Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BEIRUT3540
2006-11-03 17:24:00
SECRET
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

LEBANON: AOUN DEFENDS HIZBALLAH RELATIONSHIP,

Tags:  PGOV PREL PTER LE 
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 003540 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING
STATE FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/FO:ATACHCO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: AOUN DEFENDS HIZBALLAH RELATIONSHIP,
INSISTS ON CABINET EXPANSION


Classified By: Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ambassador. Reason: Section 1.4 (b
) and (d).

SUMMARY
-------

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 003540

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING
STATE FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/FO:ATACHCO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: AOUN DEFENDS HIZBALLAH RELATIONSHIP,
INSISTS ON CABINET EXPANSION


Classified By: Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ambassador. Reason: Section 1.4 (b
) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (S) In a November 2 meeting with the Ambassador, FPM
leader Michel Aoun denied that his party had any dealings
with Syria and asserted that Hizballah is increasingly
independent of Damascus. Despite March 14 group warnings of
violent confrontation, the FPM has no plans either with or
without Hizballah to carry out acts of violence, Aoun said.
The FPM will participate in the Berri-sponsored national
consultations planned to begin next week, but neither those
talks nor a proposed joint committee process can take the
place of expanding the cabinet. Aoun defended his
relationship with Hizballah and implied that this
relationship had spared Beirut violence during the
July-August war. End Summary.


2. (SBU) The Ambassador and Pol/Econ Chief called on Free
Patriotic Movement (FPM) leader General Michel Aoun November

2. Aoun son-in-law and advisor Gebran Bassil also
participated in the meeting. FPM official Naji Hayek
appeared briefly at the beginning of the meeting but left
within a few minutes.

WARNINGS
--------------


3. (S) The Ambassador began by noting the intense USG
attention to Lebanon and Lebanon's potential to reap benefits
from the relationship. He continued, however, with a warning
to General Aoun that the FPM's continuing relationship with
Hizballah and Aoun's public statements criticizing the
Embassy and USG policy are alienating those in the United
States who would like to have a more constructive
relationship with the FPM. In particular, rumored dealings
with Syria on the part of some FPM officials have resulted in
great concern and suspicion. Some are saying that Aoun has
sold his reputation to Hizballah, he added, and they do not
understand Aoun's motivations at present. Americans have a
hard time accepting the threats and ultimatums coming out of
Hizballah; being unhappy with an electoral outcome should not
mean taking to the streets. The USG does not understand why

Aoun would stand with Hizballah in this strategy.


4. (S) Aoun countered that he had no advisors who go to Syria
and that such charges were simple "misinformation." No one
in his party is authorized to go to Damascus and there is no
engagement between the FPM and Syria, he insisted. There may
have been some dealings with Syria without his knowledge, he
admitted. However he is careful to avoid close relationships
with either Syria or Iran. He recounted what he said when an
Iranian parliamentary delegation of three MPs visited his
Rabieh home; he could have "friendly" relations with them but
could not form a political axis with Iran. He related that
Abbas Hashem, a Shia MP aligned with the FPM, and FPM MP
Ibrahim Kenaan were present and that Hashem (who is
particularly close to Hizballah) was disappointed with the
General's refusal to come to a more formal arrangement with
the Iranians.


5. (C) Aoun recalled that he visited Washington in 2005,where
he told his interlocutors that Lebanon was at an impasse. It
remains at an impasse today, because the March 14 coalition
refuses to share power and hasn't accomplished anything.
Aoun imagined a solution, which for him meant coming to an
understanding with Hizballah. Aoun said that it was he who
first demanded the national unity government, now described
as a Hizballah demand, over a year ago, before his written
compact with Hizballah. Expanding or adjusting the cabinet
would also call for a new Ministerial Declaration, Aoun said.
(Note: This is a subtle variation from the Hizballah
position, which is that the Ministerial Declaration can
remain the same. Perhaps hoping to seduce his guests, Aoun
may have been providing a hint that language in support of
the "resistance" might be lifted. End note.)

