LEBANON: AOUN CRIES BETRAYAL AGAIN BUT WILL AVOID

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 003613

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING
STATE FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/FO:ATACHCO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2016
TAGS: PREL PTER LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: AOUN CRIES BETRAYAL AGAIN BUT WILL AVOID
STREETS FOR NOW


Classified By: Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ambassador. Reason: 1.4 (d)

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Michel Aoun recounted to the Ambassador November 13
that March 14 leaders had offered a tradeoff to Aoun and
Hizballah during Nabih Berri's national consultations -- the
Hariri assassination tribunal for an expansion of the cabinet
-- but that the group had gone back on its offer and abruptly
planned to implement the tribunal unilaterally. The move was
emblematic of March 14's exclusion of others from power, in
particular Christians. The March 14 offer to Aoun never
approached Aoun's desired outcome: a sixth of the cabinet,
electoral reform, new parliamentary elections, and
subsequently a replacement of the President. Meanwhile,
following the resignation of the Shia ministers, the cabinet
is powerless, and any attempt to govern without them -- with
or without Aoun -- would be dangerous. The rump cabinet's
move to approve the tribunal on November 13 is provocative,
but no street action will come before Berri's return from
Iran, November 16 at the earliest. Aoun, meanwhile, says he
will keep his supporters out of demonstrations for the time
being and use his contact with Hizballah as a moderating
influence. End Summary.


2. (C) The Ambassador and Polchief called on a relaxed Michel
Aoun, leader of the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM),at his
residence in Rabieh November 13. Aoun's son-in-law Gebran
Bassil also attended. Aoun remarked that he had met the
previous day with the new Norwegian Charge d'Affaires;
following the visit of its foreign minister last week, the
GON has just established an embassy in Beirut. Clearly
relishing the spotlight, he recounted that he had also
received UN envoy Geir Pedersen, Justice Minister Charles
Rizk and Aoun advisor Mohammed Chattah on November 12.

CONSULTATIONS
--------------


3. (C) Aoun was surprised at the failure of the
consultations, he said. The group set out to discuss a
possible expansion of the cabinet and a new electoral law.
They discussed the first but reached no agreement, he
explained. The crucial moment was the evening of November 9,
he said, when Berri told Aoun that he had talked with
Mustaqbal Party leader Saad Hariri and Hizballah
representative Mohammed Raad and said that they had reached a
proposal for consideration at the November 11 session. Under
the proposal, Hariri would support the expansion of the
cabinet, including a blocking minority, as long as there is
agreement to create the tribunal. Hizballah
Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah was consulted and gave his

SIPDIS
assent.


4. (C) Then on the morning of November 11, two surprises
greeted conferees arriving for the final round of
consultations, according to Aoun. The first was that Saad
Hariri had withdrawn his agreement to the November 9
proposal. The second was that Siniora was not present; he
was busy notifying the cabinet and President Lahoud of his
intention to place the tribunal document on the agenda of the
November 13 cabinet meeting. (There is a 48-hour advance
notice requirement to add agenda items.) This changed the
atmosphere of the November 11 session completely, Aoun said,
for the worse.


5. (C) Bassil expressed his disappointment that the March 14
leaders had gone back on their offer of a "tradeoff" -- the
tribunal for a cabinet expansion. When the Ambassador
challenged the term "tradeoff," noting that all Lebanese
parties had expressed at least verbal support for the
tribunal, Aoun said that his principal concern is to obtain a
blocking minority. The PM, he averred, had scuttled the
proposal because he is determined to reduce Christian power
in Lebanon. The Ambassador countered that should Aoun have
four seats in the cabinet, the PM would not govern against
FPM's wishes, just as he would not govern against Amal or
Hizballah wishes. The principle of consensus would be
respected for the FPM as well as for the other parties and
confessional groups.


BEIRUT 00003613 002 OF 003


AFTER THE RESIGNATIONS
--------------


6. (C) The Ambassador noted that after their resignations,
the Amal ministers' statements suggested that there may be a
way out of the crisis, whereas the Hizballah ministers
appeared resigned to a permanent impasse, possibly to
confrontational demonstrations. Aoun said that the
resignations were more important than any possible
demonstrations. All confessions have to be represented in
the cabinet, he said, and without the Shia the cabinet is
powerless. The Ambassador noted that the signatures of both
the PM and President are required to accept the resignation
of a minister, and that Siniora had refused to recognize the
resignations. Aoun rejected that notion, saying that what is
important is the minister's will. Finally, when asked, Aoun
doubted that Hizballah's MPs would resign from the Chamber of
Deputies.


