Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BEIRUT3651
2006-11-18 09:25:00
SECRET
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

SINIORA, HARIRI RESOLUTE, ASK FOR HELP AND

Tags:  PTER PGOV KDEM LE SY IS 
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O 180925Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6557
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0532
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 BEIRUT 003651 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2026
TAGS: PTER PGOV KDEM LE SY IS
SUBJECT: SINIORA, HARIRI RESOLUTE, ASK FOR HELP AND
CONTINGENCY PLANNING


Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
-------

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 BEIRUT 003651

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2026
TAGS: PTER PGOV KDEM LE SY IS
SUBJECT: SINIORA, HARIRI RESOLUTE, ASK FOR HELP AND
CONTINGENCY PLANNING


Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (S) The Ambassador met one-on-one with Prime Minister
Fouad Siniora late on 11/16 and with Saad Hariri the
following evening. Both the PM and the MP came across as
strong and resolute, commenting that the March 8-Aoun
alliance was taken aback by the March 14 resistance to the
pro-Syrian demands. Acknowledging that Siniora's head is now
high on the March 8-Aoun list of demands, they offered a
familiar list of requests for support: quick action on the
tribunal, strong messages to Syria and Iran, cessation of EU
and U.S. hints of talking to and visiting Damascus, halt to
Israeli overflights, something on Sheba' Farms. Siniora
mused about a compromise to solve the cabinet crisis, a
complicated formula which would allow each side, assuming
good will, to claim victory. Informed by Hariri the
following day that Berri found the proposal lacking, the
Ambassador suggested that, nevertheless, the March 14 side
peddle the proposal publicly, to demonstrate reasonableness.
Hariri urged that the USG and its allies also develop
contingency plans now for what happens if UNIFIL is attacked
or Siniora killed. Syria is now emboldened, Hariri insisted,
and only threatening contingency plans that leak will stay
Syria's hand. Admitting that he was not speaking to Berri
but had passed messages, Hariri said that he was open to
dropping Siniora as part of a deal to kick out Emile Lahoud,
but he did not indicate having a preferred presidential
replacement. Asked about his future vision for the period
after this crisis, Hariri emphasized Lahoud's dismissal and
Hizballah's disarmament. Hariri also claimed that his father
had a meeting with Hassan Nasrallah, where Rafiq Hariri had
tried to convince Nasrallah to break with Syria. That
converation, Saad said, probably led to Rafiq's murder. End
summary.

PROPOSING A COMPROMISE
--------------


2. (S) Siniora told the Ambassador that he had used
(resigned) Minister of Health Mohamed Khalifeh to pass a

message to Nabih Berri about a potential compromise to solve
the cabinet crisis. Along the lines of an earlier discussion
between Siniora and the Ambassador, the cabinet would expand
from 24 to 30 ministers. The March 8-Aoun alliance would
have 9 slots, short of the "one-third-plus-one" blocking
minority that could trigger cabinet resignation on any issue.
March 14 would have 19 ministers, less than the two-thirds
needed to ram through action. Two ministers would be
considered neutral and be committed to refrain from voting on
any issue where their votes would be decisive and also to
refrain from being the decisive voices in triggering a
cabinet resignation.


3. (S) To get decrees passed, March 14 would be forced to
have votes from the March 8-Aoun camp. To trigger a cabinet
resignation, March 8-Aoun would need to have at least two
participants from the other side. In practice, Siniora said,
this formula would not change the basic pattern of governing,
since his cabinet had, with very few exceptions, operated on
consensus all along. There would have to be an agreement in
advance to approve the special tribunal. Siniora offered
several variations on how the neutral ministers might be
chosen and what would happen to current portfolios in such a
reshuffle (as Aoun would certainly insist on one of the "big
four" most powerful and prestigious ministries -- Interior,
Finance, Defense, and Foreign Affairs -- which also have to
be distributed among the "big four" confessions -- Maronite,
Sunni, Shia, and Greek Orthodox). Siniora argued that, if
there is good will on both sides, everyone can claim victory:
March 8-Aoun can point to Aoun's participation with four
ministries and to the fact that March 14 cannot push through
cabinet decisions without March 8-Aoun concurrence. March 14
can point to the fact that March 8-Aoun did not get the
"one-third-plus-one" minority that could topple the
government at any time.


