SPECULATING ABOUT HIZBALLAH'S RALLY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 003062

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/SINGH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2026
TAGS: PREL PTER KDEM LE SY
SUBJECT: SPECULATING ABOUT HIZBALLAH'S RALLY

Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY AND COMMENT
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1. (S) Hizballah is applying pressure to Lebanese from all
political factions to show up at "the largest rally in
Lebanon's history" tomorrow (9/22),by hinting that those who
don't share in the collective celebration of Lebanon's
"divine victory" must be Israeli collaborators. Syria,
according to Military Intelligence Chief Georges Khoury, is
more direct, by ordering its loyalists, and Palestinians from
the camps, to swell the ranks in a show of intimidation.
Most people believe that the demonstration, no matter how
large and frightening in appearance, will not turn violent:
Nasrallah presumably wants to intimidate other Lebanese --
and the world -- by showing how many people he can assemble
and control. With no one knowing whether Nasrallah will show
up in person or what his message will be, much speculation
revolves around the content of his speech: will he back the
ouster of Siniora's cabinet in favor of a national unity
cabinet? Aoun for President? Besides hoping to reverse the
perception that Hizballah's support is declining, we believe
that Nasrallah is also using this rally to stop progress
toward mplementation of the international tribunal for
Hariri's assassination. End summary and comment.

"LARGEST RALLY IN LEBANON'S HISTORY:
BUT WILL NASRALLAH SHOW UP?
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2. (SBU) Lebanon's usually hyperactive political life is in
suspended animation for the moment, as everyone waits to see
what the 9/22 Hizballah rally will bring. Hizballah bills it
as "the largest demonstration in Lebanese history," meaning
that the aim is more than the rally that previously enjoyed
that honor, the estimated million people who showed up for
the March 14, 2005 "Cedar Revolution" in Beirut's Martyrs'
Square. Beirut media today (9/21) is filled with images of
Hizballah activists setting up hundreds of thousands of
chairs in a cleared area of Beirut's devastated southern
suburbs. One of the key questions people are asking is
whether Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah will
dare defy Israel's vow to kill him at any opportunity and
show up in person. Hizballah erected soaring television
screens on the site, which could be used under either a
no-show scenario or an actual appearance.

AIMED AT REVERSING HIZBALLAH'S DECLINING SUPPORT
-- AND INTIMIDATING THOSE WHO QUESTION HIZBALLAH
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3. (SBU) The consensus among Embassy contacts is that
Hizballah's Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah has several
goals in calling this pre-Ramadan demonstration. First, he
wants to reverse the growing perception that Hizballah is
losing ground, as the losses suffered by Lebanon in the
July-August conflict sink in and people begin to question
whether the "divine victory" was worth the price. Second,
the massive numbers expected are designed not only to revive
Nasrallah's base but intimidate those Lebanese who want to
see Hizballah's power further diminished. Most people
dismiss the chance that the demonstration will turn violent,
believing that Nasrallah prefers to leave Lebanon (and the
world) with the impression that he, and he alone, can produce
so many people and control them, too -- with the
not-so-subtle underlying message being that he could easily
incite the crowd into taking physical action, if others would
make too many demands of Hizballah.

TRYING TO CORNER ALL TO SHOW UP
-- OR RISK BEING BRANDED AS "COLLABORATORS"
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4. (C) In marketing its demonstration, Hizballah has
succeeded in cornering other Lebanese politicians, by
inviting all parties and movements to participate in what
they are describing as a collective celebration of the
"divine victory" over Israel. Everyone who participated in
this victory are welcome, says the Hizballah propaganda.
March 14 politicians are in a particular bind: if they go,
they end up becoming part of the propaganda tool as Hizballah
shows it can turn people out in force. If they decline, they
can be accused of collaboration with Israel, of having wished
Israel to have won. Minister of Social Affairs Nayla Mouawad
predicted that Nasrallah's rhetoric regarding the March 14
politicians may depend entirely on whether March 14 is

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represented at the rally or not. In her theory, Nasrallah
will hold back in his criticism and appeal to national unity
if March 14 turns out in sufficient strength. But -- as she
expects -- few or none go, then Nasrallah might unleash his
fury. (PM Siniora has told us, and said publicly, that he
will not go.)