7. (C) When the Ambassador proposed that Aoun would be in a
good position to sit out the dispute between March 8 and
March 14 groups and emerge relatively stronger, he said that
he would insist to be a part of any proposed change in
government. One of his principal demands would be
"anticipated" -- i.e., accelerated -- parliamentary
elections. Aoun will also insist on the principle that a
two-thirds parliamentary majority is required to install a
new cabinet, as opposed to a simple majority. Finally, Aoun
will continue to demand cabinet representation for each party
in proportion to its share of seats in Parliament. When
asked by the Ambassador, Aoun said that he had indeed been
offered four seats in the cabinet -- but in a cabinet of 30
ministers, not 24. (From the beginning of the consultations,
Aoun held out for one-sixth of the cabinet, the same
proportion of seats he controls in Parliament.)


8. (C) Aoun told us, as had PM Siniora previously, that
former Washington Ambassador and close Siniora advisor
Mohammed Chattah had visited him the day before in an attempt
to solve the cabinet crisis. Aoun turned down Chattah's
overture, however, as he had offered Aoun the same formula --
four seats out of 30 -- that Aoun had rejected in the
consultation process. In addition, Aoun said, there could be
no "national unity government" without the Shia ministers.
When the Ambassador suggested that Aoun join the cabinet now
as a way to pressure the Shia to come back, Aoun said that
such a move would be dangerous and cut the last ties between
Christians and Shia. Aoun added that he sees the future very
pessimistically, and warned that there could be civil war.

CREATING A CRISIS
--------------


9. (C) The Ambassador explained to Aoun that the USG is
principally concerned regarding the positions taken by Amal
and Hizballah. The FPM position that its voice is not
counted is not groundless. However Amal and Hizballah are
represented in the GOL, and the only explanation for their
action to create a crisis now is the tribunal. Aoun replied
that he had also met on November 12 with Justice Minister
Charles Rizk, whom he asked to inveigh upon PM Siniora to
delay the cabinet meeting (discussing the tribunal) to
November 16 (the regular weekly cabinet session),which Aoun
considered less "provocative." If the meeting could not be
delayed, Aoun asked Rizk to work to delay the decision. Aoun
did not indicate why approving the tribunal on the 16th might
be less provocative or more palatable than it would on the
13th.


10. (C) When the Ambassador suggested that the GOL may be
concerned that Hizballah demonstrations could prevent the
holding of a cabinet meeting on November 16, Aoun doubted
that Hizballah would take to the streets to stop the
tribunal. March 8 parties can stop the tribunal in the
Chamber of Deputies, Aoun said, because as a transfer of
sovereignty to the UN the tribunal requires parliamentary
approval. There is, however, powerful objection to the
tribunal, he added.


11. (C) The Ambassador noted that Aoun and the Shia parties
have different reasons for insisting on a blocking minority
in the cabinet. Aoun seeks the power to collapse the cabinet

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at any moment (through resignation of a third of its
ministers),making himself the master of the cabinet and
paving the way for early parliamentary elections and for his
ascension to the presidency. On the other hand, Hizballah
seeks a veto over measures before the cabinet, including the
tribunal. Either way, the proposal to expand the cabinet is
presented as confrontation, not partnership. Aoun complained
that according to March 14 figures, if one is not with them
one is against them. Bassil added that the FPM had
collaborated with the March 14-led government on several
occasions, citing Aoun's calling for an international
tribunal early on, as well as FPM MPs voting against the
extradition of Walid Jumblatt requested by Damascus.

THE STREETS
--------------


12. (C) Aoun noted that March 8 parties may go to the streets
but that "we are in no hurry." He said that he would express
his wish that the other groups not demonstrate.


13. (C) Berri, Aoun said, can do nothing about the crisis.
Nevertheless, Hizballah will not do anything at the street
level until Berri returns from Iran, which means Thursday at
the earliest.


14. (C) When asked whether, in the context of the FPM
Memorandum of Understanding with Hizballah, Aoun could
monitor Hizballah and perhaps exert some constructive
influence, Aoun confirmed that FPM remains in contact with
Hizballah. Up to now, he said, Hizballah has said nothing
about resorting to street action.
FELTMAN