Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BEIRUT3160
2006-09-29 16:17:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

LEBANON: LEBANESE FORCES PARTY ASSESSES ITS OWN

Tags:  LE PGOV PREL 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 003160 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/SINGH
STATE FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/FO:ATACHCO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/28/2016
TAGS: LE PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: LEBANON: LEBANESE FORCES PARTY ASSESSES ITS OWN
AND THE FPM'S FUTURE


Classified By: Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ambassador. Reason: 1.4 (d)

SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 003160

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/SINGH
STATE FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/FO:ATACHCO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/28/2016
TAGS: LE PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: LEBANON: LEBANESE FORCES PARTY ASSESSES ITS OWN
AND THE FPM'S FUTURE


Classified By: Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ambassador. Reason: 1.4 (d)

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) According to two senior party officials, the Lebanese
Forces (LF) are buoyant following Samir Ja'ja's speech on
September 24, which may have drawn more than 100,000 people.
Michel Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement (FPM),on the other
hand, is losing popularity in the LF's view. While the FPM
is currently seeking power through political maneuver, its
headstrong persistence in an alliance with Hizballah suggests
that the party seeks to destabilize Lebanon as well.
Meanwhile, the LF remains a committed member of the March 14
movement. It seeks to overcome its bloody militia past, and
also embraces its character as a Christian party and has
judged that confessional politics are here to stay for the
foreseeable future. End Summary.


2. (SBU) Polchief and the Ambassador's Special Assistant met
with Lebanese Forces officials Elie Khoury and Jean-Marie
Kassab September 28. Both were LF fighters who saw action in
the Lebanese Civil War and left Lebanon in 1989 to pursue
business careers abroad. Khoury, who only returned in 2005,
is now one of LF leader Samir Ja'ja's political advisors.
Kassab, according to his own account, is only now re-engaging
with the Maronite political movement and is a senior leader
"without portfolio." They reflected with bitterness on the
violence of the civil war, the suffering it caused to their
militia, and the failure to achieve any lasting resolution of
Lebanon's confessional disputes.

JA'JA' RALLY
--------------


3. (C) Our LF contacts were buoyant following the September
24 Harissa rally at which LF leader Samir Ja'ja' addressed a
strikingly large crowd of people outside the Harissa
Cathedral. When Emboffs asked how many attended, the
officials noted they would not give an estimate in public.
Hizballah puts great stock in the number of supporters it can
gather; but the LF as a smaller party does not intend to play
the numbers game with Hizballah. They told us that their
internal estimate was that 150,000 supporters were present at

the LF rally. When Emboffs expressed surprise at the large
estimate, Khoury claimed that the mountain setting of the
Harissa Cathedral, along with unfortunate camera placement,
diminished the size of the crowd apparent in television
coverage. Both Khoury and Kassab noted, as had Embassy
personnel who were travelling in the area on September 24,
that LF supporters were clogging roads for miles around
Harissa.


4. (C) Khoury told Polchief that the Harissa area has a mix
of political affiliations, including Aounists and
independents. He said there had been a clash "between Aoun
supporters and ex-Aounists" in Harissa on the day after
Ja'ja's speech. According to Khoury, the authorities had to
break up a street fight between the two gangs. The source of
the tension was a dispute over the direction of the FPM and
its flirtation with Hizballah.

WHITHER THE FPM?
--------------


5. (C) Polchief asked Khoury whether, in light of Aoun's
confrontation with March 14 figures and the FPM's attempt to
organize with Hizballah a majority bloc comprising the
Christian and Shia communities, it is possible to conclude
that the FPM is not truly on a political track to power.
Khoury agreed that the FPM is capable of causing unrest
(principally via street demonstrations and possible
confrontation with the Sunni-dominated ISF) to effect
political change, but doubted that Aoun would make such an
attempt until all political avenues -- including the demand
for a national unity cabinet -- were exhausted.


6. (C) Both LF officials regard Aoun as mentally unstable,
driven by an overwhelming desire to attain the presidency,
and willing to sacrifice national stability for his ambition.
His Free Patriotic Movement is losing popularity due to poor
political choices -- lending credibility to the view that the

BEIRUT 00003160 002 OF 002


FPM has chosen to gather the kind of power that it and its
ally Hizballah derive from their numbers, muscle and Syrian
support.

NEXT STEPS FOR LEBANESE FORCES
--------------


7. (C) When the conversation turned to the future of
confessionalism in Lebanon, the LF officials explained that
it is still the strongest current in Lebanese politics, and
unavoidable. They called the FPM and the other parties'
claims to multiconfessionalism "nonsense." The Lebanese
Forces will remain a Christian-dominated party for the
foreseeable future. Partly this is due to the LF's
reputation as the successor to a Christian militia, and
partly to the need to organize and protect the interests of
the vulnerable Lebanese Christian community. Nevertheless,
both officials deeply resented the LF's lasting association
with the militia and its violent acts.


8. (C) The LF is committed to the March 14 grouping of
parties, however. Khoury held out hope that Parliament
Speaker Berri's Amal party and Aoun's FPM would see fit to
ally themselves with, if not join, March 14. He agreed,
though, with Polchief's doubt that Berri would provoke an
open split within the Shia, a split from which he might not
emerge the victor. Berri is not a risk-taker, Khoury agreed.


9. (C) Khoury told us that the LF is the only parliamentary
member of the March 14 group committed to electoral law
reform. The rest of March 14 is not enamoured of the concept
but would go along with reform. As for early elections, the
LF is deeply in favor as the party felt that it had been
cheated, as were the other Christian parties, in the 2005
election. Constitutional worries aside, the LF would support
early elections, even in the face of opposition from its
March 14 allies. (Note: The LF currently has five members
in the Parliament. End note.) Khoury stated that his party
could have fought for more in last June's elections, but gave
way to other parties in an attempt to keep up the Cedar
Revolution's momentum. End Note.)
FELTMAN