RIZK BEWILDERED BY LAHOUD'S ATTACK ON TRIBUNAL,

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 003517

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA, IO, AND L; NSC FOR
ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2026
TAGS: KCRM PREL PGOV PTER LE SY
SUBJECT: RIZK BEWILDERED BY LAHOUD'S ATTACK ON TRIBUNAL,
URGES FAST ACTION ON TRIBUNAL

REF: BEIRUT 3510

Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (S) Over lunch with the Ambassador on 11/1, Minister of
Justice Charles Rizk expressed bewilderment over the
blistering attack his childhood friend (and Lebanese
President) Emile Lahoud launched against him and the special
Hariri tribunal on 10/30 and 10/31 (reftel). Rizk, who felt
until Lahoud's attack that the tribunal was easily within
reach, believes that Lahoud is motivated by Syrian orders and
his own need to avoid the "infamy" the tribunal will likely
bestow upon him. Saying that he was meeting the Russian
ambassador the following day, Rizk urged quick achievement of
a P-5 consensus on the tribunal texts. At that point,
despite Lahoud's objections, Rizk has the green light from PM
Siniora to table the text before the cabinet for immediate
debate. He is now working to secure the approval of Nabih
Berri and Hizballah, in hopes that cabinet action on the
tribunal will distract parties from street action to change
the Siniora cabinet. With his presidential ambitions more
visible than ever, Rizk also argues that quick action on the
tribunal will embarrass and corner Lahoud and possibly pave
the way to a quick presidential transition -- with Rizk
hoping to emerge as the successful replacement of Lahoud.
End summary.

LAHOUD WELL BRIEFED
ON TRIBUNAL NEGOTIATIONS
--------------


2. (C) Hosting the Ambassador to lunch in his Ministry of
Justice office suite, Rizk said that he could not understand
the belated, "vicious" attacks (both oral and written) by
Lahoud (reftel) on his Ministry's work in negotiating with
the UN Office of Legal Affairs (UN/OLA) on the special
tribunal to try suspects in the assassination of Rafiq
Hariri. After all, Rizk said, Lahoud was a participant in
the cabinet meetings where Rizk provided regular progress
reports on the GOL-UN/OLA negotiations, and Lahoud received
all copies of correspondence with the UN. Lahoud's arguments
about the President's constitutional perogatives also did not
hold water in the post-Taif era, Rizk said, and were clearly
a transparent attempt to raise Christian paranoia about
Lebanon's Muslims eroding the powers of the presidency. Rizk
noted that the two judges working on the tribunal, Ralf
Riachy and Choukri Sadr, are (like Rizk) both Christians, so
Lahoud is particularly disingenious in trying to raise
Christian fears.

LAHOUD'S CRITICISM OF TRIBUNAL
IGNITES PARLIAMENTARY ATTACK
--------------


3. (C) Rizk said that, in the middle of the
Israeli-Lebanese conflict this summer, Lahoud had sent him a
private note complaining of some aspects of the tribunal, but
nothing Lahoud had said subsequently to Rizk or at the
cabinet had prepared the Minister for Lahoud's attack. At
best, Lahoud was making himself and the presidency "look
silly," Rizk said. "For the first time in my life, I was
ashamed of being a Maronite," Rizk said, in relating some of
the more colorful statements about Lahoud by MPs in the 10/31
opening session of the parliament. No one, not even
Hizballah, stood to defend Lahoud against the onslaught of
parliamentary criticism to Lahoud's 32-pages of written
objections to the tribunal summarized in that morning's
papers. Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, according to Rizk,
visibly enjoyed Marwan Hamadeh's use of an Arab quotation
that "a prostitute speaks most virtuously of virginity" in
describing Lahoud's objections to the tribunal. When PM
Siniora mistakenly addressed Berri in the session with the
title normally reserved for heads of state ("fuhamat
al-ra'is"),"the whole chamber applauded," Rizk lamented.
"Look what Lahoud has done to the presidency!"

LAHOUD'S CRITICISMS ORDERED,
POSSIBLY DRAFTED, BY SYRIA
--------------


4. (C) Rizk said he could only explain his childhood
friend's behavior by two things: orders from Syria to stop

BEIRUT 00003517 002 OF 003


the tribunal at all costs, and Lahoud's own desire to escape
culpability. Lahoud "must have known" in advance about
Hariri's assassination, Rizk said, and now he wants to escape
the "infamy" that would result from the special tribunal. In
reading Lahoud's written objections, Rizk said that he was
convinced of Syrian authorship, with "plenty of help" from
former Minister of Justice Adnan Addoum and Judge Selim
Jeressaiti, both pro-Syrian figures close to Lahoud. While
he had ordered Riachy and Sadr to prepare a written response
to Lahoud's objections "in order to be constitutionally
correct," Lahoud's criticisms were without merit, Rizk said.

