LEBANON: DRUZE LEADERS ASSESS SYRIA THREAT,

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 003209

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/SINGH
STATE FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/FO:ATACHCO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/03/2026
TAGS: KCRM LE PGOV PREL PTER
SUBJECT: LEBANON: DRUZE LEADERS ASSESS SYRIA THREAT,
RELATIONS WITH MARCH 8 AND BERRI


Classified By: Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ambassador. Reason: 1.4 (d)

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (S) Druze politicians Walid Jumblatt and Marwan Hamadeh
offered us suggestions for helping Lebanon overcome Syrian
influence, and discussed how to counter March 8 group calls
for a national unity government. They were optimistic about
improvement in the March 14 group's relations with Speaker
Berri, and positive that UNIIIC is focusing on Syria as the
culprit in the assassination of former PM Hariri. Jumblatt
expressed interest in visiting Washington in late October.
End Summary.

SYRIA REMAINS A PREOCCUPATION
--------------


2. (S) Ambassador and polchief visited Druze leader Walid
Jumblatt and Minister of Telecommunications Marwan Hamadeh on
October 3. When asked how the USG could best promote
stability in Lebanon and support the March 14-dominated
Siniora government, Jumblatt had little new to offer in terms
of advice. He advised continued international pressure on
Syria, especially from Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The USG
should also encourage the Europeans to keep pressuring Syria
and "not to go too far" with the EU-Syria Association
Agreement that, as Hamadeh told us last week, would be
discussed in Brussels in October. Other pressure points
might include Syria's relationships with Russia and Turkey.


3. (S) Jumblatt suggested making contact with the "reasonable
and serious" opposition in Syria. He noted that Hikmat
Shihabi will soon be back in Los Angeles and that two of
Ghazi Kanaan's sons are in the U.S. Both he and Hamadeh
agreed that bilateral sanctions on Lebanese figures acting on
behalf of Damascus could be useful. They cited the example
of Issam Fares, who disappeared from Lebanon and renounced
further involvement in Lebanese politics when the USG
announced that it would look into the finances of pro-Syria
politicians. They suggested that the USG sanction big fish,
and cast a net wide. If only a few Lebanese allies of
Damascus are sanctioned, such limited action would boost
their images and make them martyrs in the public eye.

NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT AND
POSSIBLE COUNTERPROPOSALS
--------------


4. (C) Hamadeh shared with us some new details about the
Hizballah/FPM push for a national unity government. (Note:
In most of our conversations with March 8 figures the
proposal has consisted of the creation of six new ministerial
positions without portfolio, confessionally balanced with one
representative from each of the following communities:
Maronite, Greek Catholic, Orthodox, Sunni, Shia and Druze.
End Note.) Hamadeh told us that in a cabinet meeting on
Monday, Lahoud for the first time mentioned some names of
potential new ministers. Provocatively, he proposed Arslan
Talal, Jumblatt's political rival, for the Druze slot.
Michel Aoun himself would assume the Maronite position.
Greek Orthodox Issam Abu Jamra and Catholic MP and Aoun ally
Ily Skaff were also mentioned by name. Lahoud did not
specify a candidate for the proposed new Shia position
(although presumably Hizballah would have its pick, and said
merely that the Sunni candidate should "represent the whole
Sunni community" -- implying, to Hamadeh, that the Sunni
minister would be a Hariri opponent.


5. (S) Jumblatt and Hamadeh were clear that such an addition
to the cabinet would create a "blocking minority" of over one
third of the cabinet when combined with March 8 ministers
already serving on it: six new ministers plus the five
existing Shia ministers, or 11 ministers out of 30. Jumblatt
has no doubt that Hizballah's purpose for obtaining this
blocking minority is to "sabotage and delay" the proposed
tribunal to try suspects in the Hariri assassination and
related crimes.


6. (S) Our interlocutors assessed that high-profile USG
pressure opposing the national unity government concept will
only complicate matters for March 14. Hamadeh wants March 14
to fight its own battle in this case; "we have our own
arguments." Similarly, Hamadeh feels that USG statements on
Syrian interference in Lebanon might also cause a backlash;

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"we really resent outside pressure in Lebanon." Jumblatt
expressed confidence that March 14 is better organized and
more effective than March 8, but that it needs to relieve the
tension between PM Siniora and Speaker Berri first.


7. (S) The Ambassador proposed that March 8 figures seeking a
national unity government could be offered positions on
special commissions as an alternative to the blunt "no" that
has made March 14 appear to be intransigent, power-hungry,
and disdainful of the growing popularity of a national unity
government proposal. Hamadeh, however, was unenthusiastic,
and feared that such commissions would become too powerful in
their own right. In addition, the March 8 leaders' record
from the national dialogue period suggests that they would
not act in good faith in any institutionalized forum.
Jumblatt and Hamadeh considered the possibility of using
March 8's energies in a commission dedicated to
reconstruction, but Hamadeh said that if they were brought
into any role in foreign policy or security, "its over."

