SULEIMAN FRANJIEH MASKS PRO-SYRIA BIAS WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 003088

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2026
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM PTER LE SY
SUBJECT: SULEIMAN FRANJIEH MASKS PRO-SYRIA BIAS WITH
HARIRI-BASHING

Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY AND COMMENT
--------------


1. (C) Former MP and ex-Minister Suleiman Franjieh,
receiving an Embassy delegation on 9/18, expressed
considerable worry about the March 14 majority using Hariri
money and influence to impose its will on Lebanon. Even the
special tribunal for the Hariri assassination might become a
tool to settle scores with political rivals, he argued.
Echoing many of Michel Aoun's comments, Franjieh suggested
that the Sunnis -- and Hariri in particular -- were a bigger
threat to Lebanon's Christians than the Shia and Hizballah.
While claiming to want to dispense with confessionalism,
Franjieh said that, until such sweeping changes in Lebanon's
political culture could be made, then at least
confessionalism needed to work better, particularly in terms
of Lebanon's Christians. While Franjieh purported to be
advancing an independent stand, we suspect, given his
family's long alliance with Syria's Assad family, we are sure
that he ermains heavily -- and voluntarily -- influenced by
Syrian thinking. But unlike many other of Lebanon's
pro-Syrian politicians in the so-called "National Front,"
Franjieh does retain a strong and loyal following in his
native Zghorta region. End summary and comment.

SECURITY FEARS AND WORRIES OF AIRSTRIKES,
GIVEN RUMORS FRANJIEH OFFERED NASRALLAH SHELTER
--------------


2. (C) On 9/18, the Ambassador, Pol/Econ Chief, and Pol
Advisor called on former Minister Suleiman Franjieh at his
imitation, self-designed Swiss chalet in Bneshay, northern
Lebanon. Franjieh -- who lost his MP seat in the 2005
elections -- was accompanied by advisor Rony Arayji and
financial backer Richard Haykel. Despite the clear evidence
of checkpoints under construction by his Marada
militia-turned party on the road leading to his house,
Franjieh denied that he was upgrading the security.


3. (C) Sitting below mounted trophies of game he has hunted
around the world, Franjieh noted that he and his wife Rima
spent the July-August conflict moving between different
houses. They wanted to avoid potential Israeli airstrikes,
given rumors and (inaccurate) news reports that Hizballah
Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah had taken refuge in

SIPDIS
Franjieh house. Rima, Franjieh said, was particularly scared
with the Israelis hit a radio tower near their house and
assumed that they were the actual target. Franjieh described
Hizballah's 7/12 capture of the IDF soldiers from Israel as a
"military operation" that he thought should naturally lead to
a prisoner exchange.

HARIRI RULE WORSE FOR LEBANON
THAN HIZBALLAH-ISRAEL WAR
--------------


3. (C) On the Hizballah-Israel war, Franjieh thought that
PM Siniora and his cabinet were exaggerating the economic and
physical losses. Incredulous that the total direct and
indiret costs were anywhere close to $15 million claimed by
some, Franjieh said that, whatever the losses, the war was
far less costly to Lebanon than the years of Hariri bloc
domination. At the end of the civil war, Franjieh noted,
Lebanon had approximately $1 billion in debt. Today, that
number exceeds $40 billion, a figure he blamed on Rafiq
Hariri. The Ambassador noted that, for nearly all of the
post-war period, Franjieh had been a cabinet minister. Yes,
Franjieh acknowledged, but he "always" opposed Hariri's
plans. Hariri rule was far worse for Lebanon than the
Hizballah-Israel war.