SYRIA ISSUES ORDERS: SHOW UP
--------------


5. (S) Military intelligence (G-2) chief General Georges
Khoury, dining with the Ambassador and DATT on 9/20, noted
that Hizballah and Syria are taking no chances with the
crowd. First, Syria has instructed the Palestinians who
dance to Syria's tune to show up, potentially swelling the
ranks by several hundred thousand if the refugee camps empty
out. (Khoury noted that the Lebanese Armed Forces are adding
checkpoints to look for wanted Palestinians who might try to
leave the camps.) Second, Syria has summoned its traditional
Lebanese allies to Damascus to give the order to bring their
followers to Hizballah's rally. Khoury ticked off a long
list of names of pro-Syrian figures (Suleiman Franjieh, Omar
Karami, Talal Arslan, etc.) who he insisted trooped to
Damascus for instructions over the past few days.

EVEN MIKATI TRAVELS TO DAMASCUS
--------------


6. (S) One surprising figure, even for Khoury, was former
PM Najib Mikati, who has studiously kept his distance from
Damascus since December (probably as much, we believe, due to
his political ambitions than to a serious rift with Syria; we
believe that Mikati for our benefit exaggerates how
independent he has become of Damascus' orbit). Mikati
traveled to Damascus a few days ago, Khoury insisted. Bashar
al-Asad's orders must have been extremely strong for Mikati
to have responded, Khoury noted. We note that, in addition,
Mikati has often expressed fear of Shia strength and, while
an occasional visitor to Nasrallah's (now demolished)
headquarters, he has not previously attended such rallies.

GUESSES BUT LITTLE KNOWLEDGE
OF WHAT NASRALLAH WILL SAY
--------------


7. (C) As to the content of Nasrallah's anticipated remarks
(whether delivered by video or in person),our contacts
disagree. Some say that he will give a predictable,
rabble-rousing "victory" speech that, while unpalatable to
our ears, will not cover new ground. Others suggest that
Nasrallah will define an aggressive political agenda that
could include the following elements: collapse of the
Siniora government in favor of a national unity cabinet,
promotion of Michel Aoun as Lebanon's next president,
discrediting of some Lebanese politicians and/or the March 14
movement more generally for insufficient enthusiasm for
Hizballah's "victory," etc. (We note that pro-Syrian
newspapers here have, for the past few days, hinted at the
existence of clandestine taped recordings of March 14
politicians expressing hope that Israel would badly damage,
if not destroy Hizballah. If such tapes exist -- and we know
that some of the allegations dealing with what the Ambassador
supposedly said or heard by phone with March 14 politicians
are complete fabrications -- Nasrallah could cause
embarrassment by using his rally to play them.)

COMMENT
--------------


8. (S) The wide gamut of speculation indicates that no one
really knows what the content of Nasrallah's remarks will be
or whether his rally will significantly alter Lebanon's
poltical landscape. Nasrallah and Syria seem to aim t a
watershed event. While we share the analysi that Nasrallah
will not want the demonstration to turn violent, we expect
the rally to be a frighening show of force nonetheless. And
if Nasrallh calls for a national unity government to the
ceers of hundreds of thousands of people in a county with a
population of only four million, the March 14 majority will
be thrust back, weakened, on he defensive, after a few weeks
of basking in a ost-conflict strengthened position. After
all, t sounds perfectly reasonable to many Lebanese not
deeply versed in what are the politic stakes to include
Michel Aoun in the cabinet.


9. (S) Whle it is difficult to make assessments before the
rally takes place, we suspect that, among other goals, this

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demonstration, in fact, is one important skirmish in what
appears to be an increasingly heated battle just in its
initial stages to forestall Lebanese approval of the special
tribunal of international character to try suspects in Rafiq
Hariri's assassination. Bringing Aoun into the cabinet makes
it easier for Syria to exercise a veto over the tribunal, as
long as Aoun remains willing to trade any principle for a
chance at the Presidency. As for potential participants in
the rally, probably no one is more uncomfortable than
Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, who probably wishes that he
had extended his trip to Switzerland (where he met up with
his long-time mistress, Lebanon's ambassador to Bern) for a
few more days in order to have an easy excuse for staying
away. Saad Hariri, we note, has prudently decided to spend a
few more days abroad. End comment.
FELTMAN