MGLE01: SINIORA ON END TO CABINET BOYCOTT,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BEIRUT 000324

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH/WERNER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2026
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER KCRM LE IS SY KPAL
SUBJECT: MGLE01: SINIORA ON END TO CABINET BOYCOTT,
HIZBALLAH ACTION, UNIIIC AND HARIRI TRIAL, HAMAS, AND
BY-ELECTIONS

REF: A. BEIRUT 320


B. BEIRUT 268

Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) In a 2/4 meeting with the Ambassador, Prime Minister
Fouad Siniora claimed that he and Parliament Speaker Nabih
Berri had orchestrated the end of the Shia cabinet boycott by
cornering Hizballah publicly. There is no private and no
written deal, Siniora insisted, noting that he fully expected
Hizballah to provoke other crises soon. Regretting that he
had lost any potential diplomatic initiative after Israel's
killing of a Lebanese shepherd, the PM expressed dismay over
Hizballah's 2/3 Blue Line violations. Aware that there would
now be no UNSC action despite the GOL request (ref a),he
asked for U.S. help in curbing Israeli overflights. Asked
about the UNIIIC, Siniora noted that he was concerned that
UNIIIC Chief Brammertz, a "clinical" man, seemed to be
questioning all work that preceded him. Siniora revealed
that, as follow-up to the UN/OLA mission (ref b),the 2/2
cabinet meeting had discussed modalities for an international
tribunal. Siniora rejected the Lockerbie model. On 2/6,
Siniora planned to meet with Minister of Justice Rizk to
decide who to send to UN headquarters to continue discussions
on the modalities for the tribunal. On the impact in Lebanon
of Hamas' electoral victory, Siniora predicted that Hamas, a
minor player in Lebanon, would now expand here. His deeper
concern was that Iran would increase its growing influence to
include the Palestinian territories. As for the Lebanese
parliamentary elections in Baabda-Aley, Siniora advocated a
single compromise candidate, backed by the Aoun and March 14
blocs, to prevent the elections from elevating tensions
further in Lebanon or leading to violence. (Note: This
meeting took place before the 2/5 riots in Beirut, covered
septel. End note.) End summary.

HIZBALLAH CORNERED; NO SECRET DEAL
TO BRING SHIA BACK INTO CABINET
--------------


2. (C) Receiving the Ambassador in his private apartment on
2/4, Siniora -- his characteristic optimism and good humor
restored -- insisted that he had made no private deals with
Hizballah and Amal to end, after seven weeks, the cabinet
boycott by the five Shia ministers that began on December 12.
Nor did he revive his controversial written text, as neither
the March 14 majority nor Hizballah liked it. Nor did the
international community, the Ambassador reminded the PM. The
solution to the cabinet boycott, Siniora explained, emerged
in part out of a meeting he had with Parliament Speaker Nabih
Berri just prior to the 2/2 parliament session. Berri
insisted that the two of them had to solve the crisis that
day; in Berri's view, the cabinet split had already gone on
for too long. The Speaker told the PM that, if he would just
say in front of the parliament that Hizballah is not a
militia, he would see that the five Shia ministers returned
to the cabinet. Siniora told Berri that he had no authority
to say those words, given opposition from his own backers and
allies. After an increasingly heated debate with an
unbudging Siniora, Berri then opened the parliamentary
session in an annoyed and worried mood.


3. (C) Siniora said that, as he sat in the parliament
session listening to the fiery speech of Hizballah deputy Ali
Ammar condemning Israel and the Siniora cabinet in equal
doses, he suddenly thought of a potential solution. While he
had no authority to say that Hizballah was not a militia, he
could repeat what his own cabinet statement as well as other
Lebanese politicians contiually say, that Hizballah is a
resistance. Leaving the word "militia" out, he jotted down a
formula on a notebook, reading it out to the parliament in a
speech following Ammar's. "We have never called, and will
never call, the resistance by any other name but the
resistance, until our national lands are liberated," Siniora
repeated to the Ambassador, paraphrasing his parliamentary
remarks. This, Siniora said, avoided a split with Walid
Jumblatt, stayed within the parameters he received from Sa'ad
Hariri, and established a marker that the resistance had only
one purpose, liberation of occupied Lebanese lands, "not the
conquest of Jerusalem or the end to Israeli aggressions."