RELATIONS WITH BERRI SET TO IMPROVE
--------------


8. (S) Jumblatt gave us an update on Speaker Berri's efforts
to obtain funding for and control over the Council of the
South. Saudi, Kuwaiti and Emirati funds have been deposited
in the Central Bank for use by the Council. The other large
Gulf donor, Qatar, remains determined to carry out its
projects without coordination. Berri will travel to Saudi
Arabia on October 8 to raise more funds, and Hamadeh
suggested Berri would be easier to deal with politically when
he returns, flush with cash for the south. (Note: In a
meeting with the Ambassador on 10/3, Saudi Ambassador
Abdulaziz Khoja said that King Abdullah had made the decision
to invite Berri to Saudi Arabia, in hopes of keeping Berri at
least neutral in the March 8/Aoun-March 14 fights. End note.)

UNIIIC
--------------


9. (C) On the tribunal, Hamadeh noted the irony that while
language citing "crimes against humanity" had been removed
from the statute draft, the cabinet was considering accusing
Israel of such crimes during its last Council of Ministers
meeting. Hamadeh assessed that changing the text such that
the statute strips immunity on crimes involving international
law would broaden the scope of the tribunal to other crimes,
some not closely related to the Hariri case.


10. (C) Hamadeh mentioned that in a conversation he had had
with Serge Brammertz, each of the UNIIIC investigator's
questions related to Damascus. (Note: Hamadeh survived a
bomb attack in October 2004, the first in a series of
bombings that included the assassination of Rafiq al-Hariri.
For this reason he has been both a political actor in the
UNIIIC investigation and a witness. End Note.) Hamadeh
concluded from the conversation that Brammertz is focused on
Syria as the culprit in his investigation.

FOLLOW-UP COMMENTS FROM JUMBLATT
--------------


11. (C) Jumblatt met briefly with DCM on October 4, and led
off with the comment that a national unity government would
be a disaster, resulting in government paralysis. Hizballah
continues to receive its instructions from Tehran and
Damascus. Hassan Nasrallah may not be the one who actually
calls the shots for Hizballah, but his image has captivated
many people in the Arab world, including Egypt, and Hizballah
is thus feeling confident.


12. (C) Jumblatt urged the U.S. to press for rapid action
in resolving the GOL statute that would govern the
establishment of the international tribunal to try suspects
in the Hariri and possibly other bombings. Jumblatt said the
Cabinet needs to act quickly, because if a GOL-UN accord on
the text of the statute cannot be found soon, the whole
enterprise could be lost in national unity government as
early as November. Jumblatt, as we have reported elsewhere,
thinks the Cabinet will have no choice but to approve an
international tribunal statute, given that it had been agreed
to in principle by Nabih Berri during the national dialogue
earlier this year. Approval by Parliament will be no
problem, given the March 14 group's majority. Meanwhile,
Bashar al-Asad seems increasingly nervous about where the

BEIRUT 00003209 003 OF 003


UNIIIC is heading, as evidenced in his recent interview with
the Spanish newspaper El Pais.


12. (C) Jumblatt was relaxed when we raised the issue of
Sunni-Shia tensions. Jumblatt admitted that Nabih Berri is
angry at PM Fouad Siniora for not sending enough
reconstruction money to the South, but Berri should be
happier when he returns from Saudi Arabia early next week,
presumably with reconstruction funds from the Saudis.
Jumblatt thought it useful that March 14 leader Saad Hariri's
people had reached out to the Jemaa Islamiyya group as a way
of engaging, productively, Sunni extremists (See Beirut
3179).

WASHINGTON VISIT?
--------------


13. (C) Jumblatt expressed interest in visiting Washington
in late October to discuss what to do about Syria and to
strengthen the Siniora government. We will follow up on this
possibility.

COMMENT
--------------


14. (S) Hamadeh and Jumblatt's advice to us -- to keep a low
profile on our support for March 14 and the Siniora
government -- has been echoed by other political figures
lately. As we will report septel, PM Siniora told the
Ambassador today (10/4) that the U.S. should work quietly,
without public noise. (While we respect their views, we're
not sure we agree: some public comments about what is
clearly a Hizballah/Syrian/Aounist plot underfoot might serve
to to help undermine it.) They are clearly preoccupied with
Syria's next move, shaken by the energetic campaign waged by
Hizballah and FPM to weaken the cabinet, and sensitive to
repeated new charges that they are stooges of Israel or the
USG. Nevertheless they and other March 14 leaders are
grateful for our support behind the scenes on such issues as
monitoring Syrian interference and establishing the tribunal.
They are also open to our advice, more so than before, on
dealing with their political rivals; that fact may indicate
increased weakness, anxiety and division on the part of March
14 in general. End Comment.
FELTMAN