4. (S) Siniora reported that he was awaiting Berri's
response. During the meeting, Khalifeh called Siniora to say
that Berri was "cool but open" to the idea (a message
Khalifeh repeated later in the conversation with the
Ambassador). The following evening, Hariri told the
Ambassador that Berri had told Minister of Information Ghazi
Aridi that Siniora's proposed compromise was not sufficient

BEIRUT 00003651 002 OF 005


to sell to Hizballah. The Ambassador encouraged Hariri and,
by phone, Siniora to find a moment to take the idea public,
as it made the March 14 side look reasonable in its approach.
Siniora said he agreed but said that he should not be the
one to talk publicly about the compromise, lest Berri become
annoyed; Hariri disagreed with public disclosure altogether,
saying that it would make March 14 look weak rather than
reasonable. March 8-Aoun would say that it was merely an
opening position and insist on more. (Note: the proposal
has now leaked in any case.)

MARCH 8-AOUN TAKEN ABACK
BY MARCH 14 RESPONSE
--------------


5. (S) Both Siniora and Hariri, while speaking a day apart,
came across as strong and resolute. Siniora at one point
scolded the Ambassador, "don't look at us as if we are on our
last legs." Both offered variations on the same analysis:
Syria was out to block the tribunal by any means and to
destroy UNSCR 1701 implementation, which had proven more
effective than anticipated in curbing Hizballah freedom in
south Lebanon. Berri is a reluctant partner in these efforts
but cannot break free of his Hizballah alliance and wishes of
his Syrian and Iranian allies. Aoun is no longer an
opportunistic ally but an enthusiastic partner of Hizballah.
"Can't you expose Aoun for what he is?" Hariri urged, saying
that Washington-based leaks on Aoun's Hizballah relations
would have more credibility than anything Hariri could say or
leak in Beirut.


6. (S) But both the PM and the MP also believed that March
8-Aoun were hesitating a bit in terms of their tactics.
March 8-Aoun had anticipated that March 14 would quickly
collapse in the face of the demands and threats for street
action and civil disobedience. March 8-Aoun forces were
surprised by the solidarity of March 14. Hariri, boasting
that he could turn a "million Sunnis" out into the street
instantly, said that March 8-Aoun are starting to recognize
that use of the street could ultimately hurt rather than help
them. While Siniora (in the earlier of the two meetings)
thought that March 8-Aoun civil disobedience could begin as
early as Monday (11/20),Hariri, a day later, said that his
information indicated that March 8-Aoun would delay by ten
days, to gauge whether the constitutional/legal arguments
might fatally weaken the Siniora cabinet on their own.
Hariri, who vowed repeatedly to match any March 8-Aoun street
demonstration with some of his own, dismissed the
Ambassador's concern that March 14 Sunnis could easily be
infiltrated by pro-Syrian agents determined to make trouble,
as seemed to have happened during the Danish cartoon riots of
February 5. Then, Hariri said, the "muftis made mistakes."
This time, March 14 would be disciplined.

MOVING QUICKLY ON THE TRIUBNAL
--------------


7. (S) Siniora and Hariri gave similar, and familiar,
suggestions on what the USG and others should do to
strengthen the Siniora cabinet. Siniora in particular
pleaded for the UN to turn around the special tribunal
documents quickly, to get them back for their next round of
cabinet approvals. While Syria is hostile to the tribunal,
this issue can nevertheless be used to embarrass and corner
Berri, Lahoud and others, who will be reluctant to admit
publicly their opposition to finding out the truth behind
Rafiq Hariri's murder. Hariri said that it would be "better"
if the UNSC could simply adopt the tribunal quickly without
further reference to Lebanon, but Siniora understood that
such an option was legally and politically difficult.

