BERRI ON THE RAMPAGE AGAINST SINIORA

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 003089

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2026
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER LE SY
SUBJECT: BERRI ON THE RAMPAGE AGAINST SINIORA

Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (S) In a 9/25 one-on-one meeting with the Ambassador,
Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri relentlessly attacked Prime
Minister Fouad Siniora. Siniora, according to Berri, was to
blame for Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah's
harsh rhetoric at the 9/22 Hizballah rally: The PM visited
Berri on 9/21, before that night's cabinet meeting. The two
worked out deals, inter alia, on Surete General Chief Wafiq
Jezzini's behavior (a subject that dominated the Ambassador's
discussion with Berri),diplomatic appointments, and
reconstruction efforts. As Siniora led the cabinet, Berri
went secretly to see Hizballah Secretary General Hassan
Nasrallah, convincing him to drop his criticisms of the GOL
in his speech scheduled for the following day. But when
Berri subsequently learned that Siniora had "betrayed" him,
he passed word to Nasrallah to revert to his original speech
with its anti-Siniora flavor. Suggesting that he's not eager
to change the cabinet despite Siniora's alleged perfidy,
Berri said that he hopes eventually to revive something like
the national dialogue. But, he said, given how deep the
distrust is, he has to rebuild reasonably amicable
relationships among individuals before daring to call a group
together. One of his goals, he said, was to come up with
some kind of reconciliation between Walid Jumblatt and
Nasrallah. While the latter expressed a willingness to try,
Jumblatt is not yet ready, he confessed. End summary.

SINIORA SEEKS OUT BERRI
TO HELP LOWER TENSIONS
--------------


2. (S) Asked by the Ambassador for his views on the current
situation, Berri (who returned on 9/20 from a vacation in
Switzerland and Spain) launched into what was in essence a
75-minute monologue -- an unusually long meeting for Berri --
on how Siniora had betrayed him. Siniora, Berri reported,
had shown up at the Speaker's official residence without an
appointment last Thursday (9/21),in hopes of working out
some backroom understandings with Berri on how best to handle
some controversial issues at the cabinet meeting that night.
Berri said that he took Siniora at his word when the PM said
that he wanted to lower tensions, especially in advance of
the Hizballah rally scheduled for following afternoon.

THE JEZZINI AFFAIR: BERRI
AND SINIORA COME UP WITH DEAL
--------------


3. (S) One of the toughest issues, Berri said, related to
Surete General chief Wafiq Jezzini. Berri rejected Siniora's
argument that Jezzini deserved to be disciplined for not
showing up at meetings called by Acting Interior Minister
Fatfat or PM Siniora. After all, Berri said, during the
July-August crisis, Siniora summoned security chiefs and
officials to the Grand Serail for meetings and "never once"
invited Jezzini. "Did I complain?" Berri said, suggesting
the Siniora now had no right to complain when Jezzini failed
to show up. Moreover, Berri said, "it is true" that Fatfat,
as only Acting Minister, is not technically or legally
Jezzini's boss. But, again, Berri ("unlike your friend
General Aoun," he laughed) had never made a fuss about that.
Why, he asked, is Siniora making Jezzini's attendance record
an issue, when the Speaker could now make Fatfat's tenure as
Acting Minister a problem?


4. (S/NF) The Ambassador said that he did not think that
the failure to show up at meetings was the real reason behind
Siniora's pique at Jezzini. Nodding, Berri said that Siniora
and Fatfat want to "monopolize" the security organs,
especially at the expense of the Shia. That explains why
Jezzini was never called to the Grand Serail during the
July-August crisis. Moreover, Fatfat is trying to make
appointments inside the Surete General, without consulting
with Jezzini (or -- in what we suspect is the real problem --
Berri). Finally, Siniora and Fatfat were scheming to
interconnect Surete General and Internal Security Forces
(ISF) databases, which would allow Wissam al-Hassan (the
Hariri-appointed head of the ISF's intelligence branch) to
spy on Jezzini.


5. (S/NF) The Ambassador argued that it took the 9/11
attack before the U.S. security institutions had real

BEIRUT 00003089 002 OF 004


connectivity; there was no reason why Berri should be so
suspicious of data sharing between the ISF and Surete. It is
good for Lebanon's security if the security institutions can
share information more easily. If that is the case, Berri
said, then why are Siniora and Fatfat leaving the Lebanese
Armed Forces, Military Intelligence (G-2),Presidential
Security, and State Security out of the process? Siniora
told Berri that it is because only the Surete and ISF fall
under the ISF, but Berri argued that it is because the Sunnis
want to strip the Shia of any role in security.


