTMAN