BERRI CLAIMS MARCH 14 PERFIDY, HINTS AT TIME BUT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 003653

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2026
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM PTER SY LE
SUBJECT: BERRI CLAIMS MARCH 14 PERFIDY, HINTS AT TIME BUT
LITTLE FLEXIBILITY

REF: A. BEIRUT 3652


B. STATE 184145

Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY AND COMMENT
--------------


1. (S) In a 11/18 meeting with the Ambassador, Parliament
Speaker Nabih Berri portrayed himself as the only adult
amidst squabbling, selfish children. He claimed success
twice already in preventing street demonstrations. Yet his
attempts to find a way out of Lebanon's political mess was
undermined when MP Saad Hariri and Prime Minister Fouad
Sinora betrayed him -- Hariri by backing out of a deal to
trade approval of the special tribunal for a blocking
minority in the cabinet, and Siniora by breaking a promise to
wait three more days before tabling the tribunal documents
before the cabinet. Berri claimed to remain personally
opposed to street action, but, so far, the March 14 leaders
had given him nothing workable to convince Hizballah and
Michel Aoun to back down. He rejected a compromise proposed
by Siniora (ref A) as too little, too late. Berri undermined
his vow of support for the special tribunal by repeatedly
noting Hizballah's need to understand the details.


2. (S) After threatening that it is sometimes better to
build a new house than fix an old one beyond repair, Berri's
own cabinet compromise sounded suspiciously similar to
Berri's opening position: a blocking minority in the current
cabinet. Perhaps, Berri conceded, that blocking minority
could offer guarantees not to trigger a cabinet collapse, if
those squabbling children would agree to a larger
understanding encompassing a broad range of issues ahead of
time. Berri seemed to be hinting that more time was possible
to broker a deal but that he had little flexibility to offer
on substance. While expressing bitterness against Siniora in
particular, Berri expressed solidarity with the PM regarding
Lebanon's Independence Day on November 22: if, as some
predict, President Emile Lahoud blocks Siniora's
participation in the official commemoration, Berri, too, will
stay away. Berri expressed delight over the possibility of
visiting the United States (ref B) but, asking that any
invitation be deferred for now, said that he needed to keep
cooking in the Lebanon kitchen. End summary and comment.

THE FURY OF A SPEAKER SCORNED
--------------


3. (S) Berri spent most of the unusually long meeting (75
minutes -- keeping berobed Shia clerics cooling their heels
in his waiting room) on a detailed, blow-by-blow, day-by-day,
insult-by-insult review of the lead-up to the resignation of
the five Shia ministers a week ago (11/11). As Berri's
account would tire even the most indefatigable readers of our
cables, we will summarize it here: both Saad Hariri and
Fouad Siniora are not to be trusted. Both shamelessly
betrayed the Speaker, who had always offered them the hand of
genuine partnership. In Saad's case, he offered a deal to
Berri and Mohammed Raad (representing Hizballah) on the
margins of the 11/9 consultations: if March 8 and Aoun will
commit to the special tribunal, then March 14 will concede to
the March 8-Aoun demand for a one-third-plus-one blocking
minority in a reshaped cabinet. To Berri's professed shock,
by Saturday that deal was off the table, with Samir Ja'ja',
not Saad, conveying the bad news. How, Berri asked, can he
trust Saad again. He is not serious; he is not mature. And,
no, Hariri had not asked to visit Berri since Berri's return
from Teheran, although Berri will receive him if asked.


4. (S) Siniora's sins seemed to loom larger in Berri's
mind. Siniora repeated his mistake of December 12, 2005.
Then -- the day of Gebran Tueni's assassination and the
cabinet discussion on whether to to ask the UN to set up a
special tribunal -- Berri had asked Siniora to postpone
discussion from Monday to Thursday, so that he would have
time to work the issue with "my allies" (i.e., Hizballah).
Siniora refused, and Berri had no choice but to go along with
the Shia cabinet walk-out that lasted seven weeks. This
time, Siniora did not call Berri until 7 p.m. on Friday
(11/10),ten hours after he first received the draft tribunal
documents from UN envoy Geir Pedersen. Compounding his
mistakes, the PM did not convey the texts to Berri until
three hours later. Berri then extracted a promise from
Siniora to delay the cabinet meetnig until the following
Thursday (11/16),after Berri's return from Teheran, so that

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Berri had time, again, to get Hizballah on board. Imagine
the shock, Berri said, when he learned in the 11/11
consultative session that, despite his promise to Berri,
Siniora had deviously proceeded to schedule the tribunal
debate on Monday. While Siniora had asked to see Berri after
Berri's return, Berri said that he is refusing to give "that
politically stupid man" an appointment.

HOPING, FOR A THIRD TIME,
TO STOP STREET PROTESTS
--------------


5. (S) What is sad, Berri said, is that he already
prevented Hizballah and Aounist forces from launching massive
street demonstrations twice in recent weeks: once on August
14 and once after Ramadan. Both times, Berri found an excuse
that Hassan Nasrallah and Michel Aoun could not refuse, most
recently in his post-Ramadan call for a round of
consultations. Both Hizballah and Aoun were annoyed with him
for his delaying tactics. Vowing that he remained opposed to
street demonstrations, he said that, nevertheless, if
Hizballah and Aoun insist on them, "then you will see Amal,
too." Now, with March 8-Aoun calling for street
demonstrations and March 14 calling for counter
demonstrations, Berri wants to find a way out. But no one on
March 14 is giving him anything to work with. "Put something
in my hand," Berri said, something that he can sell to
Hizballah and Aoun.

SINIORA'S COMPROMISE UNACCEPTABLE;
HIZBALLAH, AOUN WANT ALL NEW CABINET
--------------


6. (S) The Ambassador raised Siniora's proposal for a
30-member cabinet. As explained in ref A, that proposal, by
reserving two ministerial slots for "neutral" figures who
would not vote in critical cases, denied the majority the
two-thirds and the minority the blocking one-third-plus-one.
Each side could claim victory, making it a reasonable
compromise. Berri shook his head: it violates the Taif
accord and the constitution to have two ministers who refrain
from voting; it throws the whole confessional balance off
kilter. Berri does not want to set the precedent of fiddling
with Taif. Moreover, Hizballah and Michel Aoun have now
raised the stakes, wanting Siniora thrown out and an entirely
new cabinet formed. What might have been possible two weeks
ago is no longer acceptable to Hizballah and Michel Aoun, who
feel that they will prevail and do not need to settle for
little. They want Siniora out altogether. Sometimes, Berri
said, it is easier to build a new house than to try to
restore an old house that is beyond repair.

BERRI TRIES TO PUT A SHINE ON
MARCH 8-AOUN'S ORIGINAL DEMAND
--------------


7. (S) Pressed by the Ambassador, Berri said that, given
sufficient ammunition, he thought he could still sell the
one-third-plus-one blocking minority to Hizballah and Aoun,
despite their shared desire for much more. Berri argued
that, in general, Lebanon's cabinets operate by consensus
anyway, so the majority would not behave much differently
than it had from July 2005 until now under such a scenario.
Disagreeing, the Ambassador asked why March 14 should
surrender to having the threat of cabinet collapse (triggered
when one-third-plus-one of the ministers of any cabinet
submit their resignation) over their heads. That problem,
Berri said, could be resolved: by agreeing ahead of time on
major national issues -- which Berri listed as UNSCR 1701
implementation, the special tribunal, an election law, and
economic/institutional reform needed for Paris III to succeed
-- then the danger of a cabinet resignation will be avoided.
Suggesting that he knows such an agreement would take a long
time, Berri said that he could come up with "guarantees" to
March 14 that the one-third-plus-one minority will not be
used to trigger the cabinet collapse. As for the presidency,
Berri said that he is more eager than anyone to kick Emile
Lahoud out of Baabda Palace, "but you need to help us with
the Syrians -- get the Syrians to agree."

ARE THE TRIBUNAL, 1701 THE REAL ISSUES?
--------------


8. (S) The Ambassador said that he did not understand
Berri's position: if the cabinet would operate always by
consensus and the blocking minority willingly gives up its

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right to topple the cabinet, then March 8-Aoun should settle
for the Siniora compromise. The practical results would be
the same, and the current turmoil would end, to everyone's
relief. There is no reason to frighten the population with
talk of demosntrations. In considering Berri's position, the
Ambassador said that he could not help but conclude that the
real motivation of March 8, probably scripted by Syria, was
to prevent the tribunal and further implementation of UNSCR

1701. "Who said I oppose the tribunal?" Berri asked,
describing himself as "the first" to back the concept.
Expressing strong support for UNIFIL's stabilizing role and
economic benefits, he claimed to be one of the many proud
fathers who lent genetic material to the birth of UNSCR 1701.
Asked by the Ambassador how deep the Syrian opposition
really is to the tribunal, Berri said that he does not, and
will not, speak for Damascus. During what turned into a
lengthy debate over the tribunal and his claims of support
for it, Berri said repeatedly that, while Hizballah also
supported the concept of the tribunal, it was only reasonable
that Hizballah would want to study the details.

SHOWING SOLIDARITY WITH SINIORA
ON INDEPENDENCE DAY
--------------


9. (S) The Ambassador asked Berri whether he would
participate in Lebanon's official commemoration of
Independence Day on November 22. Yes, Berri said, but only
if Siniora were included. Despite being furious with Siniora
(and scrupulously dodging the Ambassador's questions about
whether he considered Siniora to be a fully empowered sitting
prime minister),Berri said that it is tradition for all
three of Lebanon's "presidents" to participate. Lebanon's
confessional balance requires it. If Lahoud, to reinforce
his argument that Siniora's cabinet is illegal, denies
Siniora a place in the Baabda Palace receiving line, then
Berri will boycott, too. But Berri did not expect Lahoud to
"go that far."

DEFERRING A WASHINGTON INVITATION
--------------


10. (S) As the meeting came to a close as nervous aides
entered the room with increasing frequency to tap their
watches, the Ambassador told Berri that he concluded that the
Speaker is looking for ways to buy more time, in hopes of
avoiding street demonstrations. Berri nodded. Drawing on
ref B, the Ambassador asked whether Berri would therefore
find a trip to Washington to be tactically useful. If Berri
wants, we can consider an invitation. Maybe the announcement
of a trip to Washington could provide him the pretext to
convince people to avoid the street, as people will want to
hear about his U.S. consultations before plotting their next
moves. Berri expressed delight with the idea but asked that
any invitation be deferred for now. "Let's keep this idea
between you and me." The time is not right, he said,
claiming that he needed to "keep cooking in the Lebanese
kitchen."

COMMENT
--------------


11. (S) To believe Berri's feelings are as bruised by
Hariri and Siniora's betrayals as he claims, one would also
be required to buy the argument that Berri trusted anyone but
Berri in the first place. His refusal to receive Siniora is
probably linked to Syria's orders to discredit the PM more
than to Berri's hurt. (And we wonder if he will be able to
maintain his Independence Day solidarity with Siniora, if
Lahoud blocks Siniora's participation in the official
ceremonies.) Reading between the lines and monitoring his
body language and public remarks, we believe that Berri has
started to gain some traction in convincing Hizballah and
Aoun -- and perhaps Syria and Iran -- to wait before blowing
up Lebanon. But we do not see any flexibility on the
substance of the political debate. His comments on needing a
"new house" rather than a "restored house" correspond with
other reports that Hizballah and Aoun are hardening their
positions. On Berri's part, we suspect that this is all
bluffing in an attempt to make the "one-third-plus-one"
blocking minority demand look reasonable. His comments about
Hizballah's need to study the details of the tribunal
documents -- when we know that Minister of Justice Charles
Rizk has scrupulously kept Hizballah informed of each
tribunal development -- are ominous. While we don't want to
exaggerate the length of Berri's leash tethering him to his

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more powerful Hizballah alies, we hope that the visible
delight he expressed at the suggestion of an possible
invitation to Washington will help bolster his resolve to
seek a solution short of street demonstrations.
FELTMAN