RUSSIAN OBJECTIONS LEAD
TO "COURT WITH NO TEETH"
--------------


5. (C) Rizk said that he found it particularly
disheartening that, until the Lahoud outburst and recent
Russian objections (which he also credited to Syrian
influence in Moscow),"we were almost there," in terms of a
Lebanese consensus in support of the tribunal. Sharing
copies of 10/27 drafts of the tribunal's statute and the
agreement between the UN and GOL on the tribunal's
establishment (both of which were faxed to NEA/ELA),Rizk
lamented that, in some aspects, the P-5 consultations on the
tribunal had resulted in a "court with no teeth." The
clauses on lifting immunity are gone, he claimed, thus
protecting Lahoud and Bashar al-Asad from prosecution. But
despite his disappointment about the court's alleged weakness
as the UN struggled to get P-5 consensus, Rizk said that he
still found the exercise useful. Imagine, he said, if it's
clear that Bashar al-Asad and Emile Lahoud are implicated by
the tribunal. Even if they can't be prosecuted, they will be
discredited and ostracized.


6. (C) Rizk fretted that P-5 consensus in New York is
"taking too long." The Russians, he said, are still trying
to remove language about the responsibility of superiors for
actions undertaken by subordinates, and the Russians also
want the Security Council, not the Secretary General, to
assign judges, to ensure a weak court. The Russians want the
tribunal's authority confined to the Hariri case only. Rizk
said that he was having lunch with Russian Ambassador Serge
Boukin the following day in hopes of moving the Russians
toward acceptance of the current text.

URGING QUICK ACTION ON TRIBUNAL
TO "SAVE" SINIORA CABINET
--------------


7. (S) Insisting that the action on the tribunal documents
currently rests in New York, Rizk urged quick action on
achieving P-5 consensus. If, Rizk said, UN/OLA officially
forwarded documents "today or tomorrow" that have P-5
consensus, then he has Siniora's backing to bring the
documents immediately to the cabinet for debate and
discussion. Thus, he said, the tribunal has the potential to
distract those who are now concentrating on changing the
Siniora cabinet. The debate on the tribunal might even be
able to "save" the Siniora cabinet, Rizk said, since even
Hizballah ministers will be "too embarrassed" to reject the
tribunal out of hand. If the tribunal documents, with P-5
consensus, get to the cabinet right away, the whole idea of
street action to change the Siniora cabinet could change,
Rizk insisted, since it would be "too transparent" for
Hizballah to walk out of the cabinet and turn to the street
during debate on the tribunal.


8. (S) Rizk said that, working quietly behind the scenes,
he believes has has "almost won" Nabih Berri's blessing for
the tribunal as defined in the current drafts. While he has
not seen Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah in
months, Rizk quoted Nasrallah's television interview of the
previous night to note that Nasrallah, unlike Lahoud, only
noted the need to study the details of the tribunal.
Nasrallah, Rizk argued, did not and cannot reject the
tribunal outright, lest he risk an outbreak of Sunni-Shia
clashes he can't control. Having shared drafts with
Hizballah over the last few weeks, Rizk expressed confidence
that, while Hizballah doesn't like the idea, Hizballah is
generally on board.

AND HOPING THE TRIBUNAL
LEADS TO A RIZK PRESIDENCY
--------------

BEIRUT 00003517 003 OF 003




9. (S) The other advantage of moving fast for P-5 consensus
now, Rizk said, is that the tribunal issue can "corner" and
"embarrass" Lahoud, to the point where it may become easier
to remove him. If the cabinet approves the tribunal despite
Lahoud's oral and written outbursts, his humiliation might
spark a change in the presidency. Rizk said that he thought
the tribunal issue -- and even Lahoud's tirades against him
-- had burnished his own credentials for the presidency. If
he gets the tribunal approved by the cabinet, then the
Hariris will be more likely to back him. Berri, he claims,
would probably accept Rizk as a fallback to Berri's preferred
candidate of Jean Obeid. The Patriarch and Walid Jumblatt
just want Lahoud out and would accept even an ex-friend of
Lahoud. Hizballah, he predicted, would not veto him, for
fear that March 14 would propose someone worse from the
Hizballah perspective. If the presidency changes, then the
whole argument over a national unity cabinet changes, Rizk
pointed out, since the cabinet constitutionally resigns when
a new president takes office.

COMMENT
--------------


10. (S) While Rizk's hurt about his ex-friend Lahoud's
attack appeared genuine, Rizk should hardly be surprised:
after all, months ago, Rizk calculated that his best, if not
only, chance to achieve the presidency under a March
14-dominated parliament was to overcome the odor of his
friendship with Lahoud by presenting himself as the father of
the special tribunal. He now clearly relishes the increased
international profile he has achieved through supporting the
tribunal. We agree with Rizk that Lahoud's attacks have
increased his political profile and perceived independence
considerably. We also guess that Rizk's head would be one of
the first on the chopping block, were Hizballah and Michel
Aoun able to force a cabinet change on Lebanon: Rizk has
proven to be too cooperative on the special tribunal, and
Michel Aoun has announced his intention to place one of his
advisors as Justice Minister.


11. (S) Rizk probably exaggerates the potential of the
tribunal issue to stave off the Hizballah-Aoun campaign to
use the street to force a cabinet change. Given the
heightened political tensions in Lebanon today, we're not
convinced Hizballah and those allied with Lahoud will be as
reluctant as Rizk thinks to oppose the tribunal outright.
Cabinet debate on the tribunal could lead to the very clashes
Rizk argues can be averted by the tribunal. But, with such
street action looking increasingly likely in any case, it is
certainly worth a try to distract attention from the
Hizballah threats of street demonstrations. In order to keep
the pro-Syrians off balance, we hope that tribunal drafts,
with P-5 endorsement, arrive in Lebanon as soon as possible.
FELTMAN