LEBANON: NEA DAS DANIN MEETS WITH SULEIMAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 003412

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING
STATE FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/FO:ATACHCO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: NEA DAS DANIN MEETS WITH SULEIMAN
FRANJIEH

Classified By: Christopher W. Murray, Charge d'Affaires. Reason: Sect
ion 1.4 (d)

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Political leader Suleiman Franjieh told visiting DAS
Danin that Israel is the ultimate source of tensions within
Lebanon and between Lebanon and the west. Hizballah will
disarm if its demands are met, and Christians have joined
with Hizballah only to counter a Sunni bid to dominate
Lebanon and a wider "Sunni project" in the region. The
post-Ramadan period could witness political tension and
security problems, but such activities would be against the
interests of Christians. While some form of national
consensus is needed, Franjieh allowed that an expansion of
the cabinet is not necessarily required (in a remark that
breaks with other opposition group statements). There is, he
suggested, no alternative to dealing with Hizballah, either
for Lebanon or for the USG. Finally, Franjieh minimized the
threat of Sunni extremism in Tripoli. End Summary.


2. (C) Visiting NEA DAS Robert Danin, Polchief and Polstaff
called on ex-MP and former Minister of Health and Interior
Suleiman Franjieh, leader of the Marada ("Rebels") party and
heir to the political movement and erstwhile militia of his
father, Tony Franjieh and grandfather, Suleiman Franjieh,
President of Lebanon from 1970-76. Danin conveyed the United
States' support for Lebanon and desire to fully implement
UNSCR 1701.

ISRAEL IS THE PROBLEM
--------------


3. (C) Franjieh expressed his hope that the USG would support
democracy in Lebanon and respect the "true will of the
Lebanese." "No one wants to be an enemy of the U.S.," he
said, though there are differences of opinion on many issues.
The real enemy, Franjieh said, is Israel.


4. (C) Nevertheless, said Franjieh, there are many issues
between Israel and Lebanon that can be addressed, and even
peace is achievable. Instead of treating the symptoms, one
should treat the causes of the problem. There is a practical
solution to the problems of the Sheba'a Farms and Lebanese
prisoners in Israel. A full respect for Lebanese sovereignty
is the beginning of a process for peace.

HIZBALLAH DISARMAMENT
--------------


5. (C) On Hizballah, Franjieh noted that Ambassador Feltman
had expressed skepticism during a September meeting regarding
Hizballah's preparedness to disarm should two conditions
(Sheba'a and prisoners) be met. Triumphantly, Franjieh noted
that the very next day Hizballah Secretary-General Hassan
Nasrallah issued a statement that his party would disarm if
those conditions were met. Franjieh had to admit, though,
that Nasrallah had also tied disarmament to a cessation of
Israeli incursions into Lebanese airspace, waters and
territory and also to the creation of a "strong state" in
Lebanon. Still, if all these conditions are met and
Hizballah still does not disarm, Franjieh said that his party
would adopt a different stance on Hizballah.


6. (C) When DAS Danin asked Franjieh how Hizballah could be
disarmed, should the terrorist group choose to impose new
conditions, Franjieh responded that any attempt to disarm
Hizballah by force would destroy Lebanon. Hizballah has the
strength, cover and support of all the Shia, part of the
Sunnis, and most of the Christians, Franjieh said. In
addition, he claimed that Hizballah is covered and
legitimized by the 2005 ministerial statement and 2006 GOL
policy statements that give the party free rein to undertake
armed "resistance" against Israel. However, should their
demands be met they would have no more justification to keep
their weapons. In response to Danin's question, Franjieh
insisted Hizballah would abide by resolution 1701. It is a
dangerous situation, DAS Danin riposted, if Hizballah can
bring Lebanon into a war that Lebanon doesn't want. Franjieh
repeated that the current government had given Hizballah
legitimacy through its policy statements authorizing

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Hizballah to do "anything" to achieve the return of the
Sheba'a Farms and Lebanese prisoners in Israel.

POLITICAL ALLIANCES
--------------


7. (C) On the subject of interconfessional relations,
Franjieh said that the problem in Lebanon is that one group
or another always tries to dominate the country. At the
moment, he alleged, that group is the Sunnis led by Sa'ad
Hariri. Whenever one group attempts to assert control, the
other two groups combine to resist it -- which is why it is
natural, he said, for Shia and Christians to ally against
Hariri's party. Franjieh stated that relations between
Hizballah and other Christian communities are "excellent."


8. (C) Franjieh speculated on the March 14 coalition's
political strategy. He said that the Siniora government
would allow March 8 figures to enter the government but at
less than a "blocking minority" (i.e., more than one third of
the cabinet). This will fail to create consensus in the
country, Franjieh said.


