LEBANON: GEMAYEL SEES LIGHT AT THE END OF A VERY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 003630

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: GEMAYEL SEES LIGHT AT THE END OF A VERY
DARK TUNNEL


Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman. Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) an
d (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Former President Amin Gemayel believes that the
chaotic situation in the Lebanese government will get worse,
and factions may take to the streets before it is resolved,
but he does see hope for resolution. Gemayel is convinced
that the supporters of the current government will remain
firm, and that everyone will recognize the need for
compromise. Aoun will not get the presidency, some outside
pressure may be required to help the government through its
current crisis. A new president and a new government may be
able to work well together. End Summary.

SYRIA AND IRAN MOVING APART
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2. (C) In a meeting with the Ambassador on November 14,
former President Amin Gemayel shared his view of the current
political struggles in Lebanon. Initially explaining that
Syrian and Iranian interests in Lebanon have diverged, he
argued that nevertheless, neither is satisfied with the
current formula of power sharing. Their dissatisfaction is
not as Shiites, but as interested outside political powers.
While the Syrians have nothing to lose, having lost both
their military presence and much of their intelligence
machinery within Lebanon, the Iranians have gained
tremendously in their influence in the country.


3. (C) The result of this divergence is that Syria would
support a move to chaos, especially if it would have a
negative effect on the international tribunal to try suspects
in the Hariri assassination and other crimes. At this point,
Syria needs Hizballah. Iran, conversely, is directing
Hizballah, and stands to lose ground in a chaotic Lebanon.
Although Gemayel stated that this results in a paradox -- why
is Hizballah willing to resort to chaos? -- Gemayel made it
clear that he does not believe that Hizballah will go that
far.

WHAT HAPPENS NOW?
--------------


5. (C) Gemayel's vision of the near term is of increasing
confrontations, disturbances, and a large degree of
brinksmanship. But finally, no one will "break the ship,"
because "Lebanon means compromise" and there will be a
solution because there is a balance of power. He views the
confrontations as initially political, with "the street" used
to assist political goals. He sees debate over
constitutional interpretations, sit-ins, and increasing
violence. Hizballah will be better at this, because they
have military, financial and political influence over the
Shiites, and can use their supporters in a display of "nizaam
arsous" or paramilitary demonstrations. But because the
pro-government factions are a strong "alliance of
conviction," they are also "strong in the street" now. Not
only is the March 14 coalition firm, but so are the Sunnis
and the Druze as confessional groups. Gemayel, like others,
appeared firmly convinced of this.


6. (C) Gemayel believes that when the confrontations become
unbearable, there will be a kind of intervention, possibly
from outside, which will force a compromise between the
government and the presidency. Because the presidency is
"more and more on the table," no one will be able to avoid
discussing it. Already in the national dialogue and current
consultatons, the presidency has been recognized as an issue
that needs to be addressed. The change in government and the
presidency will be a "package deal".


7. (C) Asked how long this process might take, Gemayel sees
the first phase as dangerous, as all groups purge themselves.
Hizballah will push things, but cannot afford to go too far,
because in the event of a vacuum, they cannot be sure that
they will be able to fill the void, rather than other Islamic
extremist groups. Suggesting that outcomes might include the
resignation of parliament, or of the Prime Minister, Gemayel
imagined that Hizballah might find itself with no functioning
government, and therefore no enemy. This would inevitably
invite international oversight, which is neither in the
interest of Syria nor of Hizballah.


BEIRUT 00003630 002 OF 003


WHERE DOES THIS LEAVE AOUN?
--------------


8. (C) General Aoun is uncomfortable, according to Gemayel.
Aoun does not know what to do or how to behave. Asking the
Ambassador about his meeting the previous day with Aoun,
Gemayel said it would be better if other countries did not
invite Aoun to visit. In particular, he cited Aoun's
reported end-run around the Saudi ambassador to Lebanon,
going straight to Riyadh to talk about a meeting. Gemayel
said a meeting in Riyadh of all Lebanese Christian leaders,
as a counterbalance to Aoun's visit, would be wrong and
Gemayel would not attend. Expressing hope that the U.S.
could use its influence to get the invitations cancelled,
Gemayel also complained about a Kuwaiti invitation to Aoun to
visit.


9. (C) Previously, Hizballah viewed Aoun as a "serious
candidate," but not its candidate, for the Lebanese
presidency. But now their position is that Aoun has been
upgraded to Hizballah's candidate. However, Aoun is not the
candidate of Parliament Speaker Berri, and if a compromise is
brokered, there is no way to bring Aoun in as president.
Gemayel believes that there will come a point in the process
where Aoun will understand this, and where Hizballah will
tell Aoun that they cannot impose him as president against
the will of the others. Aoun will then be obliged to
recognize the depth of the crisis. If Hizballah's Nasrallah
wants a national unity government, he cannot oppose a new
president, recognizing that Lahoud has completely lost all
credibility. Currently, even Aoun cannot visit Lahoud, which
indicates both a real crisis, and also a recognition that
Lahoud is dispensable.

A FLEXIBLE NEW GOVERNMENT
--------------


10. (C) Gemayel painted an attractive picture of a possible
new government, if both the new president and the prime
minister are flexible. A new president would be necessary
because he would serve as "a fair referee," over a group of
ministers who might be "black, white and gray", rather than
polarized as at present. In Gemayel's view, a group of
neutral ministers could promote good governance. First,
there would need to be a compromise among the Lebanese, and
possibly an agreement something like Taif.


11. (C) Asked about the long-term prospects with Syria and
Hizballah in this event, Gemayel said that neither could be
expected to change overnight. The Syrians would need to put
aside their ambitions for Lebanon, which will be difficult
because most Syrians consider Lebanon to be a part of Syria.
Although Gemayel thought these changes might need to be
brought about by outside influences, he nevertheless wanted
to know what was up with Blair sending an envoy to Syria
recently.

WHO COULD BE PRESIDENT?
--------------


12. (C) In a one-on-one session with the Ambassador at the
end of the meeting, Gemayel discussed potential candidates
for the presidency. He provided a description of a
hypothetically ideal candidate from his point of view (that
sounded very close to defining Amin Gemayel himself). After
dismissing rumors that he yearns to return to Baabda Palace,
Gemayel concluded that a successful candidate must be able to
talk to both March 14 and March 8 politicians. He mentioned
Minister of Justice Charles Rizk, LAF Commander Michel
Sleiman, former Foreign Minister Jean Obeid, and Central Bank
Governor Riad Salameh as possibilities, although he doubted
Obeid has cut his ties to Syria sufficiently. But Gemayel's
favorite candidate was for someone outside Lebanon: Carlos
Ghosn, Chairman of Nissan-Renault. Lebanese in origin, Ghosn
has the experience and the weight to restore the presidency,
Gemayel said. (In a strange coincidence, Minister of
Telecommunications Marwan Hamadeh mentioned Ghosn to the
Ambassador in a later meeting on the same day. Hamadeh, who
claimed to be a friend of Ghosn, said that he is going to
test the waters with Ghosn privately.)

COMMENT
--------------


13. (C) Gemayel's analysis of a potential divergence in
Syrian and Iranian interests in Lebanon was intriguing.

BEIRUT 00003630 003 OF 003


Egyptian Ambassador Hussein Derar, in a 11/15 meeting with
the Ambassador, offered the same analysis: Iran has an
interest in Lebanon's stability, given Hizballah's power;
Syria has an interest in chaos in Lebanon, in order to have
an opportunity fill the vacuum. But Derar said that his
government concluded that Iran would cede the local political
ground to Syria, so Syria's desires trump Iran's.
FELTMAN