6. (S/NF) The Ambassador asked whether the problem might
simply be with Jezzini, not an entire confession. After all,
we have heard that France has issued an arrest warrant for
Jezzini (who is in charge of passports and immigration) for
using forged documents to acquire French passports for
himself and his family. This does not engender trust. Berri
bristled, saying that LAF Commander Sleiman had the same
problem with the French, yet people are "praising" rather
than sidelining Sleiman. Moreover, Berri said, "everyone
knows" that the USG has had a long-standing relationship with
Surete General. If they didn't know it, they do now, he said
(referring to a front-page story on the 9/23 Hariri-owned
Mustaqbal newspaper that reproduced in full a Jezzini memo
outlining a USG armored vehicle gift). "People say" Jezzini
is Hizballah-allied, Berri said. But that obviously isn't
true or else the USG would not deal with him. "You
remember," Berri continued, "you told me that you could not
deal with Hussein Laquis" (a Hizballah ally who was dropped
from consideration in favor of Jezzini, after the former
Surete General chief Jamil al-Sayyid resigned in April 2005).
"Jezzini is not Laquis."


7. (S) In any case, Berri said, he won Siniora's approval
for a way by which everyone could save face. Jezzini would
go to Fatfat's office the next time he was called, and that
would be seen by all as implicit recognition of Fatfat's
authority. Fatfat would not make appointments inside Surete
General without consulting with Jezzini (who presumably would
consult with Berri). And Siniora would call a meeting for
all security chiefs to discuss how to build security
databases that were interconnected. Berri said that both he
and and Siniora were satisfied with this outcome. Berri
understood that Siniora would orchestrate just such a cabinet
outcome.

DIPLOMATIC APPOINTMENTS: SUBSTITUTING
A MARONITE FOR AN ORTHODOX FOR WASHINGTON
--------------


8. (S) Berri also raised diplomatic appointments with
Siniora, asking the PM whether London, Washington, New York,
Cairo, and the Arab League were all so insignificant that the
posts could be left indefinitely without ambassadors.
Siniora briefed Berri on recommendations made by the MFA for
these and other positions but noted that he had a problem:
the MFA, with Emile Lahoud's backing, proposed a Maronite
(Boutros Assaker) for Washington, when that slot had been
held by a Greek Orthodox. Putting a Maronite there would
mean a further reshuffling, in order to give a Greek Orthodox
an important embassy elsewhere. Berri said that he agreed
with Siniora that Anthony Chedid, currently the MFA's
Director of International Organizations and a Greek Orthodox,
could substitute for Assaker. Berri would get Lahoud's
approval for the needed papers of accreditation. But the
appointments should for forward for cabinet approval that
night, they agreed. (Comment: Neither Chedid nor Assaker
are particularly inspiring choices. End comment.)

BERRI TELLS SINIORA TO START
DISTRIBUTING COMPENSATION ON FRIDAY
--------------


9. (S) On reconstruction, Berri urged Siniora to begin to
distribute the cash according to the formula he announced
previously (up to $40,000 for housing, furniture, and
fixtures) and to announce compensation for cars, crops,
factories, and shops. After much back and forth ("he really
doesn't like to spend money," Berri marveled),Siniora agreed
to Berri's insistence to give a 2 p.m. press conference on
Friday, a couple of hours before Hizballah's scheduled rally,
to announce the start of cash distribution and payments for
vehicles destroyed. Berri said that the timing was not
coincidental -- such an announcement would accrue good will
to the cabinet in advance of Hizballah's rally.


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BERRI USES SINIORA'S CONCURRENCE
TO CONVINCES NASRALLAH TO MODERATE SPEECH
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10. (S) Based on these understandings, Siniora went off to
lead the cabinet meeting. Berri made arrangements for a
secret meeting with Nasrallah, "our first meeting since the

SIPDIS
war." (Berri noted that today's newspapers talk of a 9/24
Nasrallah-Berri meeting, but the actual session took place
three days earlier.) Berri said that he "worked on Nasrallah
for five hours" to convince him to drop the Siniora-bashing
part of his speech for the next day, based on the
understandings Berri had worked out with Siniora. At long
last, Nasrallah agreed to talk of international affairs, not
domestic politics. Nasrallah tried to get Berri to join him
in complaining about Siniora, but Berri said that he trusted
Siniora.