4. (C) In the parliament session, Berri listened to Siniora
intently, the PM continued. When the PM paused after his

BEIRUT 00000324 002 OF 005


resistance lines, Berri ostentatiously stood and applauded,
with his own Amal bloc immediately joining in. Hizballah
deputies were left with an uncomfortable choice, of
preserving Shia unity by applauding a PM whom Hizballah
leaders had continually denounced, or maintaining their
boycott at the expense of Shia unity. They choose Shia
unity. The real key to the cabinet reunification, Siniora
said, was Berri's commitment to find a way to end the boycott
and thus the risk Berri took in offering his spontaneous
ovation. While Siniora, by omitting the word "militia," gave
him less than he wanted, Berri saw a face-saving exit.


5. (C) The Ambassador told Siniora that, while the USG
would probably not comment publicly on his parliament
statement, we did not like it. Siniora should not presume
that we will stop pursuing implementation of UNSCR 1559.
Siniora said that he understood and asked the Ambassador what
he would tell the ubiquitous Lebanese press if someone asked
for comment on his statement to parliament. The Ambassador
said that he would blandly welcome the reunification of the
cabinet and express hope that essential work on reform and
appointments would resume. "Good," Siniora said; "that's
perfect. Don't say more."

HIZBALLAH TO MAKE TROUBLE AGAIN,
BUT PROBABLY BY DIFFERENT MEANS
--------------


6. (C) The Ambassador asked Siniora how long he expected
the Shia ministers to stay in the cabinet before they
engineered another destructive walk-out. Siniora said that
he did not think that the ministers would do so readily
again, for they know that they lost public support because of
the boycott. But the cabinet indeed has many difficult
issues to discuss, and Hizballah will make trouble, using a
variety of methods. Hizballah "does not want us to succeed,"
Siniora said, and might even resort to violent and
frightening street protests over social issues.

NO LINKAGE BETWEEN BLUE LINE ACTION
AND CABINET REUNIFICATION
--------------


7. (C) Noting that the Shia ministers had re-entered the
cabinet at a much lower price than they had been seeking
(e.g., a written, signed document stating Hizballah was not a
militia) and that Siniora insisted there was no private deal,
the Ambassador asked if there was a linkage between the
cabinet reunification and the 2/3 Blue Line action by
Hizballah. Was Hizballah, already determined to retaliate
for the 2/1 killing by Israel of a Lebanese boy, looking for
cabinet cover? Siniora said that he did not believe there
was such a linkage, "although you can never tell for sure."

SINIORA REJECTS THEORY THAT NASRALLAH
ALSO SURPRISED BY BLUE LINE ACTION
--------------


8. (C) The Ambassador cautioned Siniora that, after
Hizballah had initiated hostilities across the Blue Line on
2/3, it was unlikely that the UNSC would react positively to
the Lebanese request (ref a) that the Israeli killing of
Ibrahim Rahil on Lebanese territory be discussed. Siniora
said that he understood that Hizballah had "destroyed our
chances for diplomatic initiatives." Claiming to have been
pressing Hizballah actively to "leave the matter to me," he
expressed deep annoyance that Hizballah had decided to
retailiate for Rahil's death. The Ambassador noted that
Hizballah insists on having the ability to veto what Siniora
decides but reserves the right to drag Lebanon into war
without reference to Siniora. Agreeing, Siniora said that he
did not concur with some stories circulating around Beirut,
that Hizballah leadership and Nasrallah in particular were
surprised by the firing into Sheba'a Farms. Siniora thought
that the shelling of Sheba'a Farms had been too carefully
calibrated and then too easily turned off to have been
carried out by dissident, radical, mid-ranking Hizballah
fighters.