VIOLENCE
--------------


BEIRUT 00003540 002 OF 004



6. (C) Regarding Walid Jumblatt's statement the day before
that any violence would be met with violence, Aoun pointed
out that the only parties mentioning violence are the March
14 coalition. Jumblatt is talking about blood and
anticipating violence, he charged, but the FPM is not
planning any. However, despite Jumblatt's bravado, it would
not be in the government's interest to resort to violence.


7. (C) Furthermore, he added, Hizballah has been the victim
of violence on many occasions, at the hands of the
(Sunni-dominated) Internal Security Forces and others, and no
one has responded. The Ambassador advised Aoun that he
should be careful to avoid the appearance that he stands with
a revolutionary, radical cleric seeking to topple a
government leadership that enjoys wide international support.
The statements by March 14 leaders are in direct reponse to
the threats of street demonstrations coming from Hizballah
and Aoun. Aoun said that there was no plan or understanding
between the FPM and Hizballah on next steps should March 14
stick to its refusal to expand the cabinet.

DIALOGUE
--------------


8. (C) Aoun confirmed that he would participate in Speaker
Berri's proposed national consultations, saying there is no
alternative. He would concentrate on adjusting or changing
the government. The Ambassador asked whether there might be
some issues on which the FPM and the governing coalition
could focus on within joint committees, to make political
progress and reduce tension. He suggested electoral law
reform and preparation for the Paris III donors conference.
Aoun responded that the FPM could participate in the Paris
III preparations as long as the other side wished to discuss
it "objectively." Bassil complained that what is discussed
in committees is not implemented. When the Ambassador
suggested that the committees could have executive power to
work on implementing issues agreed upon in the earlier
National Dialogue sessions, such as disarmament of the
Palestinians, Aoun said that the place for such discussion is
within the government; "put us in government and we will
participate."


9. (S) Aoun said, regarding the possibility of participating
on a committee on electoral law reform, that once the reform
is completed the next step would be to proceed to early
parliamentary elections. The Ambassador suggested changing
the president first. Aoun countered, "We can't let this
parliament elect a president." Aoun tried to make a deal
with Saad Hariri over the presidency, he asserted, but Hariri
refused because he "wants all the power." The Ambassador
asked whether there might be a compromise candidate for
president, someone whom both the FPM and March 14 could
accept. A new president, after all, would lead
constitutionally to the need for a new cabinet. Aoun did not
answer this directly but continued to insist that the current
Chamber of Deputies is the result of a failed electoral law.


10. (C) The Ambassador noted that different parties,
including the Patriarch, have different opinions regarding
which type of electoral system is appropriate. However, it
is dangerous to establish a precedent of simply overthrowing
the government whenever one doesn't like the results of an
election. He expressed his concern that others could use the
precedent to overthrow a government of which they do not
approve. He also warned that the new electoral law could be
harder to achieve than Aoun believes and could take longer.

RELATIONSHIP WITH HIZBALLAH
--------------


11. (S) Aoun told us that he lacked all confidence in the
current leadership, in particular in Jumblatt and Hariri.
The Ambassador countered that, while Siniora had earned the
confidence of the world, Aoun appeared, paradoxically, to
have tremendous confidence in Nasrallah. Whether or not
Jumblatt and Hariri have faults as leaders, Nasrallah can
lead Lebanon into destructive war. He has a militia and, if
his own words are to be believed, 30,000 rockets aimed at
Lebanon's powerful neighbor Israel.


12. (S) Aoun complained that he had the situation with

BEIRUT 00003540 003 OF 004


Hizballah "handed to me" from decisions made when he was in
exile. After his return, he tried to get March 14 group
support to deal with Hizballah but they responded by making a
bid to monopolize power in Lebanon; they reneged on their
electoral deal with Hizballah and paralyzed the
Constitutional Council.