BUT SINIORA DOESN'T DELIVER
--------------


11. (S) Exhausted, Berri did not return his phone messages
when he returned that night and only learned from the
newspapers Friday morning that the cabinet disciplined
Jezzini and did not discuss diplomatic appointments. When he
called Siniora to complain, Siniora admitted that he needed
more time as well before announcing the start of compensation
payments. Furious, Berri sent a message to Nasrallah to use
the previous text of his speech. While Berri agreed with the
Ambassador that the language and tone of the speech escalated
tensions in Lebanon, Berri blamed Siniora.


12. (S) In a way, Berri said, "Siniora gave me a gift." So
many people were pushing Berri away from moderation to
extremism. Aoun "hates me," because Aoun sees Berri as the
only obstacle preventing a collapse of the Siniora cabinet.
The Syrians are deeply unhappy with Berri's partnership with
Siniora, and Hizballah does not understand why Berri refuses
to go along with the proposal to withdraw the Shia ministers
and make Siniora's cabinet politically unviable. "I don't
have to be moderate when someone doesn't respect me," Berri
said.

NATIONAL UNITY CABINET -- GOOD IDEA,
BUT TO KEEP IN THE POCKET FOR NOW
--------------


13. (S) The Ambassador asked whether that means that Berri
will now work insist on a national unity cabinet, as
Hizballah and Aoun are doing. Berri said that "no one" can
oppose a national unity cabinet, but the question is the
timing. He suggested having discussions about a national
unity cabinet but to put any likely formulas for such a
cabinet "into our pockets until the time is right." The
Ambassador asked whether the time might be right after Emile
Lahoud is removed from the presidency. "I am thinking about
the same thing," Berri laughed, but added that he is worried
that the political climate in the country could deteriorate
severely in the meantime. The Ambassador suggested that an
easy solution to that would be to accelerate the presidential
elections to the quickest date possible.

PREMATURE FOR NATIONAL DIALOGUE
BEFORE INDIVIDUAL RECONCILIATION WORK
--------------


14. (S) The Ambassador asked Berri whether he was going to
try to resume the national dialogue, as has been rumored.
Berri said that he thought that the national dialogue would
be a good way, eventually, to release tension and allow Aoun
to feel that he is playing a proper national role. But the
distrust is so great between politicians that it would be
unrealistic now to call everyone back to the table and expect
a constructive atmosphere, he said. Instead, he was doing
some bridge-building between individuals who participated in
the national dialogue. Once he senses that he has been
successful in restoring some confidence, he then will call
for some form of national dialogue.


15. (S) Berri said that he was working particularly hard to
rebuild some kind of relationship between Nasrallah and
Jumblatt. He claimed to have convinced Nasrallah to set
aside his bitterness over Jumblatt's rhetoric and positions
in order to try to find some common ground with Jumblatt.
Jumblatt, however, is refusing to go along with Berri's
proposal. Yet even with Jumblatt there is a signal of

BEIRUT 00003089 004 OF 004


flexbility, Berri said, saying that Jumblatt's press
statements on 9/24 were "moderate." When the Ambassador
asked what Berri meant, he responded that Jumblatt had said
that his problem with Hizballah was its alliance with Syria.
That, Berri said, shows that Jumblatt is prepared to deal
with a purely Lebanese Hizballah, a position Berri thought
was helpful.

COMMENT
--------------


16. (S) Berri's harsh message about Siniora was in contrast
to his upbeat mood. This suggests to us that he is
calculating how to use Siniora's "betrayal" to his tactical
advantage -- probably meaning more jobs or reconstruction
support sent his way for his followers. After all, Siniora
will be the one who will have to blink in any Siniora-Berri
fight: Siniora cannot fight Syria, Hizballah, Michel Aoun,
and Nabih Berri all at once. We did not get the sense that
Berri is in any hurry to see the cabinet replaced by a
national unity cabinet, either, as Berri's share of the power
would be reduced as the cabinet expands to take in at least a
share for Aoun.
FELTMAN