Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BEIRUT3542
2006-11-03 17:52:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

LEBANON: BERRI EXPLAINS HIS GOAL OF A UNITY

Tags:  PGOV PREL PTER LE IS SY 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 003542 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER LE IS SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: BERRI EXPLAINS HIS GOAL OF A UNITY
GOVERNMENT -- AND SAYS UN TRIBUNAL WILL BE APPROVED


Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (b)
and (d).

SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 003542

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER LE IS SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: BERRI EXPLAINS HIS GOAL OF A UNITY
GOVERNMENT -- AND SAYS UN TRIBUNAL WILL BE APPROVED


Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (b)
and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Amal Movement Leader and Parliament Speaker Nabih
Berri argued November 3 that his recently-announced
initiative for "consultations" among Lebanon's political
blocs was not a Syrian-Hizballah plot but rather a genuine
attempt to defuse a dangerous situation created by a
"pressured" Hassan Nasrallah and an overly-ambitious Michel
Aoun. Berri said that without his proposed 15-day period of
consultations, the intemperate actions of Nasrallah and Aoun
and the predictable counter-actions by the March 14 coalition
could bring a cascade of sectarian tension and eventual
violence. Berri contended that he does not want a collapse
of the current cabinet and he does not want a change in the
Prime Ministership. What was necessary, he argued, was an
"opening" of the Siniora government, specifically an increase
in the Council of Ministers to 30 members, to include
representatives of Michel Aoun (but not from other pro-Syrian
factions). He even broached the idea of dealing with the
Lahoud presidency, as part of a grand compromise. Concerning
the UN Tribunal to try the Hariri and possibly other
suspects, Berri unexpectedly stated that in its present form,
he was confident the draft agreement between the UN and
Lebanon would be approved in both the Council of Ministers
and Parliament. End summary.


2. (C) A noticeably upbeat Nabih Berri met with the
Ambassador and emboff at Berri's offices in Ain El Tineh on
November 3. The Speaker's political advisor, Ali Hamdan,
also attended the meeting. It was the first face-to-face
meeting between Speaker Berri and any senior U.S. official
since September 25. On numerous occasions over the past
months, Berri, rebuffing requests for meetings with USG and
Congressional officials, had expressed his displeasure with
U.S. support for Israel, and in fact, started the meeting

with an accusation that we were "coddling" the GOI by not
coming out forcefully against IDF overflights of Lebanese
territory. Berri also brought up an old issue, the CBS "60
Minutes" news story that implied he was on a terrorist watch
list, but was not exactly clear about what more he wanted
from the U.S. beyond the already-issued statement that the
story had its facts wrong concerning Berri. Once these
matters were addressed, the meeting settled down to a
remarkably clear discussion of Berri's near-term goals and
views on the current political situation.


3. (C) When assured that U.S. support for Lebanon was firm,
Speaker Berri somewhat undiplomatically asked what option did
the U.S. have? The Speaker explained that in his political
analysis, the U.S. could ill-afford to jeopardize (in his
eyes) the one true democracy in the Middle East, when U.S.
interests were under severe strain elsewhere in the region.
Berri acknowledged that Lebanon needs Western support to
recover and prosper, but he also warned (as he has been
recently quoted in the press) that "too much U.S. love," or
at least in its public displays, could be dangerous.

HIZBALLAH'S ALLY...WITH CAVEATS
--------------


4. (C) Rejecting the suggestion that his topics revealed a
pro-Syria and Hizballah bias, Berri explained his reason for
initiating national "consultations" as an almost noble act of
patriotism. (Note: Berri prefers calling his initiative by
this term, because they will deal with a limited agenda,
rather than his earlier "National Dialogue," which he
considered an open forum at which almost any issue could be
discussed. End note.) Berri stated that he saw a coming
clash between the pro-reform March 14 coalition and the
Nasrallah/Aoun-led March 8 movement. The Speaker said that
for several weeks, both Nasrallah and Aoun had raised
tensions by issuing several subtle, and not so subtle,
threats of street demonstrations if their calls for a "unity
government" went unheeded. Berri also heaped criticism on
the March 14 coalition politicians for refusing to engage on
this issue and, in their turn, using increasingly provocative
language against their political adversaries.


5. (C) Berri argued that even when he raised the idea of
consultations, the March 14 coalition had attacked him, even
though he had purposely included the issues of Paris III and
the draft Electoral Law to balance the agenda against the

BEIRUT 00003542 002 OF 003


Hizballah-Aoun issue of a "unity government." In Berri's
account, the final straw came in Nasrallah's interview early
this week, in which Hizballah's leader threatened street
action if the Siniora Government failed to meet his terms by
November 13.


6. (C) To lower tensions and create a peaceful alternative,
Berri said he met with Minister of Telecommunications (and
ally of Walid Jumblatt) Marwan Hamadeh, along with five other
members of the March 14 alliance. Berri said he challenged
them to explain their accusations that his initiative was a
threat against the government, while he argued that
"consultations" were actually the only way out of an
increasingly volatile dilemma. The March 14 idea that
discussing a new election law would lead to early elections
("which I don't support") was ridiculous, in his view: Berri
(being Berri) used as an unassailable argument (to him) a
question to Hamadeh about why he, Berri, would ever plot to
do himself out of his job as Speaker, which could
theoretically happen if a new parliament were voted in.


