LEBANON: AOUN "RIGHT-WINGER" ON HIZBALLAH, MONEY,

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 003518

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING
STATE FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/FO:ATACHCO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: AOUN "RIGHT-WINGER" ON HIZBALLAH, MONEY,
RE-ENGAGEMENT WITH U.S.

Classified By: Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ambassador. Reason: 1.4 (d)

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (S) A Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) contact claimed to us
that he represents a less-vocal, less-visible wing of the
party that is anti-Syrian, skeptical of Hizballah, and which
seeks closer ties with the international community. He says
that FPM leader Michel Aoun himself is worried about the
FPM's international standing and the prospect of losing
Hizballah's support, and is seeking new political alliances
and a rapprochement with the international community. Our
contact claims that Aoun did not criticize Afghan President
Hamid Karzai, that the FPM will not join Hizballah
demonstrations threatened for mid-November, and that the
party now has its own financing source in the form of the
newly-launched ORANGE TV. Furthermore, he claims that the
FPM is not cooperating financially with Hizballah. End
Summary.

FPM: THE ANTI-SYRIAN WING
--------------


2. (S) Polchief met with Naji Hayek, FPM official and Aoun
confidant. Hayek describes himself as a "right-winger"
within FPM; he clarified that he and his comrades are
anti-Syrian, anti-Hizballah and pro-West. Hayek contrasted
his views with those of the most prominent FPM officials and
MPs, and insisted that Aoun's security and intelligence
cadres (of which he was once a formal member) are dominated
by anti-Syrians, many of whom are aghast at the FPM
flirtation with Hizballah led by Aoun son-in-law Gebran
Bassil.


3. (S) Hayek dismissed Bassil, a frequent Embassy contact, as
an opportunist and political arriviste consumed by personal
ambition. No one knew Bassil before his engagement to Aoun's
daughter in the mid-1990's, said Hayek, who became associated
with Aoun during the Lebanese Civil War after a time spent
fighting in Dory Chamoun's "Tigers" militia. Within the
party, Bassil lacks all "street cred" and is seen by many as
an insufferable, media-hungry upstart. Hayek suggested that
Bassil's failure to win a parliamentary seat in the 2005
election left him desperate, bitter and radicalized.

AOUN YEARNS FOR RAPPROCHEMENT,
COULD DROP HIZBALLAH
--------------


4. (S) Hayek had met with Aoun the previous evening, and
described the General as anxious about the current political
situation and regretful of the increasing gulf between his
party and the international community. Aoun explained to
him, as he had on prior occasions, that he undertook his
Memorandum of Understanding with Hizballah only as a result
of being pushed into a corner by Mustaqbal and other March 14
forces. His political marginalization at their hands had led
to the marriage of convenience. Aoun and his oldest
followers are distressed, Hayek insisted, that the FPM is
running afoul of Paris and Washington.


5. (C) Nevertheless, Hayek noted, Aoun is the most popular
Christian leader and cannot be shunted aside within Lebanon.
Replacing President Lahoud without consultation with Aoun and
his people is inconceivable and would not be accepted by most
Christians. March 14 figures, Hayek alleged, want to replace
Lahoud with a Christian figure who has no popular support,
regardless of political alliances. Such a weak president, he
continued, could be controlled by March 14 and, if need be,
replaced at will without consultation with the Christian
community.


6. (S) In light of the importance of Aoun, Hayek continued, a
rapprochement with the international community is desirable
from both sides. Aoun could give up his condominium with
Hizballah, but he "would have to be offered something" in
return. Topping the list of desiderata would be a new
electoral law guaranteeing fair representation for
Christians. Another high priority would be for Aoun to be
received in Washington. Even before the MOU with Hizballah,
Hayek complained, Aoun's people were unable to get high-level

BEIRUT 00003518 002 OF 003


meetings in Washington. Polchief pointed out several
instances of USG engagement with Aoun and his officers to
refute Hayek's point; however, Hayek noted, Aoun seeks the
kind of senior-level meetings that confer a true USG embrace.
Either the electoral law or a successful Washington visit
could give Aoun the political capital he needs to leave
Hizballah.


