Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BEIRUT3407
2006-10-21 08:30:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

LEBANON: PM SINIORA RECOGNIZES NEED TO ENHANCE

Tags:  PGOV PREL PTER LE IS SY 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 003407 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER LE IS SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: PM SINIORA RECOGNIZES NEED TO ENHANCE
ARMS EMBARGO, READY FOR OPTIONS


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Christopher W. Murray. Reason: Secti
on 1.4 (b).

SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 003407

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER LE IS SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: PM SINIORA RECOGNIZES NEED TO ENHANCE
ARMS EMBARGO, READY FOR OPTIONS


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Christopher W. Murray. Reason: Secti
on 1.4 (b).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Prime Minister Siniora expressed an interest in
exploring further ways to enhance the arms embargo provisions
of UNSCR 1701. Although he would not provide immediate
endorsement for any specific ideas, such as establishing a
United Nations "embargo committee," Siniora said they merited
further study and discussion. Noting daily Israeli
overflights of Lebanon, Siniora asked whether there was some
way that the Israelis could be satisfied in some other way.
He asked the USG to be patient with his government's efforts
on political and economic reform, reporting that steady
progress was being made. Concerning regional interference in
Lebanon, Siniora confided that he was well aware that Syria
and Iran were carrying out a destabilization effort against
his government and had become more adroit at using their
political allies within Lebanon. But Siniora expressed
complete confidence that pro-reform forces would successfully
meet the challenge, especially if progress could be made on
the Shebaa Farms and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Finally, the Prime Minister said he had formed a team to
prepare for the upcoming Paris III Donors Conference. He
said he will travel to Japan, Russia, and Saudi Arabia to
present Lebanon's case for assistance. End summary.



2. (SBU) Prime Minister Fouad Siniora received visiting NEA
DAS Robert Danin and the Charge at the Grand Serail on
October 20. Senior political advisors Mohammed Chattah and
Rola Nouraddine also attended the meeting. DAS Danin
presented two letters from the President, one conveying Eid
wishes, and the second which outlined planned U.S. security
assistance to Lebanon. Siniora expressed warm thanks to the
President for his correspondence and said that Lebanon
welcomed valuable U.S. aid to his country's hard-pressed and
poorly equipped security services.

ARMS EMBARGO ENFORCEMENT IS CRITICAL
--------------


3. (C) In response to the Prime Minister's criticisms of
continuing Israeli overflights of Lebanese territory, Danin
explained to Siniora that unless the arms embargo provisions
of UNSCR 1701 were more tightly enforced, his arguments
against Israel would remain compromised. The embargo is
essential. Danin asked whether there were ways to tighten
the embargo while meeting the concerns of both Lebanon and
Israel. Would Lebanon find it useful, for example, for
international monitors to deploy along the Syrian-Lebanese
border? What about the possible creation of an "Air UNIFIL"
which could monitor border crossings, or the creation of an
"embargo committee" that could report on and discuss
suspected arms violations?


4. (C) PM Siniora said that he was interested in exploring
proposals that could break the current stalemate, which he
acknowledged was not satisfactory to either Lebanon or
Israel. The Prime Minister asked for more details and said
he would consider any proposal that was equitable. Citing
the 1974 Israeli-Syrian disengagement agreements as a
possible model worthy of further examination, Siniora was
particularly interested in the possibility that the UN could
conduct aerial monitoring vice what he termed as provocative
and destabilizing Israeli activity in Lebanon's sovereign
airspace. He asked how the Western countries could not see
the "double standard" that allowed the IDF to overfly Lebanon
at will while UNIFIL was charged by the Security Council with
monitoring and preventing violations on the ground. Siniora
said it was time for new ideas that respected sovereignty and
provided confidence, and encouraged the U.S. to continue to
expore such ideas further.

SINIORA RECOGNIZES THE THREAT,
BUT REMAINS CONFIDENT
--------------


5. (C) In response to concerns expressed about Damascus'
efforts to weaken his goverment, Siniora said that he
understood both Syria and Iran were engaged in activities
designed to destabilize Lebanon and roll back the democratic
advances made in the past year. Siniora said that Syria, in
particular, had become more subtle recently and was

BEIRUT 00003407 002 OF 003


effectively employing its political allies within Lebanon to
criticize and weaken the pro-reform movement led by the March
14 coalition government. Clearly referring to recent
speeches made by Hizballah, the Free Patriotic Movement, and
other anti-reform parties, Siniora said it was ironic that
authoritarian Syria could use the media and free speech of an
open society to push its agenda. Nevertheless, the Prime
Minister was confident that his strategy of slow, steady
pressure was turning the tide, and said that he was
determined to stay the course. Siniora pointed to the recent
appointment (and Cabinet approval) of highly capable
individuals to a broad range of key diplomatic posts, as well
as a steady increase in government appointments based on
competency rather than influence.