7. (C) Interestingly, Berri was much more critical of
Nasrallah's heavy-handed tactics than he has almost ever
been. As noted above, he was sharply critical of Nasrallah's
intimidating language. When asked what his far more powerful
Shia ally would think of the initiative, Berri responded, "I
am allied with Hizballah, but I only take orders from God."
In Berri's opinion, the soon-to-commence consultations would
help preserve the Siniora government and defuse the building
crisis.

"I WANT SINIORA TO STAY"
--------------


8. (C) Speaker Berri made clear that he has two primary
objectives: he does not want a collapse of the present
government, and he wants Fouad Siniora to remain as Prime
Minister. Even though he declared, "Naturally I'm against
the government because of their inaction in the South," Berri
also argued that replacing the entire Cabinet would be
destabilizing and undesirable. Rather, he hoped that the
proposed discussions would produce an expanded Cabinet with
six new members, five of whom would represent the interests
of either the March 8 bloc or Michel Aoun. With five Shia
ministers already in the cabinet and one Greek Orthodox
(Yacoub Sarraf) reliably pro-Lahoud, that would give the
pro-Syrians a total of 11 ministers out of 30 (vice the six
out of 24 in the current cabinet).


9. (C) Berri acknowledged that the March 8 alliance would
therefore gain the one-third "blocking vote" that the Siniora
government has long resisted, but he maintained that would
not result in the political disaster that March 14 has always
feared. To buttress his contention, Berri argued that only
once in the 18 months of the Siniora government has the Shia
bloc voted against the March 14 majority. Thus, the idea
that the March 14 majority would face vetoes by the minority
was a false argument. (Berri neglected to acknowledge that
the threat of a Shia cabinet walk-out or threat of a
"confessional veto" has consistently influenced decisions in
the Cabinet, including what is tabled before the cabinet.)


A FLUID TIMELINE
--------------


10. (C) With a wave of his hand, Speaker Berri dismissed
Nasrallah's ultimatum of a week deadline, suggesting that
ways would be found to extend the consulations as needed. He
said that he was looking for acceptance of the "concept" of a
national unity government, hoping that the warring parties
can simply agree to share power in a "more equitable" manner
in these discussions. If so, the actual process of
nominating and selecting the new members could take months.
In this manner, Berri implied that the Siniora government
would have a greater window of opportunity to enact its
long-desired reform measures, without the constant barrage of
criticism to which it was now subjected. Berri confided, "It
is much more dangerous to have Aoun outside the government,
than inside it." When asked why Nasrallah was being so
generous to Aoun, Berri said that Nasrallah had confided to
him that following Aoun's unalloyed support of Hizballah
during the war, when even some Shia had criticized him, he
owed the Free Patriotic Movment leader "consideration." In
Nasrallah's view, no one supported Hizballah as faithfully
inside Lebanon as Aoun.

BEIRUT 00003542 003 OF 003



PRESIDENCY PART OF A COMPROMISE?
--------------


11. (C) When asked if the long-simmering presidential issue
could be part of the discussions -- as a change in the
presidency leads ipso facto, constitutionally, to the
resignation of the cabinet -- Berri was intrigued and
indicated that anything was possible. He wondered aloud that
if the March 14 alliance "were ready," perhaps some sort of
"grand compromise" was achievable. But what was most
critical at this juncture, he maintained, was to get the
various blocs to sit down and openly discuss each others'
concerns and objectives. "We'll know in two days if this is
going to work," and with a Berri shrug, said that if it does
not, street demonstrations and instability were inevitable.
The Ambassador pressed Berri privately at the end of the
meeting about moving forward on removing Lahoud. Berri
indicated that he would love to do so but did not know how.
Moreover, he said, if there was a new president, particularly
one allied with March 14, he would have to insist on the
pro-Syrians having 13 or 14 ministers in the 30-seat cabinet.

HARIRI TRIBUNAL
--------------


12. (C) More unexpected was the Speaker's conviction that
the necessary approval of the UN-Lebanon Agreement on the
Special Tribunal is fairly assured, now that the clause
dealing with "crimes against humanity" had been withdrawn
from the draft document. He saw the deletion of that clause
as preserving immunity for high officials. Berri
unambiguously expressed his support for the Tribunal and
stated that he saw no reason why it would not cleanly pass
through the Council of Ministers and Parliament.

13. (C) Following the meeting, the Ambassador made a
statement to the press which called for peaceful negotiations
to resolve political disputes and condemned any efforts to
use street demonstrations to force changes. Upon hearing the
statement, Berri's senior advisor Ali Hamdan described it as
an "excellent" message.

COMMENT
--------------


14. (C) No one can doubt Berri's cleverness, often playing
multiple games simultaneously. (With his ability to
anticipate all possible moves way ahead of others, he'd be
one mean chess player.) The basic outline of the upcoming
consultations was probably Syrian (or Hizballah) inspired,
given the limited topics under discussion. After all, an
open-ended debate would have inevitably led back to the
awkward question of Hizballah's arms and could have postponed
any government expansion indefinitely. But Berri seemed
sincere in downplaying the one-week deadline imposed by
Hizballah and Aoun, and his suggestion that, once the concept
for a national unity cabinet was accepted, actually
implementing such a change could take months, during which
time the existing majority could approve the Hariri tribunal
and take other steps. In any case, Berri's consultative
process has at least bought some time.
FELTMAN