Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BEIRUT3643
2006-11-17 11:16:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

LEBANON: EMBASSY DELEGATION VISITS UNIFIL, BLUE

Tags:  PGOV PREL PTER ASEC MARR LE IS 
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P 171116Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6538
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0522
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 BEIRUT 003643 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING
STATE FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/FO:ATACHCO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER ASEC MARR LE IS
SUBJECT: LEBANON: EMBASSY DELEGATION VISITS UNIFIL, BLUE
LINE

Classified By: Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ambassador. Reason: 1.4 (d)

SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 BEIRUT 003643

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING
STATE FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/FO:ATACHCO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER ASEC MARR LE IS
SUBJECT: LEBANON: EMBASSY DELEGATION VISITS UNIFIL, BLUE
LINE

Classified By: Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ambassador. Reason: 1.4 (d)

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) An Embassy Beirut delegation visited UNIFIL's Naqoura
headquarters and toured the Blue Line area November 14.
UNIFIL Commander General Alain Pellegrini and senior officers
gave a positive overview of UNIFIL's deployment in the south,
but he and top commanders expressed private reticence toward
increasing the force level further. There had been good
cooperation between UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces
(LAF) in implementing UNSCR 1701, but the LAF remains
underequipped and its forces in the field may suffer hardship
over the winter. Nevertheless, the LAF is highly motivated
to meet its responsibility of securing the border area and
will likely remain deployed.


2. (C) Relations with local residents are generally good, but
the introduction of so many new troops from new national
contingents has resulted in some friction over road and land
use, as well as some cultural misunderstandings. UNIFIL
believes that it was these frictions, not political forces
opposed to UNIFIL, which were the source of recent negative
press articles. Thus far, there has been no detection or
confiscation of Hizballah weapons, although there are rumors
that Hizballah may be enticing or intimidating local
landlords into refusing the use of their land to UNIFIL.
UNIFIL officers deem it urgent to find an effective approach
to curb Israeli overflights.


3. (C) Trilateral UNIFIL-IDF-LAF meetings are continuing and
will likely continue for the near future at least, though
there has been no softening of the Lebanese side's refusal to
formalize the meetings. Meanwhile, UNIFIL has established
formal coordination mechanisms with the LAF and IDF both
locally and in capitals, and an LAF officer is stationed
full-time on the flagship of the UNIFIL maritime force.

Meanwhile, the mandates and rules of engagement for both
UNIFIL and UNTSO are undergoing scrutiny in New York.


4. (C) The delegation's tour of the Blue Line took it past
several former Hizballah positions which had been destroyed,
some of which have been subsequently occupied by the LAF.
The damage to Shia areas is great, in particular to Bint
Jbeil, whereas many Christian villages seem relatively
untouched. Many areas along the Line are near-ideal for
guerilla warfare against a mechanized army, and some
Hizballah positions had survived long Israeli bombardment and
shelling before succumbing to ground attack. Finally,
Hizballah flags continue to fly over a large number of
houses, and the delegation believed that it was under close
Hizballah surveillance for most if not all of its movements.
End Summary.


5. (SBU) An Embassy Beirut delegation consisting of Polchief,
Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) Chief, RSO and A/RSO, and
Poloffs visited United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
(UNIFIL) Headquarters in Naqoura, at the westernmost point of
the Israeli-Lebanese border, on November 14. The delegation
met with UNIFIL Commander Major General Alain Pellegrini and
received detailed briefings from senior UNIFIL and UN Truce
Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) officers. The delegation
then toured the Blue Line from Naqoura to Rmeish, guided by
UNIFIL officers, and passed through the heavily damaged
village of Bint Jbeil. UNIFIL staff were exceptionally
accommodating and generous to the Embassy delegation. End
Summary.

DEPLOYMENTS AND FORCE LEVELS
--------------


6. (C) General Alain Pellegrini, a French officer who has
headed up UNIFIL for over two years and who plans to leave
UNIFIL and retire in early 2007, received the delegation at
his office for a half-hour meeting. Pellegrini gave an
upbeat assessment of the ongoing cooperation between UNIFIL
and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). Currently, there are
over 10,000 UNIFIL troops deployed, including 1,700 serving
in the maritime forces monitoring the coast. Pellegrini was
confident that UNIFIL was meeting its mandated role under UN
Security Council Resolution 1701 of monitoring the cessation

BEIRUT 00003643 002 OF 006


of hostilities and assisting the LAF in its deployment of
troops to establish control of Lebanon's borders.
Coordination between UNIFIL and the LAF, from the command
level down, had been very good, he said.


