Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BEIRUT3264
2006-10-10 16:52:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

LEBANON: POLITICAL PARTIES PREPARE FOR

Tags:  PGOV PREL PTER LE 
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FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 003264 

SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (SECOND CORRECTED COPY; PARA 17 MARKING
CHANGED TO C)

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/SINGH
STATE FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/FO:ATACHCO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/09/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: POLITICAL PARTIES PREPARE FOR
MUSTAQBAL'S SHOWDOWN WITH AOUN AND NASRALLAH


BEIRUT 00003264 001.3 OF 003


Classified By: Christopher W. Murray, Charge d'Affaires. Reason: Sect
ion 1.4 (d)

SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 003264

SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (SECOND CORRECTED COPY; PARA 17 MARKING
CHANGED TO C)

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/SINGH
STATE FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/FO:ATACHCO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/09/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: POLITICAL PARTIES PREPARE FOR
MUSTAQBAL'S SHOWDOWN WITH AOUN AND NASRALLAH


BEIRUT 00003264 001.3 OF 003


Classified By: Christopher W. Murray, Charge d'Affaires. Reason: Sect
ion 1.4 (d)

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Observers on all sides of Lebanese politics are
anticipating heightened political rhetoric, calls for the
Siniora cabinet to resign, and possibly street demonstrations
or violent clashes in the next few weeks. As the end of
Ramadan comes nearer, many people are anxious that simmering
tensions, held in check during the religious season, may
erupt. The Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) of General Michel
Aoun has scheduled a rally for October 15. The FPM may be in
a last-ditch effort to win a clutch of cabinet posts and
maybe even the presidency. Meanwhile, the rival Mustaqbal
party is hobbled by internal divisions, including a possible
effort to undermine Siniora from within. The smaller
Christian parties are splitting between the March 14 and
March 8 camps, and there may be an opening for a
less-prominent Christian to garner Hizballah's support for
the presidency. Speaker Berri's Amal party, with perhaps the
most to lose, is trying to avoid a split among the Shia while
preventing a change of government. End Summary.

TENSION UNIVERSAL
--------------


2. (C) A few days before the planned FPM rally on October 15,
and ten days before the end of Ramadan, political tensions
are high in Beirut. Expectations of a clash between the GOL
and its dominant party, Saad Hariri's Mustaqbal (Future)
Movement, versus its rivals in the FPM and Hizballah, are
near-universal.


3. (C) FPM leader Michel Aoun has made increasingly-strident
public statements, most notably attacking UNIFIL for
preventing Lebanese self-defense against Israel, and vowing
that "Lebanon will not rest until Prime Minister Siniora
leaves." While the FPM's most prominent public demand has
been for an expansion of the cabinet, which Siniora has

repeatedly refused, Aoun's statements have gone so far as to
back the forcible ousting of the PM on at least two
occasions. This fact has led many to conclude that if the
cabinet expansion is not granted by the end of Ramadan, Aoun
and his Hizballah allies will take to the streets and provoke
civil unrest to topple the March 14 government.


4. (C) While there is little evidence that the parties have
already begun sponsoring violence, physical clashes began on
September 30, when Berri and Hariri supporters fought in west
Beirut streets until the LAF broke up the clashes. On
October 6 gunfire broke out between personnel of the Internal
Security Force (ISF),the Sunni-dominated security service,
and mostly Shia residents of south Beirut. The ISF was in
the Shia-dominated neighborhood to assist in destroying
illegally-constructed houses along the airport road, which
were considered a public nuisance. Two boys died over the
weekend of the gunshot wounds they received in the clash, and
a single grenade was thrown over the front gate of the ISF
headquarters. Though it produced no injuries, the grenade
cannot but have been a warning to the ISF, and it was
followed on October 9 by vandalism of the official car of an
ISF officer.

FPM OPTIONS
--------------


5. (C) The FPM has several incentives to topple the
government, and its alternatives are few and unappealing to
its ambitious leadership. The presidency, Aoun's paramount
desire, is unavailable to him at present; the isolated Emile
Lahoud can only be replaced by the agreeemnt of the
Parliament, where the March 14 Coalition enjoys a majority.
Should the Siniora government last until September 2007, when
the process of electing a new president must begin, and the
Parliament cannot muster a two-thirds majority for a single
candidate, the FPM will face its most dire prospect: the
cabinet will govern alone, as stipulated by the constitution,
indefinitely until a president can be elected.


6. (C) Meanwhile, Aoun may realize that this is his last

BEIRUT 00003264 002.3 OF 003


chance. Furthermore, and perhaps more dangerously, his
supporters may realize it is also theirs. Their party is so
closely identified with its leader, as every Lebanese party
is, that should Aoun have to retire from politics, his top
officials could drift off to other movements or new ones, or
destroy each other by fighting over Aoun's legacy. The Free
Patriotic Movement lacks not only party institutions but
also, increasingly, public support. Engineering the fall of
the government -- whether by forcing it to resign by public
disorder or bringing it down through the resignation of a
quorum of its ministers -- may be Aoun supporters' last
chance for political relevance.

MUSTAQBAL SHOWING DIVISIONS
--------------


7. (C) The technocratic Siniora enjoys public respect, but
clearly has no passionate political backing; for example,
there are no political posters of him on display even in
those areas most likely to support him. Meanwhile, some
observers suspect that Mustaqbal leader Saad Hariri has begun
to undermine Siniora as a prelude to replacing him. Hariri's
behavior suggests that at the very least, he is competing
with Siniora over the same political turf. In Iftar speeches
during the first two weeks of Ramadan, Hariri has made policy
pronouncements that would ordinarily be expected from a head
of government, or at least by a minister. The Hariri
blessing is reportedly more important than ministerial
approval for investors, international bureaucrats, and others
hoping to work with the GOL or with its agencies.