PASSING MESSAGES AND DISCOURAGING
RE-ENGAGEMENT (OR PERCEPTION THEREOF) WITH SYRIA
--------------


8. (S) Siniora reported that he had talked with all of the
Arab countries ("even the Emir of Qatar!") except Algeria
("Bouteflika is against us") and Syria to brief them on the
situation and urge their intervention with Syria and Iran.
He did the same with Italy's Prodi, the EU's Solana, Turkey's
Ertegun and Kofi Annan. Siniora urged that the USG use its
contacts, "especially with Turkey," to pass on similar
messages. Siniora and Hariri also expressed deep concern
about the subliminal and more explicit messages being sent by
the ongoing debate in the EU and United States about whether
now is the time to re-engage with Syria. Both felt strongly

BEIRUT 00003651 003 OF 005


that it was not and that any official visitors to Damascus
would undermine March 14 forces in Lebanon, as the
pro-Syrians and Aoun worked to convince the Lebanese public
that the EU and U.S. were about to "sell out Lebanon again"
to Syria. Siniora reported that he had complained to Tony
Blair about the impact of Blair's recent remarks regarding
Syria. But, alluding to Syria's intrasigence, Siniora
laughed that "Blair's checks in Damascus seem to be
bouncing." The Ambassador emphasized to Siniora and Hariri
that the USG policy toward Syria was not softening. Hariri
seemed convinced; Siniora less so.

SHEBA, OVERFLIGHTS, MEPP, ETC.
--------------


9. (S) Siniora also repeated his usual arguments about
strengthening the Arab moderates, a camp in which he puts
himself, by renewed progress on the Israeli-Palestinian
track. "Anything you can do to show light at the end of that
tunnel will help me," he claimed. Hariri and Siniora both
asked for help on getting the Israelis out of the northern
(Lebanese) side of Ghajjar village, halting Israeli
overflights, and showing some kind of movement on Sheba'
Farms. "Don't do these things to help me," Siniora (who,
characteristically, talked about these issues in more detail
than Hariri did) argued, "do them to help yourselves," in
terms of the U.S. image. Siniora said that, while he
recognized that Sheba' Farms would not be placed under UN
custody (as per his "seven points") quickly, he hoped for
"some kind of horizon" that "will not be open-ended" on the
issue. He said that, with Ghajjar, Sheba', and overflights
all being "open wounds" in the Lebanese psyche, he wanted to
be able to project himself and his cabinet as having the
international credibility and clout to resolve these issues.


10. (S) The Ambassador noted to Siniora that he was facing
an internal foe yet looking to Israel to solve his problems,
an approach that seemed at odds with Siniora's harsh response
whenever the Israelis hint at willingness to talk with
Lebanon. Siniora accused the Ambassador and USG of "lack of
imagination during crisis." He insisted that we are missing
an opportunity in not pursuing a creative approach to Sheba'.
The Ambassador asked Siniora about the 1949 Armistice
Agreement, also covered in the "seven points" and mentioned
in UNSCR 1701. Siniora evinced less enthusiasm than usual
for the topic, saying that the modernization and amendments
he seeks in the Armistice Agreement could only occur in the
context of stopping overflights and solving Sheba' Farms.

CONTINGENCY PLANNING:
WARNING SYRIA
--------------


11. (S) Hariri said that, while he was convinced that March
8-Aoun were delaying street action, it was only a matter of
time until "they do something bad against us." He therefore
urged that the USG, working with France and other allies,
start developing contingency plans now for what happens if
the pro-Syrians use violence. What will the USG do, he
asked, if UNIFIL is attacked? What will the USG do if
Siniora is killed or his Grand Serail office and official
residence destroyed? If an Embassy is attacked? Hariri
offered his own strongly held opinion -- "bomb Damascus!"
The important point, Hariri said, is to make it clear now
that "you won't simply use words," that Syria will have to
pay some kind of cost for its actions in Lebanon. "Don't use
the Israelis," Hariri said, for then Syria will be seen as a
martyr in the Arab world. But make it clear now, he urged,
that there will be severe consequences for Syria if anything
happens to UNIFIL, Siniora, Jumblatt, or others. Given
Bashar al-Asad's fury at UNSCR 1701 and the special tribunal,
only fear will make him hesitate, Hariri said.

TRADING SINIORA'S HEAD
TO OUST LAHOUD?
--------------


12. (S) The Ambassador asked Hariri about the rumors
circulating in Beirut of a potential deal to oust Siniora and
Lahoud at the same time. Hariri said that he indeed would
back such a plan, "for we can always bring Fouad back later;
Lahoud will be finished." But there are no specific
proposals in this regard. In any case, Hariri said, the
March 14 forces will try now to reshift the focus back to
Lahoud. It is outrageous that the debate now revolves around
the March 8-Aoun demand to oust Siniora, when in fact Lahoud

BEIRUT 00003651 004 OF 005


is almost universally despised. "You will see," Hariri
vowed, an increasingly public campaign by the March 14 forces
to concentrate the debate on Lahoud. Hariri said that, just
before the campaign begins, he would visit the Patriarch, a
meeting that would suggest to the public that the Patriarch
was informed and blessed the idea of a negative PR press
against Lahoud.