7. (C) Pellegrini admitted that the introduction of several
new nationalities to the UNIFIL force mix had resulted in
some minor tensions. While UNIFIL officers comprise a mix of
several nationalities, Pellegrini has appeared in his
interactions with diplomats to rely most heavily on his top
French officers, including his deputy, General Philippe
Stoltz, and Colonel Alexandre Lalane-Berdouticq. All three
of these French officers will depart UNIFIL within the next
few months, to be replaced by Italian officers and an Italian
UNIFIL commander. The timing of this turnover, according to
one French officer, has been the source of some friction with
Rome, they told us.


8. (C) Pellegrini indicated that the expanded UNIFIL had in
general received a warm welcome from local residents.
However he expressed concern over the possible impact of a
large number of new troops on local residents' goodwill.
When asked about UNIFIL's three-phase approach of installing
new troop contingents, Pellegrini confided in Polchief that
the "phase" terminology was his own invention, to create a
premise for slowing the introduction of new troops. (Without
saying so overtly, Pellegrini seemed skeptical that UNIFIL
should grow to 15,000 troops, at least in the south.) He
said that UNIFIL's force level should count maritime force
personnel as well as ground troops in arriving at the 15,000
level.


9. (C) Polchief later approached Colonel Lalane-Berdouticq in
a pull-aside to ask his view of the appropriate force level.
He replied that the area south of the Litani is already
crowded with LAF and UNIFIL troops and that adding more
soldiers to the area could not improve security, but might
prove counterproductive by engendering local hostility. He
noted that roads had been increasingly damaged since the war
by the introduction of thousands of military vehicles, and
that local residents frequently expressed frustration at the
large vehicles clogging thoroughfares.


10. (C) UNIFIL is countering this resentment with outreach
programs including medical treatment for residents, but its
resources are limited. According to Pellegrini, UNIFIL and
other aid programs are all too often used as an excuse for
the central government to continue to neglect the south.
UNIFIL is trying to find a balance that keeps pressure on the
GOL to be present in the region.

HIZBALLAH'S CHALLENGE
--------------


11. (C) When Polchief inquired about possible Hizballah
rearming in the south, Pellegrini replied that no large cache
of Hizballah weapons had been located or confiscated. He
qualified his remark by noting that UNIFIL does not search
private homes. However, Pellegrini added that under his
interpretation of UNIFIL's rules of engagement, if any such
weapons are found in the open, UNIFIL would notify the LAF
and, if necessary, take action on its own to confiscate those
weapons. Finally, he observed that Hizballah's freedom of
movement and of action in the south is extremely limited now
due to the massive influx of troops from UNIFIL and the LAF.


12. (C) General Pellegrini indicated that UNIFIL was still
having trouble securing land use rights from local residents
and landlords, and informed us he had heard Hizballah was
pressuring landowners not to lease their land to UNIFIL.
Other top UNIFIL officers blamed landlords' reluctance on
what they allege is the GOL's continuing failure to fulfill
its obligations to pay landlords, despite the GOL's October
2006 cabinet decision to do so.

TERRORISTS AND OVERFLIGHTS
--------------


13. (C) When asked about press reports of UNIFIL troop
misbehavior, such as the report of Italian soldiers stealing
from a local shop and of Spanish troops searching private
homes for arms, Pellegrini denied the reports and attributed

BEIRUT 00003643 003 OF 006


them to cultural differences, rumor and misperception at the
local level. The south has been occupied by foreign armies
for most of the past several decades, he pointed out, and no
matter how hard UNIFIL tries to promote goodwill, it will
always be seen by some as a foreign occupying force. The
many different nationalities represented only serve to
multiply cultural barriers.


14. (C) Neither Pellegrini nor Colonel Lalane-Berdouticq
believed the press stories were attributable to political
forces hostile to UNIFIL's mission. The two officers also
saw no threat to UNIFIL in an alleged al-Qaeda threat the
previous day to bring down the government of Prime Minister
Siniora, nor did they express particular concern that UNIFIL
may be exposed to terrorist attack.


15. (C) Pellegrini did, however, express growing concern over
continuing Israeli overflights in Lebanese airspace, and said
that current pressure had not made enough of an impact on
Israel. The overflights represent a danger for his troops on
the ground, he averred, and he is willing to propose to UN
Headquarters a change in the rules of engagement to allow
UNIFIL to respond with force. While admitting that UNHQ
would not likely approve such a change, Pellegrini complained
that other avenues of engaging the Israelis on this issue are
not producing results.

