SECURITY SECTOR COORDINATION: PROCEEDING WITH

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 003164

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/2026
TAGS: PREL MARR PARM MOPS PGOV LE UK FR
SUBJECT: SECURITY SECTOR COORDINATION: PROCEEDING WITH
INFORMAL CHANNELS


Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) Summary: Prime Minister Siniora, Deputy Prime and
Defense Minister Murr, and French Ambassador Emie all agree:
despite rumors to the contrary, Emie was not the cause of
Siniora's rejection of a UK-led security sector reform and
coordination unit in his office. The three argue that the UK
had unrealistic expectations as to what Siniora, under
constant attack for allegedly handing away Lebanon's
sovereignty, could accept. While the PM was too polite to
say no, he insists he never accepted the UK offer. Siniora
is equally determined to reject any EU coordination unit on
security issues, and Emie reported that an upcoming ESDP team
will strive only to improve coordination among EU member
states on security cooperation. In the place of the
coordination unit, three informal channels on security sector
coordination and reform are emerging. First, the US, UK, and
select other missions (but, notably, not France) are already
meeting discreetly to compare notes, coordinate, and work on
deconfliction, on both police and army issues. Second, Murr
told us that he will play an increasingly active gatekeeper
and coordinator role, in support in particular of maintaining
a predominately U.S.-origin equipment foundation base for the
LAF. Third, Emie agreed with our proposal that the US and
French embassies meet quietly but regularly on security
sector reform and coordination. End summary.


2. (S) The Ambassador met with Emie on 9/28 to ask about
his objections to the security sector reform and coordination
unit proposed by UK General Andrew Mackay. Expressing
exasparation that he was being unfairly blamed, Emie denied
that he was behind the death of the idea. While Mackay's
proposal looked sensible, Emie said, it was "completely
unrealistic." Can you imagine what the pro-Syrians would do,
Emie asked, if there were foreign military advisors in the
Grand Serail (seat of the premier)? Already under attack for
allegedly handing away Lebanon's sovereignty to western
imperialists, Siniora could not afford such a unit
politically. Siniora has faced repeated charges that he
fails to protect Lebanese sovereignty, and the Mackay mission
would have added fuel to the fire.


3. (S) Siniora, meeting with the Ambassador on 9/21 (with
other topics covered septel),agreed that Emie had nothing to
do with his rejection of an idea that the PM described as not
feasible politically. The Ambassador noted that the British
had the impression after Tony Blair's visit that Siniora was
comfortable with the approach, which would have maintained a
Lebanese lead at all times. Thus we found it curious that,
subsequently, Siniora cooled to the idea. The PM said that
we, and the British, took politeness for acquiescence. "Who
can say no to Tony Blair's face?" Siniora said. Asked about
the upcoming European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)
team, Siniora said that, if the team asked to help with a
unit in thie Grand Serail, he would more explicitly say no.


4. (S) Emie told the Ambassador that the ESDP team was
never intended to replace the Mackay mission, as the U.S and
UK have suspected. The ESDP team will not propose assisting
in establishing and staffing a GOL security sector reform and
coordination unit. Instead, the ESDP team will look at how
to improve intra-EU security policy. There is very little
communication and coordination and much duplication between
EU states in this area, Emie said, so the ESDP team will
propose solutions. The ESDP team will also look at where to
put any EU funds toward security sector reform. The ESDP
team will definitely want to meet with the Americans, he said.


5. (S) The Ambassador responded to Emie that, even if
Siniora couldn't accept a coordination unit with foreign
advisors for political reasons, the problem of coordination
and setting priorities remains. Emie agreed. He proposed
that our two embassies start sharing more information and
ideas. The Ambassador noted that such coordination would be
welcome. In fact, the Ambassador noted, we already have such
relations with the UK Embassy, and the lack of the same
relationship with the French had more to do with French
attitudes than American attitudes. Emie concurred on the
need for "openness and transparency." Joint U.S.-French
understandings will help persuade the Lebanese to move in
certain directions, he said. But he emphasized that he
opposed any kind of formal mechanism, even among donors
without GOL involvement, for the unwelcome attention it would
get locally. "And don't forget," Emie said, "we now have
2,000 troops on the ground." Repeating his worries about the
appearance of westerners dictating Lebanon's security policy,

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Emie said that he did not want to give any pretext for
attacks on the French UNIFIL contingent.


6. (S) In a 9/29 meeting with the Ambassador, Defense
Minister Murr shared Emie and Siniora's analysis, that it
would be "political suicide" for Siniora to invite Mackay or
the ESDP team to establish a unit in the Grand Serail. Murr
also said that he would not accept such a unit in the
Ministry of Defense. However, he would be happy to work with
donors individually or collectively, as long the mechanism is
discreet and informal, on coordination and reform. In fact,
Murr said, he will work to play a bigger gatekeeper and
coordination role himself. While he trusts his generals
working with U.S. military experts from ODC and visitors from
CENTCOM to make the right decisions, he knows that there must
be some discipline regarding what is requested or accepted
from others. Murr said that his interest was maintaining the
U.S.-origin foundation of the LAF, and he would not accept
non-complementary donations of equipment from the French and
others.


7. (S) Comment: We suspect that there may be more to the
dismissal of the Mackay proposals than what Siniora, Emie,
and Murr told us. But, nevertheless, with increased
polarization of political rhetoric in Lebanon over the past
two weeks, we agree that it is now politically unfeasible to
proceed with an idea that looked so sensible only a month
ago. Such a unit would essentially give a political gift to
those pro-Syrian Lebanese politicians, Hizballah, and General
Aoun to increase their attacks on Siniora. But the lack of a
centralized security sector reform and coordination unit
leaves those of us on the ground with an enormous gap to
fill. In fact, the U.S., UK, Germany, Canada, and others are
already meeting informally to compare notes and coordinate
our approaches on security sector assistance and reform, both
to the police and the LAF. The French are not part of this
but could be brought in later. We will also test the
seriousness of Emie's offer to coordinate bilaterally. As
for Murr, we believe that he will best be brought in if and
when we need a trouble-shooter. In addition, our access to
him is easy and good, so we will be able to help script him
for a Gulf fundraising tour he plans for the post-Ramadan
period. End comment.
FELTMAN