7. (S) Meanwhile, Hayek said, the FPM is seeking political
flexibility to break the stalemate in which it finds itself
in the face of the parliamentary majority. Aoun has secretly
reached out to March 14 Group Transport and Public Works
Minister Mohammed Safadi, a Tripoli MP who may be the second
most popular Sunni leader in Lebanon, with a proposal to
leave March 14 and bring his "five MPs" into an alliance with
Aoun, Berri, Hizballah and other oppositionists to obtain
close to half of the legislature. (Note: Safadi's Tripoli
bloc consists of him and two other MPs, so it is unclear
which other two MPs would follow him. End note.) According
to Hayek, Safadi was initially tempted by Aoun's offer to
make him Prime Minister but demurred on fears of becoming
overly isolated among Lebanese Sunnis.

KARZAI, DEMONSTRATIONS AND FINANCING
--------------


8. (C) Asked about an al-Akhbar article which suggested that
Aoun may have characterized both PM Siniora and Afghan
President Hamid Karzai as U.S. puppets, Hayek denied that
Aoun would have made such a remark. (Note: The article's
wording was ambiguous, and the statement may have been
attributed to Hizballah SYG Hassan Nasrallah. End note.)
Aoun seeks good relations with the United States, he
insisted, and would never gratuitously lash out at U.S.
foreign policy.


9. (C) The FPM will not follow Hizballah into the streets,
Hayek said, even if Nasrallah makes good on his pledge to
organize demonstrations if the GOL does not negotiate a
cabinet expansion before November 10. The FPM has never
marched or demonstrated with Hizballah, he insisted.
Polchief pointed out that the two parties would have had a
large joint demonstration on October 15 had weather not
interfered. Hayek said that FPM supporters are highly
skeptical of Hizballah supporters, whom they regard as
something akin to "unwashed masses." However, those masses
are not to be taken lightly; should Nasrallah march on
Beirut, bourgeois Sunnis and bourgeois Christians won't have
a chance to stop them. FPM officials strove to keep
Hizballahis out of Christian neighborhoods when they marched
in protest of the June 2 parody of Nasrallah on LBC, he said,
asserting that the consequences of mixing Hizballah crowds
and Christian crowds would be unpredictable. Despite Gebran
Bassil's claims to the contrary, Hayek added, FPM's ability
to coordinate street action and demonstrations with Hizballah
is extremely poor.


10. (C) Finally, on the issue of money, Hayek was well-aware
of the USG warning over FPM officials' possible handling of
funds from the Hizballah-controlled Jihad al-Bina, and
asserted that that problem was solved. The ORANGE billboards
all over Beirut, moreover, are funded by the newly-public
company ORANGE TV, whose successful IPO was announced with
great fanfare on October 25. While ORANGE TV is not an FPM
arm in legal terms, it is clearly associated with the party
and has been able to finance the billboards, which promote
the TV station and the party simultaneously. Prior to
offering ORANGE TV shares to the public, the FPM had no
source of revenue, Hayek asserted. Party officials financed
all their office and campaign expenses on their own.

COMMENT
--------------


11. (S) In all our recent conversations with FPM officials,
they have seemed anxious about the party's poor relations
with the international community and the durability of its
arrangement with Hizballah. It never took a cynic to see
that Hizballah and Aoun were using each other from the time
they signed the MOU, but until recently party officials
papered over any mistrust between the two with healthy doses
of public embrace, Hariri-bashing, and patriotic jingoism.

BEIRUT 00003518 003 OF 003


Now, flush with ORANGE TV money, eager to reestablish his
anti-Syrian credentials, and perhaps wary that Hizballah may
drop him first, Aoun has seemed more his own man in the
themes that appear in his public statements. From his side,
Nasrallah's October 31 call for mid-November demonstrations
may not have been coordinated with the FPM at all.


12. (S) Neither Aoun nor Nasrallah have much of an
alternative to sticking together, unless they are preparing
new alliances that are more advanced than we are aware of.
However, their combination increasingly appears to be a
machine operating at two speeds at once. How such a
political alliance, if that is a fair characterization, would
hold up should either partner decide to challenge March 14 on
the streets, is less clear now than it seemed during Ramadan.


13. (S) Both parties may end up in such a conflict, however,
if current rhetoric continues to escalate. All sides are now
making existential threats against their rivals. The FPM is
threatening to bare March 14 figures' past corruption to the
world, and Hizballah is threatening street-level action.
Meanwhile, March 14 supporters have ceased coddling Hizballah
and are raising complaints about Syrian influence,
interference with the international tribunal's establishment,
the damage wrought by Hizballah's July attack against Israel,
and the impossibility of having elections while one party is
armed to the teeth. Whether or not Aoun is seeking a way
out, the tension is rising.
FELTMAN