6. (C) Siniora also pointed out that his government was
moving ahead on economic reform and had just selected a team
that would prepare a progressive, comprehensive plan in
preparation for the Paris III Donors Conference to be held in
January. Siniora declared, "despite tremendous pressures
(from Hizballah and other Syrian proxies),we are moving
steadily ahead." He urged the U.S. and Lebanon's other
allies in the international community to continue their
support. The Prime Minister stated that his political
enemies may resort to street demonstrations and other
"threatening" behavior, but again he expressed his belief
that pro-democratic forces were gaining strength and
endurance. He maintained that his unwavering policy of "soft
words, but firm positions" was winning over supporters and
confounding his adversaries.

STILL MAINTAINS SHEBAA IS THE KEY
--------------


7. (C) Siniora contended that pro-democratic forces would
accrue even greater advantage if Israel could be persuaded to
abandon its "static and counter-productive" position that any
movement on Shebaa Farms would be viewed as a Hizballah
victory. He argued that it was time for Israel to take an
entirely fresh approach on Shebaa that would not only end its
problematic "occupation of Lebanese territory" once and for
all, but would actually allow Israel to achieve its
long-sought objective of a secure northern border. Siniora
stated that he had recently received several "signals" from
Israeli PM Olmert, but they were invariably tied to the "old,
classical formula" (of a separate peace with Lebanon) and
were actually "unhelpful."


8. (C) The Prime Minister then provided a lengthy
presentation of why Shebaa was "clearly" Lebanese territory.
He argued that if Shebaa could be removed from the radical
agenda, it would deprive the anti-reform elements, and
especially Hizballah, of a powerful argument to continue
their resistance. PM Siniora maintained that if the Israelis
turned the territory over to UN custody pending formal
determination of sovereignty (which could take many years),
Israel would be able to deflect criticism from the Arab world
and at the same time greatly increase its security along its
northern border. PM Siniora tried to frame his proposal as a
win-win situation, where Lebanon's pro-reform forces would
gain a resonant victory, and Israel would get rid of a
useless political albatross. Danin noted that it was hard to
see how Israel would embrace the proposal, given its
experience with its 2000 withdrawal from Lebanon and its 2005
disengagement from Gaza. He also asked how Siniora thought
such an approach could proceed, given Syria's resistance to
demarcating the Syrian-Lebanese border.

WHITHER THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLIFT
--------------


9. (C) PM Siniora also asked about U.S. strategy with
regard to regional peace. He stated that immediately
following the July-August conflict in Lebanon, he and many
others in the region thought the U.S. and other Western
powers would make a concerted effort to rekindle
Israeli-Palestinian progress. Siniora said that many
credible observers and participants believed that a window of
opportunity had opened. But the Prime Minister suggested
that it now appeared the post-conflict activity did not
presage real movement on this critical issue, and may even
have been completely unrelated. Siniora believed this was
unfortunate, because even though the process would be
extremely difficult, a just and lasting peace for the
Palestinian people would completely change the Arab and
Muslim world. In his opinion, a "new era" would commence

BEIRUT 00003407 003 OF 003


which would not only allow a long-static Arab world to
progress on many fronts, but would also produce almost
immeasurable benefits for the West and the forces of
moderation.


10. (C) Pointing to the President's September UNGA speech
and the Secretary's subsequent regional visit, Danin said
that the U.S. sought to realize the President's vision of
peace and was working with partners in the region to
strengthen President Abbas and encourage the development of a
reliable Palestinian partner with whom Israel could
negotiate. The roadmap remains the best option, given that
Israel, the Palestinians and the international community all
embrace it. PM Siniora said he understood the reasoning, but
cautioned that endless and effectively meaningless
maneuvering could severely damage a process upon which the
stability of the entire region depended. As he had stated
earlier in his discussion of 1701 enforcement, the Prime
Minister urged the U.S. and Israel to consider completely new
approaches in their attempt to resolve an issue of "absolute
centrality" to the region.


11. (U) This message has been cleared by DAS Danin.
MURRAY