13. (S) Hizballah will never be a Syrian puppet, Aoun
averred. Hizballah will have good relations with Damascus
but it is becoming more and more independent. The FPM can
work with Hizballah as long as it keeps Hizballah's trust and
focuses on the final goal. (Note: It is unclear which of
many possible goals Aoun meant. End note.) "I'm not in love
with them," but "if you isolate them they will respond
aggressively. The country can't afford clashes." The way
the security forces deal with Hizballah is counterproductive.


14. (S) The Ambassador noted that Hizballah already has a
major influence within the GOL and that it already has more
power than any other single party. Why does it need more?
Aoun replied that Hizballah believes the GOL sided with
Israel during the July-August war. Now, there is a need for
a broker between Hizballah and the GOL, and the FPM can
fulfill that role. When the Ambassador pointed out that Aoun
appeared to trust Hizballah blindly while hating March 14
leaders, Aoun responded that he had reasons for maintaining a
good-faith relationship with Nasrallah. During the war, for
example, "I prevented many things here in Beirut." In
addition, Hizballah has arms and the coalition parties have
less power to threaten. Hizballah will be disarmed, he
predicted, but it will be part of a wider solution.


15. (S) When the Ambassador asserted that "Hizballah is using
you" Aoun responded that Hariri had done worse -- Hariri
tried to destroy him in Lebanon, in the rest of the Arab
countries, and in the United States. Hariri was lobbying
against Aoun's hoped-for Saudi visit, and had hired a
lobbying firm to smear Aoun in Washington.

MEDIA ATTACKS
--------------


16. (SBU) Upon the conclusion of the meeting, Aoun handed the
Ambassador an FPM press release in response to the October 31
POTUS statement of support for PM Siniora. In the release,
sharply critical of the U.S. (and faxed to Department NEA/ELA
November 2 and which is posted in English on the FPM
website),Aoun denies that the FPM is seeking a return of
Syrian influence in Lebanon. The statement holds that, "the
desire of the Lebanese to replace a government which has
brought nothing but instability, corruption and debt upon the
Lebanese people" is "at the heart of America's values." The
release then appends a lengthy quote from the Declaration of
Independence justifying the overthrow of despotism.


17. (SBU) The November 3 as-Safir newspaper carried the
front-page headline "Feltman Threatens Aoun's Future" and an
article claiming, among other things, that an FPM official
had described the meeting between the Ambassador and Aoun as
characterized by political attacks and accusations of aiding
Hizballah to destroy Lebanon. The article also claimed that
the Ambassador had attacked Speaker Berri during the meeting
with Aoun. When called by the Embassy, Bassil denied that
any FPM official had talked to as-Safir and claimed that he
had called the paper himself to complain. Bassil said that
the FPM would post a disclaimer on its website denying that
any FPM official had made such comments and denying that the
article was an accurate reflection of the meeting's content.

COMMENT
--------------


18. (C) General Aoun's rabid hatred of the March 14 leaders
derives not from any love for Syria or Iran but rather from
his sense of exclusion from the pro-independence club he
believes he deserves to lead. But, whatever its motivation,
his hatred must warm hearts in Haret al-Hraik, Damascus, and
Tehran. This was probably our toughest, most candid meeting
yet with him, but our message does not seem to be having an
impact in getting him to think twice about his unseemly
relationship with Hizballah. Our hunch is that Aoun knows
that we (like March 14 leaders) are not going to deliver the

BEIRUT 00003540 004 OF 004


one prize he seeks: the presidency. Hizballah, Syria, and
Iran, on the other hand, just might. If Aoun can maintain
Shia support with half the Christians and a scattering of
other pro-Syrian Lebanese, he is easily the most popular
presidential candidate. But, as we have noted before,
Lebanon's presidency is decided by a parliamentary, not
popular, vote. Ergo, Aoun's insistence on changing the
parliament before presidential elecitons. Short of a massive
defection of March 14 MPs to Aoun's camp, he has no chance in
the current parliament to ascend to Baabda Palace.
FELTMAN