Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BEIRUT3124
2006-09-27 12:56:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

LEBANON: MIKATI SEES OPPORTUNITY TO REDESIGN THE

Tags:  KCRM LE PREL PTER SY 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO1863
PP RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHLB #3124/01 2701256
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 271256Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5795
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0347
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 003124 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/SINGH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2026
TAGS: KCRM LE PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: MIKATI SEES OPPORTUNITY TO REDESIGN THE
POLITICAL WINDTUNNEL

Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).

SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 003124

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/SINGH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2026
TAGS: KCRM LE PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: MIKATI SEES OPPORTUNITY TO REDESIGN THE
POLITICAL WINDTUNNEL

Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Ambassador Feltman and econoff on 26 September met
with former Prime Minister and Syria-allied telecom magnate
Najib Mikati, who saw an urgent need for a change in the
Lebanese political system within the next six months to
preempt further instability and the periodic resurgence of
crises. He assessed Hizballah as just as strong as and more
legitimate than before the Israeli offensive. Mikati also
commented on the Syrian concern over the second UNIIIC
report, sang the praises of Central Bank Governor Riad
Salameh as a presidential candidate, and condemned Prime
Minister Siniora's management of Lebanon's reconstruction.
Nevertheless, Mikati does not support a resignation of the
Siniora cabinet at this time. End Summary.

LEBANON HAS SIX MONTHS
TO REDESIGN ITS POLITICAL WINDTUNNEL
WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE TAIF ACCORD
--------------


2. (C) Mikati foresees a "normal" political situation over
the short term but expressed deep concern about the future if
Lebanon does not address its political problems in the next
six months. He likened the current political situation to a
windtunnel; "all storms in the area pass through the Lebanese
corridor." He sees the next six months as a crucial
opportunity to brainstorm ways to "redesign the corridor," to
"change the doors or windows" to strengthen and stabilize it.
Specifically he opined that the Lebanese state must
"brainstorm" a reinterpretation of the Taif Accord, while the
Arab League and international community must take action on a
new Arab-Israeli peace initiative.


3. (C) Any new interpretation of the Lebanese state must
take place within the context of the Taif Accord, according
to Mikati, which provides ample flexibility to fit all
communities. He suggested simultaneous electoral and tax
reform along federal and rural lines. Nasrallah's failure to
mention Taif during the 22 September Hizballah rally is not
significant, in Mikati's opinion. Nasrallah once told Mikati

that Hizballah "follows the Qu'ran, the constitution, and
Taif, so he doesn't need to mention these each and every
time." It is for this reason that Mikati belives Nasrallah
does not want to reopen Taif. Mikati interprets Suleiman
Franjieh's recent denigration of the Taif Accord not as a
Syrian dismissal of the accord but as an attempt to re-unite
a alienated Christian population whose loyalties are divided
among Sunni and Shia politicians and the diaspora. "Khalass
(enough),it (Taif) has to change, let us be practical."


4. (C) Furthermore, Mikati believes it will take Arab and
international involvement to find a new interpretation.
Lebanon needs U.S. assistance addressing the Arab-Israeli
issue but the United States should step aside and "let a new
committee of three deal with Taif, with U.S. blessing."
Peace in Lebanon will require Syrian involvement, according
to Mikati; all who govern Lebanon "must pass through Syria."


5. (C) To make Taif work, there must be a clearer definition
of the central government's role and a decentralization of
government, with elections on the regional and federal
levels. Confessional federalism would not succeed in
Lebanon, according to Mikati, but "advanced decentralization"
is needed. The central government could retain its 50-50
split between Muslims and non-Muslims, but there should be
four to six Mohafazat or governorates, based on Ottoman-era
divisions, with governors elected by the government. "The
gap is getting wider," he concluded, and "Lebanon can't stay
like this forever."

HIZBALLAH JUST AS STRONG
AND MORE LEGITIMATE
--------------


6. (C) Hizballah's strength has not changed appreciably
since the Israeli offensive began in July, but the group is
more legitimate today among Lebanese as well as across the
region, Mikati said. Although Nasrallah's National Dialogue
prediction that Israel would not attack was proven false his
credibility has not suffered. Today Hizballah has leverage
over Syria; Syria is a client rather than an ally of Iran.