8. (C) Many have noted that though Siniora has been received
at the White House and had a two-hour meeting with President
Bush, French President Jacques Chirac has not invited Siniora
to the Elysee Palace despite strong French support for the
Mustaqbal party to which he belongs. It is speculated that
Nazek Hariri, widow of Rafiq Hariri and stepmother of Saad,
and friend of Chirac, has vetoed any Siniora visit to Paris
out of fear that Siniora will continue to overshadow Saad
Hariri. Hariri's enemies claim he is alarmed that Siniora's
newfound popularity and international profile have eclipsed
his own. Indeed, a recent poll shows Siniora as the most
popular choice for Prime Minister with over 40 percent of the
public's support, whereas Hariri came in fourth at a little
over 3 percent.

LEBANESE FORCES, KATA'EB,
AND SMALL CHRISTIAN PARTIES
--------------


9. (C) The tug-of-war between March 14 and March 8 is
deepening the splits among Lebanese Christians. Samir
Ja'ja's Lebanese Forces are the most firmly in the March 14
camp, having laid down the gauntlet to Michel Aoun in Ja'ja's
September 24 speech in Harissa. However, the LF has no
public political activities planned for the rest of October,
and lacks the financial resources of other players. One LF
contact shared with us that Hizballah has already planned to
abandon Aoun; allegedly, Nasrallah proposed to Hariri
(through intermediaries) that his party would support a
presidential candidate acceptable to March 14, such as
Central Bank Governor Riad Salameh or publisher and former
minister Michel Edde (both clear presidential hopefuls),to
clinch a deal that would include extra representation for
Hizballah in the cabinet.


10. (C) The Kata'eb Party, represented in the Siniora cabinet
by Pierre Gemayel, has just undergone a historic
reunification after years of infighting and is struggling to
redefine its position. A party contact shared with polchief
his dire concern about the coming weeks and appealed for a
compromise with March 8 forces, including some expansion of
the cabinet. While supporting Siniora in principle and
favoring a political solution to Hizballah's arms, Kata'eb
goes further than any Christian group, other than the FPM, in
legitimizing the "resistance weapons." A Kata'eb official
has shared with us in confidence the possibility that it may
initiate a dialogue with Hizballah before the end of 2006.


11. (C) Kata'eb reflects Christian consensus on a series of
steps to reassert Christian power in Lebanon. Its proposals
are listed in a draft internal white paper shared with

BEIRUT 00003264 003.3 OF 003


polchief, which calls for a wide range of reforms based on a
full implementation of Ta'if. These include a Senate
composed of confessional representatives, strengthening the
role of the President, administrative decentralization, and
elections to the Constitutional Council. Kata'eb will also
demand a new election law and provisions requiring both the
President and the Speaker to act on proposed legislation
within a certain time limit. The party proposes a National
Christian Conference to be held later in 2006 to discuss
these ideas.

BERRI AND AMAL
--------------


12. (C) The Berri Bloc will not commit itself to stand by the
March 14 government nor will it rush to join forces seeking
to topple the March 14 Cabinet. Berri's highest interest is
to maintain his independence and freedom of maneuver
vis-a-vis Hizballah. Amal, though, knows it is far better
off with stability; should the cabinet be expanded or
re-formed, or early parliamentary elections called, Amal will
lose power relative to Hizballah, which sees itself
triumphant and energetic after its "victory" over Israel.


13. (C) Berri is therefore seized with the importance of this
political moment and the risks it carries for Lebanon. This
concern was witnessed by his recent appeal in Riyadh for
Saudi help in easing sectarian tensions and convincing Syria
to cease its support for toppling Siniora. Berri also
believes that USG engagement with Syria is crucial to contain
Damascus' interference in Lebanon.


14. (C) The March 14 cabinet should take two steps
immediately to enhance its chances of survival, according to
a top Berri advisor. The clashes with Berri must cease, in
particular acting Interior Minister Fatfat's challenges to
the autonomy of the Shia-dominated Surete Generale. In
addition, the cabinet must perform far better in
reconstructing and governing the country to win back the
public's confidence.


15. (C) Amal assesses that demonstrations to topple the
government are unlikely this month. Optimism is not
generally a feature of Amal thinking, but wishful thinking
may be; resolved to stay on the sidelines until its
parliamentary power or financial interests are threatened,
Amal has no interest in forcing a conclusion to the political
crisis. Aware that he cannot stray too far from Hizballah's
positions, Berri has begun to redefine Hizballah's message in
his own public statements. For example, he told the press on
October 7 that Hizballah does not seek the fall of Siniora's
government.


16. (C) Part of the reason for Amal's reticence is that it
has no favored solution to one of the most crucial questions
in the crisis -- the presidency. According to a top Berri
advisor, "no one can be President; no longer Aoun, and if it
were Ja'ja' we'd prefer Lahoud." While Saad Hariri has
undoubtedly identified several potential presidential
candidates from among less-prominent Maronite figures in the
March 14 movement, Amal has cultivated neither Sunni nor
Christian leaders.

COMMENT
--------------


17. (C) While opinions differ over the relative strength of
the competing March 14/March 8 alliances, every political
actor in Lebanon expects increased tension and possible
clashes beginning as soon as October 15 and at least by the
week following Ramadan. Most of our non-March 8 contacts are
worried about the effects of unrest, but believe that March
14 has the strength to stay in power. The FPM and Hizballah
obviously fancy their chances in a confrontation, or at least
feel they can only gain by shaking up the government.
Because both March 8 and March 14 are diverse alliances, and
therefore subject to fragmentation or internal betrayal, the
winner in this showdown may be the alliance that possesses
not the most brute strength, but the most internal cohesion.
MURRAY