RAHIL, A SUNNI, WAS
NOT A HIZBALLAH OPERATIVE
--------------


9. (C) The Ambassador asked Siniora for his candid analysis
of Ibrahim Rahil: was he really the innocent shepherd
claimed by the Lebanese press and the MFA? It seemed strange

BEIRUT 00000324 003 OF 005


for a sensible shepherd to be herding goats so close to a
danger zone. Siniora expressed annoyance with the question.
Rahil, he said, was Sunni. The Sunnis do not support or even
like Hizballah. He was on his family's land with their full
herd of goats and sheep. He was the only son of the Rahil
family. There were no indications that he had any aggressive
intentions. The Israelis, Siniora said, "should say
something to acknowledge they made a mistake." The
Ambassador said that Hizballah's actions had destroyed any
ability for the international community to press Israel on
the matter.

REQUESTS ASSISTANCE ON REDUCING
ISRAELI AIR SPACE VIOLATIONS
--------------


10. (C) Then "can't you at least concentrate on stopping
the air violations?" Siniora asked; "they are killing us --
not literally, of course, but politically!" Saying that he
would pass on Siniora's request to Washington, the Ambassador
noted that we can get statistics of the air violations for
southern Lebanon from UNIFIL. But, he cautioned, as long as
the GOL permitted Hizballah to operate freely in southern
Lebanon, our ability to curb Israeli overflights in that area
is limited. There is a causal relationship between
Hizballah's destructive behavior and the Israeli overflights.
As for the more provocative flights elsewhere over Lebanon,
UNIFIL does not track them. They are outside of UNIFIL's
area of responsibility. Thus, we have no statistics to use,
should Washington agree to discuss the matter with the
Israelis. Siniora promised to send statistics to the
Ambassador of all Israeli overflights in 2005, as monitored
by the Ministry of Defense. He urged again that the USG help
end Israel's air violations.

WORRIES ABOUT UNIIIC
--------------


11. (C) The Ambassador asked Siniora about the relations
between the new UNIIIC Commissioner, Serge Brammertz, and the
GOL. Fine, Siniora answered, although Brammertz "strikes me
as too clinical, too technical." Moreover, Siniora said,
Belgian Ambassador Stephane de Loecker "talks too much." It
is perhaps natural that Brammertz shares some of his thinking
with his fellow Belgian, but de Loecker, suddenly feeling
that, "probably for the first time," he has information of
some importance in Lebanon, is trying to show people how much
he knows. (As an aside at this point, Siniora turned to his
advisor and neice, Rola Noureddine, and said, in Arabic, "ask
the Belgian Ambassador to come me this afternoon.") The
Ambassador asked the PM what he had heard. "Disturbing
things," Siniora responded, suggesting that, according to the
stories being circulated by de Loecker, Brammertz was
questioning everything that happened before his arrival, even
the arrests of the four Lebanese generals. Siniora reported
that he would try to see Brammertz before Brammertz' travel
to New York on 2/7, in order to remind Brammertz of the need
to keep rumors in check and to sensitize him on the impact
anything he says or does has on Lebanese politics.

CABINET DEBATES GENERAL PARAMETERS
FOR INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL
--------------


12. (C) Noting that the GOL is expected to follow up UN/OLA
Nicolas Michel's trip (ref b) to Lebanon by deploying a team
to UN headquarters in New York, the Ambassador asked whether
Siniora had done any more thinking about an international
tribunal for Hariri assassination suspects. Siniora said
that several parameters had been discussed and agreed upon by
the 18 ministers (out of 24 -- besides the five Shia, Defense
Minister Elias Murr was absent for medical issues) who
attended the 2/2 cabinet session:

-- The tribunal must be held outside Lebanon.
-- Lebanese law should be applied, with some modifications.
The modifications would include suspension of the death
penalty and, in terms of process, using an Anglo-Saxon system
of a prosecutor.
-- The majority of the judges must be non-Lebanese.
-- The "chairman" of the judges must be non-Lebanese.
-- The prosecutor must be non-Lebanese.