9. (C) Meanwhile, Franjieh pointed out, Christians are
entitled by the Ta'if Agreement to one half of the
Parliament's 64 seats. But 44 of those seats, he alleged,
were elected by non-Christians under Lebanon's flawed
electoral law. Nevertheless, even with 20 seats in the
Parliament, or one-sixth of the seats, Aoun and his allies
should get one-sixth of cabinet posts, or at least four.

FOREIGN INTERFERENCE
--------------


10. (C) DAS Danin pointed out that the USG supports Lebanon's
independence and stability, and criticized Hizballah for
building up an independent army in the south and taking
Lebanon to war against the will of the Lebanese people and
government. Now, following the war, the U.S. is pleased that
the LAF has deployed to the south but remains concerned about
Damascus' interference in and destabilization of Lebanon.


11. (C) Franjieh responded that many countries interfere in
Lebanon -- Syria, Iran, Kuwait, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the
U.S., for example. As for Iran, Franjieh continued, it is
unclear in what way they are interfering; perhaps they are
helping Hizballah. As for Syria, its interference in Lebanon
is very limited. All phone lines are tapped, he said, and
the borders are controlled, which makes it very hard for
Syria to have an impact on Lebanese affairs.


12. (C) Franjieh continued, "there is a Sunni project and a
Shia project for the region. We Christians fear both." If
either of them succeeds, the minorities in the region will
lose out. Everyone talks about Hizballah's weapons but not
bout Palestinian weapons. When people talk about disarming
the Shia, this worries Christians. However, the talk of a
Shia-Christian alliance against the Sunni is false.


13. (C) It is Hariri's attempt to dominate the country that
is creating problems, Franjieh alleged. Hariri's ambition
has pushed (Free Patriotic Leader) Michel Aoun into the
opposition. Aoun returned to Lebanon as an ally of March 14.
After Rafiq Hariri was killed we tried to get Saad Hariri
and Aoun together, but Sa'ad refused, Franjieh complained.
It is probably too late to accomplish this, but there must at
least be dialogue. We want it, he said, but on a
party-to-party basis, not man-to-man.

POST-RAMADAN
--------------


14. (C) Asked about widespread press speculation that the
situation in Lebanon would heat up after Ramadan, Franjieh
replied that while everyone is making accusations in the
media, his Marada Party is against any anti-democratic
developments. Any security problem is bad for minorities,
and in particular, for Christians.


15. (C) Lebanon needs a national consensus. This does not
necessarily require a national unity cabinet, but some form
of national consensus. (Note: Franjieh repeated his

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formulation -- that some mechanism of national consensus is
needed, but not necessarily an expanded national unity
cabinet. This was a new formulation, and may represent a
softening of March 8 group policy, which has insisted on
expanding the cabinet, or at least of Marada's interpretation
of it. End note.) Franjieh appealed to Danin, expressing
his hope that the USG will "support consensus in Lebanon."

DEALING WITH HIZBALLAH
--------------


16. (C) Franjieh alleged that March 14 leaders had cheated
Hizballah by inviting it into the government and then kicking
it out of the parliamentary majority. Today's tension was
one result.


17. (C) If the March 8 opposition used democratic means to
take power, Franjieh asked, would the USG deal with the new
government or treat it the same way it has treated Hamas?
Danin pointed out that in a democratic system, groups such as
Hizballah cannot exploit the institutions of the state while
retaining their independent militias. One basic tenet of
statehood is for the state to maintain a monopoly of force
and have just one army. Furthermore, Danin pointed out that
the USG is prohibited both by policy and by law from dealing
with terrorist groups, and noted that Hizballah had killed
many Americans.


18. (C) Franjieh countered that in the Middle East there is
no choice but to deal with groups like Hizballah. The West
may come and go but those groups are always present. "Your
allies in Lebanon" (by which he meant the March 14 parties)
should have supported Hizballah 100 percent during the
fighting with Israel, he added. If Hizballah had lost, no
one would call March 14 traitors; if Hizballah won, as it
had, he continued, March 14 would be in a stronger position
now. As it stands, there remains only mistrust.

SUNNI EXTREMISM
--------------


19. (C) In response to a question regarding reports of Sunni
fundamentalism in nearby Tripoli, Franjieh minimized the
phenomenon. The kind people of Tripoli take in all sorts, he
said. That they should harbor Sunni extremists is not
surprising. Furthermore, any community can fall victim to
extremism. Tripoli, being poor and isolated, is particularly
susceptible. (Comment: Franjieh's attitude took us by
surprise. The skepticism he has typically expressed
regarding Sunni intentions suggested that he should be
alarmed by the suspected development of Sunni fundamentalism
in Tripoli and other parts of Lebanon. Furthermore, other
March 8 figures have raised the specter of Sunni extremism as
an argument against Sunni domination of the current GOL.
Sunni extremism is suspected, however, of being a Syrian
project. Perhaps Franjieh's close ties to Damascus explain
his lack of concern. End comment.)


20. (U) DAS Danin has cleared this message.
MURRAY