BEST TO TRANSCEND CONFESSIONALISM,
BUT -- UNTIL THEN -- MAKE IT WORK BETTER
--------------


4. (C) Answering the Ambassador's question about his press
comments after paying a call on Maronite Patriarch Sfeir,
Franjieh confirmed that he thought it was time for Lebanon to
get past its confessional political system. He denied the
existence of a Christian-Muslim divide, saying that there is
a Christian-Sunni-Shi'a-Druse divide instead. It would be
best for Lebanon to get beyond these divisons. But as long
as confessional politics are the norm in Lebanon, he argued,
then the confessional system must be better respected. The

BEIRUT 00003088 002 OF 003


Christians, he said, "must participate in it and have our
share." Picking up a cue from Michel Aoun, Franjieh
described it as unacceptable that the cabinet's Christians
are aligned with the March 14 movement, which he took as
meaning that they were subordinate to Hariri's Future party.
Glossing over the fact that he himself had voted for the
current electoral law when it was proposed in 2000, Franjieh
-- noting his agreement with Michel Aoun on this point --
also pushed for electoral reform, to prevent the Christians
from again being disenfranchised.

NATIONAL UNITY CABINET NEEDED NOW
--------------


5. (C) Franjieh noted that he also backed Michel Aoun's
call for a national unity cabinet. The Ambassador asked why
there was such a rush for a new cabinet now. After all, at
the very least, there will be a new cabinet no later than a
year from now, when a new president is elected. Franjieh
argued that, because of the boycott of Emile Lahoud, there is
a vacuum where the presidency should be. Thus, it is better
to have a national unity cabinet now, a cabinet that has
broad acceptance in the country. Given that one never knows
what might happen, one should build the national unity
cabinet now, in preparation for all contingencies. Moreover,
Christians will leave Lebanon if there is no immediate
solution, if they continue to feel disenfrachised by the
Siniora cabinet. Franjieh did not seem interested in
pursuing a different strategy -- replacing Lahoud now -- to
address his concerns. In what seemed in the context to be an
incongruous comment, he also noted that Lebanon needs a
secular and federalist system, "imposed on Lebanon from the
outside."

HIZBALLAH'S WEAPONS PROVIDE
"BALANCE" TO HARIRI MONEY
--------------


6. (C) The Ambassador noted that Hizballah's weapons -- not
PM Siniora, not Saad Hariri, not even the current vacuum in
the presidency -- posed an existential threat to Lebanon. It
is important, the Ambassador said, for Lebanon to begin
dealing with this issue now. Franjieh responded that "the
weapon of money is worse than the weapon of war," repeating
his comments about the huge debt piled up by Rafiq Hariri and
complaining about political distortions caused by the Hariri
wealth. Hizballah's weapons provide a "balance" to Hariri
money. For now, Franjieh claimed to be a "partner" with
Hizballah, again as a way to counter the Hariri money: "I
allied with the Shi'a in thie south, but I don't want to
belong to anyone."


7. (C) Moreover, Franjieh noted, Siniora's cabinet itself,
in its July 2005 cabinet decree, gave legality and legitimacy
to Hizballah's weapons, when the cabinet expressed support
for the "resistance." Franjieh claimed to be against
indefinite retention of Hizballah's weapons but noted that
Hizballah had been fighting "for a long time" in the south.
Thus trying to disarm Hizballah forcefully will lead to civil
war. To move Hizballah toward disarmament, one had to solve
Sheba'a Farms, the Lebanese prisoners in Israel, and Israeli
air violations. At that point, other parties won't tolerate
retention of Hizballah's arms. Hizballah's weapons do not
pose a threat inside Lebanon. But, if they become a threat,
"we will arm ourselves." Franjieh also mentioned solving the
nuclear issue with Iran and re-starting the
Israeli-Palestinian peace process as steps to defang
Hizballah.

UNDER HARIRI'S "MICROSCOPE,"
FRANJIEH CAN'T SMUGGLE ARMS
--------------


8. (C) Noting UNSCR 1701's requirement to combat arms
smuggling, the Ambassador asked Franjieh is he was aware of
arms smuggling into Lebanon. The Ambassador noted that we
were concerned by rumors that many groups were starting to
smuggle arms, not just Hizballah. Looking perplexed at the
oblique query about whether he had been smuggling arms
himself, Franjieh asked, "from where? To whom? Bring me the
reports, and I'll tell you." Denying that he is involved,
Franjieh added, "everyone in Lebanon has weapons. If there's
a war, I'll bring them in. But, now, Hariri has me under a
microscope.

INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL:

BEIRUT 00003088 003.2 OF 003


HIZBALLAH AFRAID
--------------


9. (C) On the proposed special tribunal with international
character for the Rafiq Hariri assassination, Franjieh said
that he had heard the rumors that Syrian President Bashar
al-Asad had threatened to destroy Lebanon if the tribunal
goes forward. He did not believe the threat. But, he said,
Hizballah is afraid. What, he asked, would happen if the
special tribunal would ask Hizballah Secretary General Hassan
Nasrallah to testify? After all, some rumors suggested that
the explosives-laden truck that killed Hariri had come from
the southern suburbs. The Ambassador noted that none of the
UNIIIC reports have suggested that Hizballah is implicated,
so Hizballah's fears at this point appear to be unwarranted.


10. (C) Franjieh responded that the special tribunal could
easily be politically, rather than judicially, motivated,
just as the UNIIIC has proven to be. The Ambassador noted
the consensus that UNIIIC Serge Brammertz is a professional
who has kept politics out of his work. Franjieh referred to
Brammertz' predecessor Detlev Mehlis and Mehlis' deputy
Gerhard Lehmann (who has also left the UNIIIC) in arguing
that the UNIIIC was political and the tribunal might be, too.
He asked again about what would happen if Nasrallah were
summoned to appear at the special tribunal. Answering his
own question, he said that civil war would result.


11. (C) As the Ambassador closed the meeting and chatted
with Franjieh on the way to the motorcade, financial advisor
Haykel told Pol/Econ Chief that Franjieh's concern with the
tribunal stems from his fear that the tribunal will become a
tool by the March 14 majority against their poiltical rivals.
The experience of the Mehlis investigation alarmed many in
Lebanon that the tribunal could be exploited for political
ends.

COMMENT
--------------


12. (C) Franjieh purported to be outlining an independent
political path for the sake of Lebanon. But, as his
subsequent appearance at the massive Hizballah rally on 9/22
showed, he is still very much aligned with Damascus. But
unlike some of the other pro-Syrian Lebanese politicians
(Wi'am Wihab, Elie Ferzli, former PM Omar Karami, etc.),
Franjieh still has a large and loyal following in the
Zghorta/Ehden Maronite-dominated region in northern Lebanon.
In fact, his electoral list last year outpolled that of Nayla
Mouawad about two-to-one in their home district. But Mouawad
and her two running mates won the three seats because the
Zghorta/Ehden district was (under the 2000 election law)
affixed to a larger district that included Sunni-majority
Tripoli, where voters went with the Hariri slat that included
Mouawad's list. Ergo, the 2000 law that Franjieh supported
in 2000 worked against him in 2005, when the Sunni vote
shifted from being pro- to anti-Hariri.


13. (C) Franjieh's anti-Hariri line probably reflects the
thinking of his friend Bashar al-Asad, as it is revisionist
history for him to claim that he always opposed Rafiq Hariri.
In one of Rafiq Hariri's last conversations with the
Ambassador, Hariri claimed that he had helped fund some of
Franjieh's pet projects. Moreover, when Hariri resigned the
premiership in October 2004 (in the aftermath of the
Syrian-imposed extension of Emile Lahoud's presidential
term),the Ambassador passed Franjieh in the hallway of the
Hariri family compound in Qoreitem -- not a location where a
die-hard, eternally anti-Hariri politician would normally be
seen. We were struck in this meeting by Franjieh's barely
masked paranoia about UNIIIC and the special tribunal. We
don't know whether Franjieh is worried for himself -- he was
Interior Minister at the time of Hariri's assassination -- or
reflecting the worries of the Asad family. But, with the
long ties between the Asad and Franjieh families, maybe one
cannot distinguish between those two types of worries.
FELTMAN