SINIORA, HAMADEH PERCEIVE SIGNS THAT HIZBALLAH MAY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 003601

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2026
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV LE
SUBJECT: SINIORA, HAMADEH PERCEIVE SIGNS THAT HIZBALLAH MAY
BLINK FIRST

REF: BEIRUT 3599

Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d)

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (S) Filling in more details of the 11/9 third round of
consultations, Prime Minister Siniora and Minsiter Marwan
Hamadeh mused that the March 14 decision to stand tough and
even suggest counter demonstration had a positive impact.
Both saw initial signs in today's session suggesting
Hizballah may be backing down on its threat -- or at least
its deadline -- for street demonstrations. Hamadeh reported
that a new March 14 flirtation with Michel Aoun, promising
him a share of the cabinet, had encouraged the General to
have second thoughts about about playing in Hizballah's game.
While as reported in reftel this round of consultations was
inconclusive, Hamadeh reported feverish activity behind the
scenes, with Saad Hariri and Walid Jumblatt trying to
convince Nabih Berri and Hizballah to accept the special
tribunal now in return for cabinet expansion and a broadly
acceptable new president later. To pressure Berri and
Hizballah, the March 14 leaders have thus reversed themselves
on the special tribunal, requesting that UN/OLA send the
documents to the GOL no later than Friday, even absent
Russian concurrence. In the most encouraging sign that the
momentum for street demonstrations may be evaporating, Berri
told the consultation participants that, if Saturday's
session results in no progress, there is always the
possibility of meeting again next Wednesday (11/15),after
Berri's return from Iran. End summary.

JUMBLATT AND RA'AD SLING MUD
--------------


2. (S) While (as reported reftel) the third round of
Lebanese political consultations chaired by Parliament
Speaker Berri ended in what our contacts tell us was better
atmosphere, Siniora and Hamadeh told us that the session
started off on a bad note, with Walid Jumblatt and Hizballah
MP Mohammed Ra'ad exchanging insults and accusations of who
has more readily sold his soul to foreign powers. In one
memorable exchange, Jumblatt blamed Hizballah for President
Emile Lahoud's continued tenure in office, to which Raad
answered that Hizballah's position are separate from
Lahoud's. Jumblatt warned Ra'ad that, when Lahoud blocks
initiatives, it is as if Hizballah had done so; "you and
Lahoud are one and the same."


3. (S) To ease the quickly escalating tension, Saad Hariri
approached Jumblatt and theatrically whispered into his ear,
loud enough to be overheard. "Walid bey! You should go
visit Lahoud! Go visit Lahoud! You can solve this!" As
Jumblatt leaned away, startled, Hariri continued: "I say,
visit Lahoud! Look what happened to Rumsfeld after you
visited him!" Jumblatt also used the U.S. congressional
elections to score points, praising the U.S. congressional
candidates for waiting and working until the constitutional
time for elections rather than choosing dates based on when
opinion polls were most favorable to each of their races.
Jumblatt also praised President George Bush for vowing to
work with a Congress controlled by the opposing party rather
than sending out thugs to assassinate the Democratic winners
who defeated his party colleagues.

BERRI STRETCHES DEADLINE
FOR CONSULTATIONS
--------------


4. (S) But in general, as we reported reftel, the
consultations were characterized by the same debate as
before. Participants ridiculed Michel Murr for his
characteristically long-winded explanation of why nine out of
26 ministers (in a slightly expanded cabinet) should not
really count as a blocking minority (even though 9 is most
definitely "more than a third" of 26). Siniora reported that
the March 8 representatives were explicit that President
Emile Lahoud would refuse to sign any cabinet appointments
if, at a minimum, Minister of Justice Charles Rizk and
Minister of Culture Tariq Mitri remained in the cabinet in
any position. With Jumblatt jumping up at one time to defend
Rizk "over my dead body" (a line Hamadeh mused was
particularly ill-advised in this atmosphere),March 14
representatives were equally adamant that Rizk and Mitri
remain, come what may. Aoun was relatively quiet throughout.

BEIRUT 00003601 002 OF 003


Eventually, Berri announced that the consulations would
resume on Saturday, 11/11, and that he would postpone his
trip to Iran. In what Hamadeh took as a hopeful sign, Berri,
when asked what would happen if the Saturday consultations
were equally inconclusive, answered that it was always
possible to get together again on Wednesday (11/15),after he
returns from Iran.

"BUREAUCRATIC SABER RATTLING"
(AND HIZBALLAH SOFTENING?)
--------------


5. (S) Hamadeh interpreted one Jumblatt-Ra'ad exchange as
indicating that Hizballah was starting to back down from its
ultimatum of "surrender to our demands or face defeats from
our street." Jumblatt told Ra'ad that he was sick of being
threatened by Hizballah's arms; "we can't keep negotiating
when you have a gun to our heads." Ra'ad professed
innocence, repeating the usual blather about Hizballah never
directing its weapons internally. When Jumblatt retorted
about the knowledge of arms backing up Hizballah's street
demonstrations threatened for Monday, Ra'ad denied that
Hizballah ever said that it would start demonstrations on
Monday. Hamadeh and Siniora both thought that this hinted at
a softening in Hizballah's position. Hamadeh in particular
argued that, if indeed Hizballah is stepping back from the
brink of street demonstrations that could lead "who knows
where," it is because March 14 leaders did not back down
themselves from their own response to launch counter
demonstrations. Jumblatt's PSP and Samir Ja'ja's Lebanese
Forces had both already applied for demonstration permits for
every day next week, Hamadeh noted, as a "bureaucratic kind
of saber rattling." For the first time ever with us, Hamadeh
hinted obliquely that some of Jumblatt's Druse followers in
the Biqa', on potential front lines with the Shia, had
started to acquire weapons. Hizballah's knowledge of this
fact may be useful, Hamadeh thought.