13. (S) The Ambassador asked whether, if some deal could be
found to get rid of Lahoud, Hariri had any hope of getting
March 14 united behind one presidential candidate. Hariri,
who had spoken with passion thorugh the meeeting, turned
reticent, talking about others' views rather than his own.
The Patriarch, he said, has shifted and now wants a
"compromise" president, someone who can talk to both March 8
and March 14. Pressed by the Ambassador for his own views,
Hariri talked about a meeting he had with Hassan Nasrallah
months ago, "when we were still talking." At that meeting,
he said, several names came up as potential replacements for
Lahoud: LAF Commander Michel Sleiman, Central Bank Governor
Riadh Salameh, and former MP from Jbeil Nazem Khoury.
Charles Rizk would have been "excellent," but he has now
burned too many bridges to March 8. Michel Edde is "too
old."

A MEETING SOON WITH BERRI?
--------------


14. (S) The Ambassador asked whether Hariri had tried to
talk to Berri about getting rid of Lahoud, since Berri's
distaste for Lahoud is as well known as the constraints on
Berri's freedom of action. "I'm not talking to Nabih,"
Hariri admitted. The Ambassador responded that, in his view,
Hariri had no choice but to renew contact with Berri. Hariri
said that he intended to visit Berri in the next day or two.
In the meantime, he had passed Berri a message via Ghazi
Aridi, accusing Berri of "killing Rafiq Hariri again."
Siniora offered a more reconciliatory approach to Berri: "We
have to show Nabih the way to help us and help himself,"
despite the Syrian and Iranian heavy influence over him.
But, nevertheless, Siniora, too, had no immediate plans to
see Berri.

ENCOURAGING A FORWARD-LOOKING VISION
AND TALKING OF HIZBALLAH'S DISARMAMENT
--------------


15. (S) The Ambassador asked Hariri about March 14 plans
once the current crisis ends. No matter how it ends, the
Ambassador said, March 14 leaders must return to the campaign
mode they had in spring 2005. They must project a positive
vision for Lebanon's future, not simply talk about Rafiq
Hariri's martrydom. Hariri insisted that March 14 would be
projecting a more unified, consistent message, initially
about Lahoud's ouster, and he listened with more patience
than usual as the Ambassador urged some kind of March 14 "war
room" with professional media advisors and others. As for
his own hopes for the post-crisis period, Hariri said that he
wanted to focus the country once and for all on Hizballah's
weapons. It is clearer than ever, Hariri said, what a
distortion Hizballah's weapons cause, and Hizballah must see
the March 14 leaders are united in insisting on Hizballah's
disarmament. It may take time and involve political
compromises, but Hizballah must disarm.


16. (S) The Ambassador commented that Hariri was more
explicit on this point than he ever had been in the past;
was he merely trying to seduce the USG by singing an
appealing tune? After all, there were lots of anecdotes
shared from the National Dialogue and subsequent
consultations that suggested Hariri was telling Nasrallah
that he shouldn't worry about his arms. Saying that he was
going to tell the Ambassador something he had not shared with
any foreigners, Hariri said that his father Rafiq had once
told him of a conversation he had in one of his secret
sessions with Nasrallah. The meeting occurred in 2005,
before UNSCR 1559 was adopted and Emile Lahoud's presidential
mandate extended. In that meeting, Rafiq urged Nasrallah to
drop the alliance with Syria in favor of a closer alliance
with him. Given Hizballah's popularity, Hizballah didn't
need Syria and didn't need Emile Lahoud's extension. When he
thinks about his father's description of this meeting, Saad
said that he realizes that his father was offering to replace
Syria as Hizballah's partner. And this admission by his
father at hoping to reduce Syria's influence, Saad said, is
probably what got Rafiq killed. So, yes, he wants

BEIRUT 00003651 005 OF 005


Hizballah's disarmament. Whether directly involved or not,
Nasrallah probably gave Bashar al-Asad the information that
provoked the order to assassinate Rafiq.
FELTMAN