TRILATERAL MEETINGS AND OTHER COORDINATION
--------------


16. (C) Pellegrini confirmed for us that trilateral meetings,
in which representatives from the IDF and LAF sit in the same
room and interact with each other via UNIFIL officers, are
ongoing in Naqoura on a weekly basis. The only subject
discussed in recent meetings has been the delayed IDF
withdrawal from the village of Ghajjar. (The delegation
would later see the border checkpoint, the only official
border crossing on the Lebanon-Israel border, through which
IDF officers cross to the Lebanese side to attend these
meetings.) When asked by Polchief, Pellegrini expected the
trilateral meetings to continue even after the resolution of
the Ghajjar issue. Polchief hoped that the meetings would
become institutionalized, at least informally; Pellegrini
allowed for this possibility but doubted that the Lebanese
side would accede to any formalized arrangement.


17. (C) Pellegrini noted that work to establish UNIFIL
coordination cells with the two militaries is well-advanced.
There is now a UNIFIL coordination cell in Tel Aviv and in
the LAF headquarters at Yarza, outside of Beirut. There is
informal coordination with the LAF in the south (LAF
Commander General Michel Sleiman delegates, Pellegrini
admitted, but "in a Middle Eastern manner") and some more
formalized coordination with the IDF takes place via mobile
phone and radio. In addition, there is a Lebanese officer
stationed full-time on the flagship of the maritime patrol
force, a German command frigate.

LAF CAPABILITIES AND FUTURE
--------------


18. (C) Regarding the LAF's future, Pelligrini told Embassy
ODC Chief that the LAF needs to focus on building its
capabilities not as a means to challenge Hizbollah but as a
means to provide a viable alternative to it. The LAF needs
to concentrate inward on asserting control of Lebanon's
internal scene rather than concentrating on the nearly
impossible goal of fighting the Israeli military. Pellegrini
admitted that it will be politically difficult for the
Lebanese government to follow this course, but ultimately
necessary for the LAF to fulfill UNSCR 1701 and achieve
UNIFIL's eventual departure from southern Lebanon.

BRIEFINGS
--------------


19. (C) Following the meeting with Pellegrini, 12-15 of
UNIFIL's top officers gathered to brief the Embassy
delegation for the next hour and a half on UNIFIL's expansion
and maritime component, UNIFIL coordination with the LAF, and
the UNTSO Observer Group Lebanon (OGL) mission. While much
of the briefing material had been shown to Emboffs and

BEIRUT 00003643 004 OF 006


third-country diplomats in previous briefings, there had been
several updates. Among the notable points brought out in the
three briefings were:

-- There has been much misunderstanding about the meaning of
the Blue Line, a withdrawal line and not an international
border. The Israeli "technical fence" is in most places a
few hundred meters into the Israeli side of the Blue Line.
As a result, Israeli work on the fence and even moving the
position of the fence is often interpreted by the Lebanese
side as a border violation. Furthermore, many Lebanese
civilians have accidentally crossed the Blue Line, resulting
in reported border violations.

-- UNIFIL's mandate continues to be subject to revision.
Briefers used some ambiguity in the definition of "hostile
activities" as cited in paragraph 12 of Resolution 1701.
When asked by Polchief for details, the briefers admitted the
UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has staffed a
Strategic Military Cell to examine this definition.
Activities such as movements, observation, photography,
construction, overflights, and many others could be
considered hostile in some contexts.

-- The LAF Navy's chief need, according to German Navy
Captain Becker, is for land-based radars for maritime
interdiction. (The previous radar installations were
destroyed during the July-August conflict.) Following this,
the LAF needs patrol boats to stop smuggling.

-- The UNIFIL maritime operation is the first-ever UN
peacekeeping operation to include a maritime contingent,
according to Captain Becker. (After the briefing, Captain
Becker told Polchief that Berlin has authorized the German
Navy to operate for one year as part of UNIFIL. Any longer
deployment would have to be reapproved by the German
government.)

-- German Navy assets participated directly in the publicized
apprehension of a small boat smuggling cigarettes from Syria
in early November, though UNIFIL allowed the LAF to take the
credit. German warships tracked the boat and another related
vessel across Lebanese and Syrian waters and assisted the
Lebanese Navy boat to interdict the smuggler.

-- UNIFIL has no separate budget for its humanitarian
assistance programs. Those programs are funded from UNIFIL's
operational budget, with the rationale that the humanitarian
programs build trust among local residents.

-- UNTSO's OGL observers operate side-by-side with UNIFIL
personnel and feed reports through the same chain of command,
but they are only active during the daylight hours. UNTSO
observers have no night-vision capability.

-- A possible retooling of UNTSO's mission is currently under
discussion in New York. Past proposals have included
expanding the observer's area of operations to the Syrian
border.

-- UNIFIL officers were unanimous that the LAF is determined
and highly committed to meeting its deployment
responsibilities in the south. However, the LAF has many
deficiencies in training, and in areas such as monitoring,
patrolling, and maintenance.