MORE HAPPENING BEHIND THE SCENES
--------------


6. (S) With little but amusing anecdotes to report from the
actual session, Hamadeh reported that Hariri and Jumblatt are
working behind the scenes to convince Berri to accept a
different kind of deal than the blocking minority demanded by
Hizballah and Aoun. They want Berri to guarantee unanimous
support in the cabinet and passage in the parliament of the
special tribunal first, in exchange for March 14's promise to
have talks immediately thereafter with the goal of expanding
the government and replacing Lahoud with a president broadly
acceptable. The question of the blocking minority is left
vague, although both Hamadeh and Siniora insisted that the
vagueness does not imply softness: March 14 will not give up
its ability to govern (itself a vague statement, of course).


7. (S) Claiming to have no objections himself, Berri asked
which presidential candidates were considered broadly
acceptable: "(Central Bank Governor) Riad Salameh?
(Maronite League President) Michel Edde?" Charles Rizk might
have been in that category, Hamadeh quoted Berri as saying,
"but now he has a little problem." In language that Siniora
thought was encouraging, Berri kept referring to potential
objections from his "allies," distinguishing himself more
sharply than usual from Hizballah. On the tribunal, for
example, Berri told Hamadeh that he wanted to see it move
forward now. But his "allies" were afraid that the tribunal
"will eventually get to them." When Hariri presented the
proposal again to Berri in the presence of Ra'ad (during a
break in the consultations),Ra'ad was, predictably,
negative, while Berri continued to express more openness to
the idea. Responding to the Ambassador, Hamadeh said only
that "time will tell" whether Berri's openness was real or a
good-cop routine.

FLIRTATION WITH AOUN
--------------


8. (S) Hamadeh said that, in one positive aspect of the
consultations, a slight opening had developed between March
14 and Michel Aoun. In the consultations, Aoun had begun to
separate himself from Hizballah, which Hamadeh thought
reflected the General's concern that he not be too closely
involved in what at one point looked to be an initiative
headed toward violence. The March 14 leaders, starting with
Ja'ja', have tried to encourage this separation, telling Aoun
that he should not be involved in any Hizballah and Syrian

BEIRUT 00003601 003 OF 003


conspiracies, that his ministers will be welcome in any case.
"You will have your share." Hamadeh acknowledged that the
warming of relations with Aoun may be short-lived, for Aoun
still insists on more cabinet ministers than March 14 is
willing to give, early parliamentary elections, and a
commitment to elect him president. But, for now, the
flirtation signals to Hizballah leaders that the Aounists are
not blindly going to follow them into the streets. And,
Hamadeh acknowledged, the development of trust between Aoun
and March 14 would, in fact, be useful for both sides. For
now, Hamadeh urged, March 14 is going to assume for
argument's sake that Aoun is an innocent victim, used by
Hizballah, rather than an active co-conspirator. Aoun,
Hamadeh said, "is not really a Syrian. He's just stupid.
And blind."

CHANGE IN TACTICS FOR THE TRIBUNAL
--------------


9. (S) Siniora told the Ambassador that, given all of the
back channel talks, the position of March 14 leaders on the
chronology for discussing the special tribunal has now
shifted. While they would still love to have Russian
concurrence in hand, they no longer wish to delay UN/OLA's
submission of the tribunal documents to the GOL. They want
to have the documents in hand by Friday, in order to make the
48-hour deadline for placement on the cabinet agenda for
Monday. Even with Russian reservations, the tribunal drafts
will put additional pressure on Hizballah and Berri to make a
more comprehensive deal. Hamadeh explained that the March 14
leaders will quickly accuse those who oppose the tribunal of
trying to harbor assassins; if, instead, Hizballah joins in
cabinet passage of the tribunal documents, then the tribunal
can be established soon. Either way, March 14 is on top.
Pressed by the Ambassador, Hamadeh acknowledged that, in
fact, a third answer is possible and indeed probable: "yes,
but," as Hizballah insists on "studying" the drafts as a
delaying tactic. But rather than continue to delay through
negotiatiosn with the Russians, UN/OLA should now forward the
text to the Lebanese, both Siniora and Hamadeh argued.


10. (S) Hamadeh and Siniora expect active behind-the-scenes
negotiations between today and Saturday, as March 14 leaders
try to lure at least Berri on board for their broadened
"tribunal-first" agenda and continue their fliration with
Aoun. While the atmosphere is still extremely tense and the
situation most delicate, for the first time all week Hamadeh
thought that March 14 "might" have found a way forward. For
his part, Siniora is still publicly insisting on traveling to
Korea and Japan next week, while readily admitting that,
depending on what happens Saturday, he may need to stick
closer to home.
FELTMAN