BEIRUT 00003124 002 OF 003




7. (C) Nasrallah's comment at the 22 September rally that
Hizballah would not disarm until Lebanon had a "clean and
just state" or a strong state was intended to rouse passions
among his followers rather than to be taken literally,
according to Mikati, but Lebanon's current weak state is not
sustainable beyond the next six months. Hizballah is a
"state within a non-state;" visiting IFC officials this week
commented to Mikati that Lebanon has no administrative
leaders for them to meet with as they do in other nations.
Instead they must meet with a series of confessional
political leaders in order to get anything done. The United
States and France have a role to play in formulating a
stronger state, Mikati opined, otherwise Lebanon's crises
will continue.


8. (C) Regaining Sheba'a farms would remove Hizballah's
argument for holding weapons, and there are three main issues
that need to be addressed to prompt disarmament, according to
Mikati: basic Lebanese political problems, the Arab-Israeli
issue, and regional issues, including the Iranian nuclear
program. If the first two issues could be eliminated, it
would keep the third from "blowing through the corridor of
Lebanon," and a redesign of the government would "minimize
the effect of the storm."

SYRIAN CONCERN FOLLOWS
THE SECOND BRAMMERTZ REPORT
--------------


9. (C) Mikati described his recent trip to Syria as a
personal visit (paying a condolence call on Mustapha Tlas
after the death of his wife) that included no political
discussions or meetings with the Asad family. But Mikati
described the Syrian reaction to the UNIIIC Commissioner
Brammertz's second report, in which he drew stronger
connections between the assassinations, as "worried."

SALAMEH FOR PRESIDENT
--------------


10. (C) Mikati would like to see Central Bank Governor Riad
Salameh as the next president of Lebanon, based on his
competence, solid ties with both Arabs and the West, and
economic management track record. Salameh's performance
during the Bank Medina scandal, where he tried to "do the
right thing despite a bad atmosphere" demonstrates his
integrity, in Mikati's opinion, and under Salameh Lebanon
could be a strong state. Mikati assessed that even if the
Syrians accepted Salahmeh, Lahoud would not. Thus, Nabih
Berri's support would not be enough to override Lahoud's
opposition, and Salameh would need protection if he did
become president. (Comment: High level civil servants are
prohibited from running for office until two years after
they've left the civil service, and it would require a
constitutional amendment for Salameh to take the presidency.)
Charles Rizk is Mikati's second choice for president.


11. (C) Mikati recently met General Aoun for the first time
and liked him, but does not support his candidacy for
president because it would strengthen the pattern of a "state
within a state." While they discussed Aoun's desire for a
new cabinet and new ministers, Mikati is opposed because even
if there was a new cabinet it would be impossible to make new
ministerial appointments; if Hizballah ministers resigned
there would be no new government, no state at all.

SINIORA MICROMANAGING
RECONSTRUCTION, INFLATING COSTS
--------------


12. (C) Mikati's family runs an NGO based in Tripoli and
that took on at least one bridge reconstruction project. He
commented that Prime Minister Siniora is not accepting advice
from his own government on reconstruction issues, and is
depending entirely on his two advisors, Mohamad Chatah and
Rola Noureddine. Furthermore the government is inflating the
cost of reconstruction projects by a "ridiculous" amount; the
bridge that Mikati's NGO rebuilt to international standards
cost just USD 600,000, rather than the USD 2.4 million
officials had requested.

COMMENT
--------------


13. (C) Mikati is not your run-of-the-mill pro-Syria

BEIRUT 00003124 003 OF 003


Lebanese politician. He does not speak in polarizing,
sensational language, and he does not peddle grand conspiracy
theories about the alleged Hariri desire to take over
Lebanon. He genuinely seems to like us. Moreover, he comes
across as reasonable (and reasonably independent, although
part of this is certainly posture). We believe that he is
trying to position himself as the non-threatening,
consensus-building alternative to a Hariri-backed Prime
Minister. He was, after all, a competent manager of the
cabinet during the difficult transition in 2005 between Omar
Karami cabinet and that of Fouad Siniora. So his support of
Riad Salameh for the presidency is not surprising: Mikati
and Salameh both share the same desire to transcend their
connections to Syria by playing up their technocratic and
management skills. But we cannot imagine a scenario by which
a March 14 majority would readily turn over two of Lebanon's
top offices to political figures who still have a whiff of
pro-Syria loyalties hanging over them.
FELTMAN