PM RULES OUT LOCKERBIE MODEL,
ASKS FOR UNSC TO CREATE TRIBUNAL
--------------

BEIRUT 00000324 004 OF 005




13. (C) Siniora said that he will meet with Minister of
Justice Charles Rizk on 2/6 to determine the composition of
the 2-3 member team, all judges, to travel to New York to
continue discussions with Michel and his team. They will
carry the parameters above, in order to focus the discussion.
The Ambassador asked whether he and Rizk, given Rizk's
alliance with President Lahoud, would be able to decide on a
single, unified team. Of course, the PM responded.
Referring to the parameters the team will carry to New York,
the Ambassador asked whether it wouldn't be better to
consider a formula by which the tribunal was much more
Lebanese in character and flavor, given that the crime took
place in Lebanon against Lebanon's most prominent citizen.
Wouldn't a Lockerbie model be more appropriate, given that
such a model would show faith in the Lebanese judicial
process and reinforce the need for the Lebanese to take
responsibility for their own decisions? Siniora ruled out a
Lockerbie model categorically. Judges would fear for their
families' safety and would not be brave enough to convict
anyone linked to Syrian or Lebanese security forces. Listing
the possibilities outlined by Michel, the Ambassador asked
Siniora what vehicle might create, legally, the international
tribunal. It can only be UNSC action, Siniora said; it would
"tear Lebanon apart" to expect Lebanese parliamentary action.

HAMAS VICTORY MEANS MORE IRANIAN POWER,
AND MORE HAMAS PRESENCE IN LEBANON
--------------


14. (C) The PM asked the Ambassador for the USG views on
Hamas' electoral victory. The Ambassador repeated U.S.
policy about what Hamas must do to be accepted as a
legitimate partner. Siniora gave a rather lengthy analysis
of Hamas' victory, urging the USG to "give them the patience
and the understanding and the leeway they need to adapt
themselves; don't give them excuses." The Ambassador asked
Siniora what the impact would be of the Hamas victory in
Lebanon. "It adds another dimension to our problems," he
responded. "The Iranian arc" is getting "bigger and
stronger." Iran will fill the vacuum in supporting the
Palestinians, meaning that Iran now has a growing circle of
assets: Iraq, Syria, Hizballah, and the Palestinian
territories. Even though Hamas is a relatively insignificant
player in Lebanon, its electoral victories and its links to
Iran "improve the chances of Hamas expansion in Lebanon."

PM WORRIED THAT BY-ELECTION COULD
INCREASE TENSIONS, TURN VIOLENT
--------------


15. (C) Minister of Social Affairs Nayla Mouawad joined the
meeting as it was coming to a close. She turned the subject
to the Baabda-Aley by-elections needed to fill the seat
vacated by the death of Lebanese Forces MP Edmond Naim. Sitt
Nayla told the PM that the March 14 coalition had to decide
whether to use the elections to weaken Michel Aoun or try to
make him more cooperative. In Sitt Nayla's view, if the
March 14 coalition and Aoun backed separate candidates,
Aoun's Christian base would be appalled by his electoral
alliance with Hizballah. So, even if the March 14 coalition
lost the seat to Aoun's candidate, Aoun would be weakened
nationally by the experience. Sitt Nayla indicated that she
favored such a strategy.


16. (C) But, Siniora responded, the Christians, too, would
be weakened, split between two candidates. The PM said that
he strongly believed that there must be a single, compromise
candidate, acceptable to both Aoun and the March 14 majority.
The situation in Lebanon was too tense for a bitter
electoral fight. The Shia and Druse in Baabda-Aley, aware of
the Nasrallah-Jumblatt disputes, might enter into open
conflict. The Christian split between Michel Aoun's backers
and those of Samir Ja'ja' could also turn violent. It is in
everyone's interest, the PM insisted, to use the Baabda-Aley
elections to calm down tensions, not increase them. Sitt
Nayla said that she agreed in principle but did not see
anyone who would fit the bill as a compromise candidate. The
PM's choice -- former MP Salah Honein -- would be rejected by
Aoun as too close to Jumblatt, even though Jumblatt dismissed
him from his slate in the 2005 elections. "We have to try to
find someone," Siniora repeated. "We can't afford a fight."
(Note: Siniora got a different sort of fight -- an ominous
one -- the day after this meeting, when Sunni rioters torched
the Danish Consulate and attacked Christian property in
Beirut. We will discuss the riots septel. End note.)

BEIRUT 00000324 005 OF 005


FELTMAN