-- The most pressing equipment need is to prepare the LAF for
the winter by providing support items such as tents, winter
jackets, fuel and housing facilities. Despite their woeful
unpreparedness for the winter, the LAF will remain deployed
in its positions in the south, according to all our UNIFIL
interlocutors.

-- Other LAF equipment requirements include: proper night
vision equipment for monitoring the border at night and spare
parts for UH-1 helicopters.

-- Currently the LAF's main armored personnel carrier (APV)
is the U.S.-made M-113. The UNIFIL assessment is that many
of the APV's are not in fully operational condition and parts
are badly needed to keep the best vehicles in operation.
UNIFIL's assessment is based on an informal study of movement

BEIRUT 00003643 005 OF 006


patterns.

-- The expected delivery of 300 HMMWV's from the U.S. in the
coming months as well as spares and repairs for current
vehicles should provide transport relief. UNIFIL officers
cautioned us that Spanish troops were exposed to harassment
by locals who resented the fact that they used HMMWV
vehicles, which locals associate with the Israeli military.
One of the briefers advised us that the LAF might wish to
avoid using US-procured HMMWV's in the south as a result of
this perception.

BLUE LINE TOUR
--------------


20. (C) The delegation toured much of the Blue Line in the
afternoon, beginning at UNIFIL HQ in Naqoura and driving
within a kilometer or two (often within a few meters) of the
Blue Line and the Israeli technical fence eastward through
several villages to Rmeish, the farthest point east on the
trip.


21. (C) Beginning from Naqoura, a thick electrical wire
parallelled the road for a few kilometers. A UNIFIL officer
riding in our car, a captain from the Ghana Battalion,
explained that the wire had been laid by Hizballah fighters
prior to or during the July-August war to supply electrical
power to rocket launchers close to the road (and presumably
also to Hizballah's fortified positions). There had been a
heavily fortified emplacement for rocket launching, including
a large tunnel complex, only a few kilometers outside
Naqoura. The IDF shelled the position repeatedly during the
war but only the Israeli ground offensive was, with great
difficulty, able to stop Hizballah from launching rockets
from it.


22. (C) The terrain surrounding Naqoura is ideal for
guerrilla fighters opposing a mechanized army, our guide
explained. We saw that the area comprises short rocky hills
separated by narrow wadis which any vehicle, armored or
unarmored, would have difficulty negotiating. The area is
also filled with thick scrub brush, making concealment
easier. While there were a few shepherds guiding flocks, the
area just outside Naqoura is only sparsely inhabited.


23. (C) Within the first few kilometers from UNIFIL HQ, our
guide pointed out to us several former Hizballah positions
which had been destroyed by the IDF. Most of them seem to
have been built from scrap metal, scrap concrete, and other
building materials which may have been available from the
area's many construction sites. One of the former Hizballah
positions, a hilltop inside a bend in the Blue Line, had been
occupied by the LAF. A large prefab structure had been
erected and a single M113 stood guard surrounded by a new
earthen berm.


24. (C) The road began to run through several villages.
Majority-Shia villages had been heavily damaged, and our
guide pointed us to several former Hizballah firing positions
within those villages. Most of these were houses which had
been wrecked by IDF attacks. Hizballah flags continued to
fly over several structures. The Christian villages we
passed through, on the other hand, were relatively unharmed.


25. (C) The delegation's convoy passed by several GhanaBatt
positions (usually a gated complex with a high concrete wall)
and GhanaBatt HQ. The convoy stopped at several places
including a GhanBatt position within a few meters of the
technical fence. A Hizballah position had been nearby. A
mixed collection of shell casings attested to fighting -- M16
5.56 spent and live ammunition and AK-47 7.62 casings
littered the ground. At another high point along the Line,
no more than a kilometer from an Israeli artillery base under
which the road passed, the LAF had taken over another
Hizballah position and moved in prefab structures.


26. (C) Finally, on the way back to the road that would take
the delegation through Tyre and back to Beirut, the convoy
passed through Bint Jbeil, which was the most heavily damaged
town we encountered. Of the structures we could see from our
drive through, perhaps half were totally destroyed or had
suffered clear structural damage to an extent sufficient to

BEIRUT 00003643 006 OF 006


render them unusable. The remainder were heavily damaged and
would clearly require expensive rehabilitation. The
delegation was not in a position to see all of Bint Jbeil nor
to undertake a systematic survey of the damage, but the
destruction was impressive.


27. (C) It is worth noting that at several points along the
delegation's movements from Naqoura along the Line, up to
Bint Jbeil and back to Tyre, surveillance of the delegation
was detected. It was presumed that that surveillance was
carried out by Hizballah.
FELTMAN